Cross-Examination
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| by Paul J. Passanante |
& Dawn M. Mefford1 |
I. Introduction
This article will review the law relating to cross-examination in Missouri and provide some guidance to lawyers preparing to cross-examine witnesses.
II. Purposes and Scope of Cross-Examination
The Supreme Court of Missouri has stated that "[t]he right of cross-examination exists solely because cross-examination is a necessary safeguard against the receipt of false or mistaken evidence."2 When cross-examining an adverse party's witness, however, counsel is generally seeking to achieve one or more of the following goals: to impeach the witness's credibility; to test the strength of his memory, knowledge and perceptions; and, in some instances, to simply develop new facts.3
In Missouri, the scope of cross-examination is governed by statute. Section 491.070 provides:
A party to a cause, civil or criminal, against whom a witness has been called and given some evidence, shall be entitled to cross-examine said witness (except where a defendant in a criminal case is testifying in his own behalf) on the entire case, but this shall not be considered to entitle a defendant who has pleaded a counterclaim or setoff in a civil case to cross-examine a plaintiff's witness in respect thereto, but as to said counterclaim or setoff such witness (if examined by defendant in relation thereto) shall be deemed defendant's witness and be so examined in the course of the trial.4
Thus, in Missouri, "[i]f a witness is sworn and [has provided] '
some evidence'" in the case, regardless of the breadth of the testimony on direct examination, the opposing party may cross-examine that witness "as to
all matters in the case."
5 This rule applies no matter how "trivial or unimportant" the witness's testimony was on direct examination.
6 Furthermore, Missouri courts have held that a witness may be cross-examined on any matter that the witness testified to on direct examination, no matter how irrelevant or collateral.
7
A party has an "absolute right" to cross-examine witnesses called by an opposing party,
8 but the extent of cross-examination is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on matters of cross-examination unless an abuse of that discretion is clearly demonstrated.
9
Although counsel has an absolute right to cross-examine an adverse party's witness, counsel is not required to exercise that right, and may wish to forego cross-examination of a witness in some circumstances. It has been suggested by some commentators, however, that counsel should forego cross-examination of a witness in only the rarest instances, because it is a missed opportunity to persuade the jury of the cross-examiner's theory of the case through the testimony of the adverse party's witnesses.
10
Some lawyers apparently believe that the purpose of cross-examination is to rehash what the witness said on direct examination. Such an approach misses the point; what the witness testified to on direct examination was intended to support the adverse party's theory of the case. There is no need to reinforce it by repeating it. Effective trial lawyers know that cross-examination should consist only of questions which: (1) cast doubt on an assertion of the adverse party; (2) are likely to be conceded by the adverse party but need to be highlighted or placed in the proper context; (3)were omitted in direct examination but need to be presented to the jury because they assist the cross-examiner's theory of the case; and (4) diminish the credibility of the witness.
11
III. Permissible and Impermissible Questions
Cross-examination is typically conducted with liberal use of leading questions.12 This method of questioning is preferred because it provides counsel with the most control over the witness and, therefore, the information that is presented to the jury. Some commentators believe that the most important rule of cross-examination is to use only leading questions, because non-leading questions pose too much risk for the cross-examiner.13 Other commentators have put it a different way, and recommend that you should only ask a question on cross-examination if you know what the answer will be.
As a general rule, "a witness may be asked any questions" on cross-examination "which tend to test his accuracy, veracity or credibility or to shake his credit by injuring his character. He may be compelled to answer any such question, however irrelevant it may be to the facts in issue, and however disgraceful the answer may be to himself, except where the answer might expose him to a criminal charge."14
Generally, questions which are "immaterial and can have no effect other than . . . to prejudice the jury against the witness or" the adverse party are impermissible.15 It is improper to ask the witness on cross-examination questions which are "argumentative," "assume facts" not in evidence, or "call for a conclusion."16 Thus, it is impermissible to ask questions regarding "speculative, hypothetical" situations, as such questions tend to unfairly "raise suspicions, and prejudice" the jury.17 Repetitive interrogation and questions which have the intent solely to harass and humiliate the witness are likewise improper.18 Practically speaking, counsel should also try avoid any question that is open-ended and turns over control to the witness; some commentators caution against asking questions on cross-examination which begin with any of the following words: who, what, when, where, how, why, or explain.19
IV. Testing the Witness's Knowledge, Memory and Perception
The Supreme Court of Missouri has stated that "it is always proper to show matters affecting the condition of the witness at the time of the matters testified to, as affecting his ability to observe or recollect them."20 Thus, any physical or mental condition tending to alter or affect a witness's ability to accurately observe or recall material events are proper subjects of cross-examination. A witness may properly be questioned as to whether he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the events to which he is testifying,21 or whether he suffers or suffered from a mental or psychiatric condition that may impair his ability to observe or recall.22 However, questions regarding prior drug abuse or addiction which do not relate to the events of the case may not be permissible.23
V. Impeachment
The most obvious purpose of cross-examining a witness is to discredit his testimony. The credibility of a witness can be undermined in one or more of the following ways: (1) impeaching the witness with previous statements he has made which are inconsistent with his present testimony, (2) demonstrating that he has a bias or prejudice for or against a party or by demonstrating that he has an interest in the outcome of the litigation, or (3) showing that he has a criminal background, a reputation for dishonesty or has engaged in specific acts of misconduct.
A. Prior Inconsistent Statements
It is "well settled that when a witness has testified to a material fact it is proper to admit evidence that he has previously made a statement relating to that fact which is inconsistent with his present testimony."24 To be considered a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes, the prior statement must be so inconsistent with the whole effect of the witness's testimony that both statements could not be true.25 Furthermore, "to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent statement," counsel must first lay "a proper foundation."26 Counsel must first ask the witness whether he made the statement, and the witness must be provided an opportunity to refresh his recollection of the statement and admit or deny it.27 Counsel must quote the prior statement and must indicate the circumstances in which the prior statement was made.28 If the witness admits that he made the prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic evidence of the statement is inadmissible.29 In the instance of a prior inconsistent statement made by a witness who is no longer available to testify, the courts will apply "a balancing test" to determine whether the statement is admissible despite the lack of a proper foundation.30
If the witness denies making the prior inconsistent statement or maintains that he cannot recall whether he made the statement, counsel may then introduce extrinsic evidence to prove that he made the statement.31 "Extrinsic evidence" is any "evidence of the prior inconsistent statement [that is] 'offered other than through the witness himself,'" and can take the form of another witness's testimony that he heard the prior statement, transcripts of depositions or prior proceedings, factual allegations contained in abandoned pleadings, written reports or statements, audio tapes, etc.32
However, if the issue upon which the witness is being questioned is a collateral matter, extrinsic evidence may not be introduced. The purpose of excluding extrinsic evidence of collateral matters is "to shield the jury from a proliferation of issues which would require the court to go into the merits of such collateral matters and to avoid the unfairness and surprise of requiring the opposing party to disprove issues not raised by the pleadings."33 The rule relating to collateral matters has been stated as follows:
When the fact in dispute is of no material significance in the case or is not pertinent to the issues as developed, the matter is collateral. If a party has been permitted in the trial court's discretion to cross-examine a witness as to a collateral matter, the cross-examiner is bound by the witness' answers and will not be permitted to offer evidence to contradict the witness relative to such matters.34
It is important to understand what issues will be considered collateral. Ultimately, "[t]he test for determining whether a matter is collateral" is "whether the party seeking to introduce it for purposes of contradict[ing]" a witness "would be entitled to prove it as part of his case."
35
Furthermore, when a witness is impeached with a prior inconsistent statement, the statement is not limited to attacking the credibility of the witness, but also can be considered as substantive evidence. In
Rowe v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. the Supreme Court of Missouri abrogated the traditional rule that prior inconsistent statements are hearsay and inadmissible as substantive evidence, holding that such statements can indeed be used as substantive evidence.
36
B. Bias, Prejudice and Interest
Evidence of the bias, prejudice or interest of a witness is admissible for purposes of attacking the witness's credibility.37 Typically, the bias of a witness can be demonstrated by the existence of a personal or professional relationship of the witness to the party for whom he testified.38 The prejudice of a witness against a party can be shown by eliciting information relating to the bad history or ill feelings between the witness and the party against whom he testifies.39 Additionally, counsel may attempt to discredit a witness by demonstrating that the witness has some sort of stake, such as a financial interest, in the outcome of the litigation.40 These issues of bias, prejudice and interest are always deemed to be relevant, and are never to be considered a collateral issue.41 Even if the witness admits his bias, prejudice or interest, "the extent of it may be shown" although "how far the inquiry may go" is a matter left within "the discretion of the trial court."42 Furthermore, in contrast to impeaching with a prior inconsistent statement, counsel is not required to first lay a foundation to attack the credibility of the witness based on his bias, prejudice or interest in the litigation.43
It is advised that, when attempting to discredit a witness because of his bias, prejudice, or interest in the litigation, counsel should reveal it as early as possible in the cross-examination. In addition to casting doubt on all of the witness's answers, revealing his bias, interest or prejudice is likely to make him nervous or uncomfortable and thus may elicit the following responses: (1) "[t]he witness may become [more] defensive in his answers" and try too hard to justify his answers; (2) "[t]he witness may become self-doubting and [thus] hold back damaging information" in an effort to appear less biased; or (3) "[t]he witness may become argumentative . . . in reaction to the [questioning] of his motives" and thereby offer "more evidence of his bias."44
C. Criminal History and Reputation for Dishonesty
On cross-examination, counsel may also attack the credibility of a witness by demonstrating that the witness has a criminal history; the cross-examiner is not bound by the witness's answer, but may rely on extrinsic evidence to impeach the witness. Section 491.050 provides in part:
Any person who has been convicted of a crime is, notwithstanding, a competent witness; however, any prior criminal convictions may be proved to affect his credibility in a civil or criminal case. . . . Such proof may be either by the record or by his own cross-examination, upon which he must answer any question relevant to that inquiry, and the party cross-examining shall not be concluded by his answer.45
The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that this statute grants counsel "an absolute right . . . to impeach the credibility of any witness[es]" with "prior criminal convictions."
46 Although some Missouri courts have indicated that it may be impermissible to impeach the credibility of a witness with a conviction too remote to have any bearing on the witness's present credibility, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District has specifically denied that any "remoteness exception" to § 491.050 exists.
47
The witness's "reputation for truth fullness and veracity is [always an] issue," and on cross-examination the adverse party may attack a witness's reputation for truth fullness and veracity.
48 However, questions may not seek information relating to a witness's reputation for morality.
49 Although the credibility of a witness may not be attacked by showing specific instances of an arrest "or criminal charge which did not result in a conviction," "specific instances of . . . conduct may," nonetheless, "be inquired into during cross-examination if" the misconduct goes to the truth and veracity of the witness.
50 However, counsel is not permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence of the misconduct.
51
VI. Special Issues Relating to the Cross-Examination of a Party Witness
Missouri law provides that, in civil cases, a party may compel any adverse party to testify as a witness on his behalf, and the witness may be examined according to the rules governing cross-examination. Section 491.030 provides:
Any party to any civil action or proceeding may compel any adverse party, or any person for whose immediate and adverse benefit such action or proceeding is instituted, prosecuted or defended, to testify as a witness in his behalf, in the same manner and subject to the same rules as other witnesses; provided, that the party so called to testify may be examined by the opposite party, under the rules applicable to the cross-examination of witnesses.52
Direct examination of a party called to testify for the adverse party is conducted under the rules of cross-examination, and counsel is therefore permitted to use leading questions and attack the credibility of the adverse party witness.
53 Further, counsel who calls an adverse party as a witness "is bound by that witness's testimony" only "if the testimony [remains] uncontradicted or [is] the only testimony on the subject."
54 Additionally, the "adverse witness's testimony [elicited] on cross-examination [by his own lawyer] is not binding" on the party who called him as a witness.
55
It is improper to attempt to discredit a party witness by cross-examining that witness regarding the exercise of his legal rights. It is, therefore, improper to question a witness about when he hired counsel,
56 about his choice of venue,
57 about whether he has previously filed for bankruptcy,
58 or about prior or subsequent unrelated claims.
59
It is also impermissible in a negligence action to question a party witness concerning prior lawsuits against him, as such matters are deemed irrelevant and collateral.
60
VII. Special Issues Relating to the Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses
There are some special considerations in conducting cross-examination of an expert witness. Missouri courts often say that counsel should be given an especially wide latitude by the trial court in cross-examining an expert witness.61 Counsel's goal in the cross-examination of an expert witness is to diminish the expert's qualifications, skill, credibility and accuracy in order to undermine the strength of his opinions.
The qualifications of an expert witness can be challenged during cross-examination in an effort to persuade the jury that the expert lacks the appropriate skill and knowledge about the subject to which he is testifying, and, therefore, that his opinions should be given less weight. Thus, an expert may be questioned regarding his education, training, experience, licensing, certification, and presence or absence of hospital privileges.62 Missouri courts have held that it is within the trial court's discretion to allow counsel to cross-examine an expert regarding his failure to pass certain examinations, such as board certifications.63 However, it has been held the cross-examination of an expert concerning a "voluntary surrender of his license to dispense [medications]" due to a drug addiction was impermissible, as it had no bearing on his qualifications to render an opinion.64
The bias and pecuniary interest of an expert witness can also be exploited on cross-examination to undermine the credibility of his opinions. An expert witness's bias can be shown by demonstrating that the expert has a general "willingness to testify for any client,"65 for one side only (plaintiff or defendant),66 for the same party,67 or for the same attorneys.68 An expert witness can also be cross-examined regarding the sources of his research grants and funding in order to show bias.69 The cross-examiner may also inquire as to how the expert came to be employed by the adverse party to testify in the case.70
Similarly, the expert's pecuniary interest in the litigation can be shown by questions relating to the compensation he receives for his testimony. Generally, a court will allow questioning regarding the amount that the expert witness will receive to testify in the case being litigated, but will not allow questions as to compensation received in other cases unless they have a material relation to the interest of the expert in the case being litigated.71 Further, in order to impeach an expert by proof of the compensation received in other cases, there must be evidence that the expert in fact received the compensation, and the compensation received must raise an inference that the amount "went beyond the fair compensation usual for such services."72 Questions relating to the amount of annual income that the witness receives for expert services are also permissible.73
An expert may be questioned during cross-examination regarding testimony given in other cases by the expert which is inconsistent with his testimony in the case being litigated.74 However, it should be kept in mind that the collateral matter rule will prevent counsel from introducing extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent testimony if the court believes the issues being examined are irrelevant to the issues of the present case.75
An expert witness may also be impeached through the use of authoritative texts, such as professional journal articles, textbooks, etc.76 This method of impeachment of an expert witness underscores the necessity for counsel to thoroughly prepare for the cross-examination of an expert witness. Counsel must not only familiarize himself with the scientific, medical or technical literature upon which he is aware the expert has relied in forming his opinions, but will want to also familiarize himself with the literature in that field generally as it relates to the issues of the case.
In state court, the cross-examiner must first lay a foundation that the text is authoritative within that field of expertise.77 Evidence that the text is generally accepted in the field as authoritative must be adduced.78 This may be accomplished through acknowledgement by the witness himself or another expert in the field who has testified in the case that it is authoritative, or it may be established by judicial notice.79 It should be noted that textbooks are often viewed as more authoritative and reliable than periodic journal articles, and therefore will be more likely useful for purposes of impeaching an expert witness during cross-examination.80 Generally, to impeach the expert through the use of authoritative texts, counsel should formulate his question "using the exact language of the author and" ask the expert whether he agrees with the statement.81
It is also proper to cross-examine the expert by posing hypothetical questions based upon facts not in evidence.82 Such questions may be asked in an effort to test the expert's knowledge and familiarity with subject matter, and to test the accuracy of his opinions.83
VIII. Demeanor
It is extremely important for trial lawyers to remember that most often they are cross-examining witnesses whose testimony is not favorable to their theory of the case. A witness called by the other side is "unfriendly" and may be anxious to say something which will undermine the cross-examiner's client's case. Such witnesses must be handled with care.
A boxing analogy seems appropriate. The cross-examiner should attempt to control the fight, and attempt to score points without getting hit, or knocked out, by a stray punch thrown by the witness.
With preparation and forethought, a trial lawyer should know the weaknesses of the witness and limit cross-examination to those questions which most effectively demonstrate those weaknesses. A trial lawyer who asks unnecessary questions on cross-examination risks getting hurt by the answers. It would seem to be more prudent to "go for the jugular."
It is also extremely important for a trial lawyer to keep in mind that a jury is watching. If done effectively, cross-examination destroys the witness and the jury disregards the testimony. Long, rambling efforts to cross-examine a witness bore a jury. Points that are made during such an exercise may not be appreciated. Even worse, if the trial lawyer is disrespectful, rude or obnoxious, the jury may well identify with the witness and loathe the cross-examiner. When that occurs, a wonderful opportunity has been lost. The most skillful cross-examiners are professional, polite and lethal.
Footnotes
1 Paul J. Passanante is a principal at the law firm of Simon•Passanante, P.C. He received his J.D. from Saint Louis University School of Law in 1976, and is licensed to practice in Missouri, Arkansas, Florida and the District of Columbia.
Dawn M. Mefford is an associate at the law firm of Simon•Passanante, P.C. She received her J.D. from Saint Louis University School of Law in 2003, and is licensed to practice in Missouri and Illinois.
2 Bartlett v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 160 S.W.2d 740, 745 (Mo. 1942).
3 State v. Hyde, 735 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987); Hungate v. Hudson, 185 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1945).
4 Section 491.070, RSMo Supp. 2005.
5 State v. Gardner, 8 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Mo. banc 1999). Emphasis added.
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Robinson v. Empiregas, Inc. of Hartville, 906 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995).
8 Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d 404, 421 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999).
9 Id. at 421.
10 Larry S. Pozner & Roger J. Dodd, Cross-Examination: Science and Techniques, §8.05 (2nd ed. 2004).
11 Id. at § 9.12.
12 King v. Copp Trucking, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993).
13 Pozner & Dodd at Chapter 8. The two other rules of cross-examination espoused by Pozner and Dodd are (1) each question should introduce only one new fact and (2) counsel should break cross-examination into a series of separate and definable goals.
14 Sandy Ford Ranch, Inc. v. Dill, 449 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1970).
15 Hungate, 185 S.W.2d 646.
16 Lonnecker v. Borris, 245 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Mo. 1951).
17 Anderson v. Wittmeyer, 895 S.W.2d 595, 601 (Mo. App. W.D.1995).
18 State v. Russell, 625 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. banc 1981).
19 Pozner & Dodd at § 8.17.
20 Lagud v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 136 S.W.3d 786, 794 (Mo. banc 2004).
21 Id.; Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. banc 1996).
22 See, Turnbo v. City of St. Charles, 932 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996).
23 Noble v. Lansche, 735 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987); State v. Thompson, 697 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Mo. App. W.D. 1985).
24 Nichols v. Preferred Risk Group, 44 S.W.3d 886, 892 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001).
25 State v. Powell, 684 S.W.2d 514, 518-519 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984) (citing State v. Nimrod, 484 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972)).
26 Long v. St. John's Regional Health Ctr., 98 S.W.3d 601, 606 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Litton v. Kornbrust, 85 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002).
30 Frey v. Barnes Hospital, 706 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986).
31 Aboussie v. McBroom, 421 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. App. E.D. 1967).
32 Litton, 85 S.W.3d at 114; Lazane v. Bean, 782 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. App. W.D. 1990).
33 Cline v. William H. Friedman & Assocs., 882 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 699 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. banc 1985).
37 Houfburg v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. of Maine, 283 S.W.2d 539, 548-549 (Mo. 1955).
38 State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. banc 1995); St. Francis Medical Ctr. v. Sheffer, 892 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995).
39 State v. McLachlan, 283 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Mo. 1955).
40 Weatherly v. Miskle, 655 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Mo. App. E.D. 1983).
41 Houfburg, 283 S.W.2d at 548-49; St. Francis Medical Ctr., 892 S.W.2d 394; Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. W.D. 1988).
42 892 S.W.2d at 397.
43 State v. Beaver, 621 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. App. W.D. 1981).
44 Pozner & Dodd at § 11.20.
45 Section 491.050, RSMo Supp. 2005.
46 M.A.B. v. Nicely, 909 S.W.2d 669 (Mo. banc 1995).
47 Forbis v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. App. S.D. 1974) (overruled in part by Lewis v. Wahl, 842 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. banc 1992)).
48 State v. Trimble, 638 S.W.2d 726, 735 (Mo. banc 1982).
49 State v. Gregory, 822 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992).
50 State v. Carothers, 710 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986).
51 Id.
52 Section 491.030, RSMo Supp. 2005.
53 Love v. Baum, 806 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991).
54 Hoer v. Small, 1 S.W.3d 569, 571-572 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999).
55 Id.
56 Carlyle v. Lai, 783 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989).
57 Hungate, 185 S.W.2d 646.
58 Shull v. Kallauner, 300 S.W. 554 (Mo. App. W.D. 1927).
59 Dent v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 98 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. App. W.D. 1936); Johnson v. National Super Markets, 752 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988).
60 Darnaby v. Sundstrom, 875 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994).
61 Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. banc 1993).
62 Kinser v. Elkadi, 674 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. App. S.D. 1984).
63 Nelson v. Waxman, 9 S.W.3d 601, 603 (Mo. banc 2000); Compare, Beis v. Dias, 859 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993).
64 Noble v. Lansche, 735 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987).
65 Weatherly, 655 S.W.2d at 844 (permitting cross-examination of expert concerning mass mailings sent to lawyers advertising services as an expert witness in personal injury cases).
66 State ex rel. Lichtor v. Clark, 845 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992).
67 Zarisky v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 186 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App. W.D. 1945).
68 State v. Anderson, 79 S.W.3d 420 (Mo. banc 2002); Lammert v. Wells, 13 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1929).
69 Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 869.
70 Lichtor, 845 S.W.2d 55.
71 Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 199 (citing Board of Public Buildings v. GMT Corp., 580 S.W.2d 519, 531 (Mo. App. E.D. 1979).
72 Id. at 199.
73 Lichtor, 845 S.W.2d at 65.
74 Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 197-199 (trial court permitted questions on cross-examination of expert pertaining to expert's opinions in other similar cases); Frey, 706 S.W.2d 51.
75 Lineberry v. Shull, 695 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. App. W.D. 1985) (disallowing extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent testimony by expert regarding collateral matters).
76 Coats v. Hickman, 11 S.W.3d 798 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972).
82 Stafford v. Lyon, 413 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. 1967).
83 Id.
JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI BAR
Volume 62 - No. 1 - January-February 2006