by William G. Reeves1
The appellate courts of this state have historically recognized more than one legal vehicle by which a child may be adopted. Under common law principles that have evolved over a period of more than 100 years, a child may become "equitably" adopted by judicial declaration, notwithstanding the purportedly exclusive statutory scheme for adoption set out in Chapter 453 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri. Although "equitable adoption" has in recent years been rejected by our appellate courts as a basis for establishing custody or guardianship of a child on behalf of an "equitable parent,"2 the doctrine remains viable within the probate realm as a means of establishing a right of inheritance from a putative parent.
II. Theoretical Basis For Equitable Adoption
Prior to 1917 the only statutory method of adoption in the State of Missouri was by a written "deed of adoption" filed of public record.3 In 1917, that method of adoption was repealed and Chapter 56 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri was enacted, which vested exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption of children in the juvenile division of the circuit court.4 It has been generally recognized, however, that "the enactment of [our] adoption statutes" does not preclude "a court of equity" from exercising "jurisdiction to declare the existence of an equitable adoption."5 "The theoretical underpinnings of the equitable adoption" are based upon either "the specific performance of a contract to adopt or an equitable estoppel to deny that an adoption" has been agreed to between the putative adopter and adoptee.6
"It has long been recognized . . . that a person . . . legally competent to adopt may enter into a binding contract . . . to take another [person] as his [or her own] child. Where such a contract is actually made and is based upon a good consideration, and where it is fully performed by the person to be adopted but is not performed by the promisor during his lifetime, a court of equity will declare specific performance against the [putative] adopter's [heirs or] estate to the extent of . . . making the [putative] adoptee an heir. . . . However, [as a prerequisite to] a decree for specific performance . . . [the proponent] must prove the existence of a contract to adopt." Equitable adoption by contract may be proven either by direct evidence of an agreement, or "by acts, conduct, . . . admissions" and circumstances, provided that the proponent meets the quantum of proof required under the law.8
Equitable adoption by estoppel (sometimes referred to as "adoption by estoppel") is cognizable under circumstances that render it wholly inequitable to permit someone to avoid an agreement with a natural parent or custodian of a child to adopt the child, usually when "the child [is of] such an age that [the child] has no will or choice of its own in the matter, . . . [and] after the child has performed everything contemplated by the" parent-child relationship.9 Although there are some evidentiary distinctions between proving up an equitable adoption by contract and an equitable adoption by estoppel, the result under either theory is the same: The putative adopter is either compelled to perform his agreement to adopt or he is precluded from denying an agreement that is implied under principles of equity.
III. Burden Of Proof
The onerous burden of proof imposed upon the proponent has been well-defined in a longstanding line of appellate decisions. The proponent "seeking a decree of equitable adoption must establish its existence with evidence so clear, cogent and convincing as to leave no room for reasonable doubt."10 The "clear, cogent and convincing" standard is applicable to each and every element which is required to be proven in order to establish an equitable adoption.11 Regardless of whether the proponent seeks to establish equitable adoption by contract or by estoppel, the same burden of proof is applicable.12
The burden and quantum of proof for establishing an equitable adoption has been characterized as "highly rigorous,"13 requiring evidence that is "clear, unequivocal and of a strong and compelling nature,"14 thereby necessitating judicial scrutiny with "especial strictness."15 "[P]roof to sustain a claim of this kind . . . must be overwhelming in its probative force, leaving no room for a reasonable doubt. . . . [T]here must be no equivocation or uncertainty in the case."16 It has been "intimated [in some cases] that the proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt . . . it must leave nothing to conjecture or guess."17 "In cases where . . . a stepchild seek[s] equitable adoption from a stepparent" the courts have attributed less weight to the child's detrimental reliance upon the parental role assumed by the stepparent, instead seeking evidence of an affirmative expression of the stepparent's desire to adopt the stepchild, particularly "through indicia of an actual intent or attempt to adopt" the child.18 Thus, in stepparent cases an additional quantum of proof is imposed upon the proponent, in that there must be proof of a relationship between the putative adopter and putative adoptee that is clearly distinguishable from that which might ordinarily be expected between a stepparent and stepchild.
The courts of this state have been admonished not to lower the standard of proof in equitable adoption cases, upon the premise that any lesser burden of proof would encourage the indiscriminate filing of "unfounded and trumped-up claims" against the estates of stepparents or others who have served in loco parentis for the benefit of someone else's child.19 An exacting scrutiny of the evidence is required in this type of case, in part because the proponent is invoking principles of equity as a vehicle for circumventing the usual statutory safeguards designed to protect the sanctity of a solemn contract:
When . . . a court of equity is called upon to establish and enforce a contract of this character in the teeth of the statute of wills and of the statute of frauds and perjuries, and to set aside a disposition of valuable property made in conformity with the requirements of those statutes, there is devolved upon the chancellor the greatest responsibility, perhaps, that ever attaches to his high office. And nothing short of the inherent justice of the claim, supported by evidence that can be relied upon with the utmost confidence, proving existence of the contract, its terms and conditions, and a substantial and meritorious compliance therewith, with such certainty and definiteness as to leave no room for reasonable doubt, can ever justify the exercise of such an extraordinary prerogative.20
Proof of a contract to adopt necessitates evidence of the specific terms and conditions under which the adopter intends to effect the actual adoption of the putative adoptee.21 "[T]o sustain the alleged oral contract the proof must . . . leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the [trial judge] not only that [the particular] contract" as alleged was entered into, but also that its terms and conditions have been clearly proven.22 "It will not satisfy the requirement to show that there was an understanding of an indefinite character, leaving its terms more or less to inference, that the child was to be taken [by the putative adopter] and reared as a member of the family."23
IV. Reliance Upon Circumstantial Evidence
In a great many equitable adoption cases the proponent must rely solely upon circumstantial evidence in order to prove the equitable adoption. In such cases our highest courts have cautioned trial courts to carefully weigh the evidence to dispel any possible alternative to the putative adopter's purported intention to adopt; i.e., the "circumstantial evidence . . . must be consistent only with the existence of an equitable adoption and inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis."24 There must be a "showing of acts, words, conduct and attitude of [the putative adopter] of such a character as to be referable to the relationship of adopted child and adoptive parent, and to no other relationship."25 (emphasis added)
V. Relevant Factors
A comprehensive review of appellate decisions in the realm of equitable adoption reveals several recurring and significant factors relied upon by the courts in deciding whether to sustain or reject a claim of equitable adoption. No one factor is determinative of the issue, although the courts have from time to time emphasized the importance of one or more factors in a particular case. Although each case must necessarily be analyzed on the basis of its own peculiar facts, the following issues have been repeatedly and consistently addressed by our appellate courts when ultimately deciding whether to sustain or reject the claim of equitable adoption: (1) Is there unequivocal evidence of an express agreement to adopt or a declared intention to adopt by the putative adopter? (2) Was the putative adoptee a child of tender years during the period when the putative adopter assumed a parental role with respect to the child? (3) Was the child's relationship with his or her natural parents abandoned or discontinued after the putative adopter took the child into his or her own custody? (4) After assuming physical custody of the child, did the putative adopter publicly hold out the child as his or her own child? and (5) Did the putative adopter signify his recognition of the child as his own child by means of any testamentary or inter vivos disposition of his or her estate?
A. Unequivocal Evidence of an Agreement or Declaration of Intent to Adopt
In virtually every case in which an equitable adoption claim has been sustained (including cases premised upon an estoppel theory), there is clear and unequivocal evidence that the putative adopter either expressly agreed to adopt the child or expressly declared his or her intention to adopt the child. An overview of these cases yields some valuable clues as to what sort of evidence may be used to establish an unequivocal agreement or intent to adopt. The strongest evidence of an agreement to adopt is a written contract under which the putative adopter has specifically and unequivocally agreed to adopt the child, although there appears to be only a few reported cases in which such evidence has been available.26 In the absence of a written contract to adopt, there is sometimes evidence that the putative adopter has initially arranged to take the child from a natural parent or other third party upon the express condition that the putative adopter will adopt the child.27 Usually such arrangements are acknowledged orally by the putative adopter, and sometimes they can be substantiated through records obtained from a hospital, orphanage or other third party.28 Oftentimes, an unequivocal intent to adopt has been substantiated through evidence that the putative adopter has taken one or more steps toward legally formalizing the adoption, as by consulting with an attorney regarding the possibility of adopting the child,29 by obtaining the written consent of a natural parent,30 or by simply having the putative adopter's attorney prepare a written memorandum memorializing his or her intent to adopt the child.31 Even without a written contract and without evidence of any formal steps taken toward legalizing an adoption, an agreement or intent to adopt may be established through the testimony of the child, one of its natural parents, or through the putative adopter, the putative adopter's spouse, family physician, attorney, friends and acquaintances as to statements and conduct evidencing the putative adopter's agreement or intent to adopt.32 Unequivocal expressions of the putative adopter's intent to adopt have included a representation by the putative adopter that he has taken the child into his home as his own child,33 or that the putative adopter is planning or has planned to adopt the child,34 or that the putative adopter has an expectation that the child will at some time in the future be his child.35 In many instances, the putative adopter has represented to others that he or she has already adopted the child, despite not having actually done so.36 In one instance, the intent to adopt was inferred in part from the putative adopter's subjective belief that he was actually the biological parent of the child.37
In cases rejecting equitable adoption, the appellate courts have in all instances found insufficient evidence of any actual agreement to adopt, sometimes in spite of the fact that the putative adopter evidenced an intention to adopt the child.38 In some cases the courts have declined to infer any agreement to adopt even where the putative adopter has expressly referred to the child as his or her adopted child.39
B. Child of Tender Years
In cases in which an equitable adoption has been sustained upon an estoppel theory, it is significant that the child/proponent is almost invariably a child of tender years, taken into the adopter's home when the child is too young to know its true parentage, when the child has no choice or will in regard to its subsequent treatment as a natural child by the adopter.40 Conversely, equitable adoption by estoppel has been consistently rejected in cases when the child is not "of tender years," particularly in cases where a stepparent is the putative adopter.41 Decisions on both sides of the fence appear to be premised on the assumption that the older a child is at the time he is taken in by a putative adopter, the less likely the child is to believe or assume that its relationship with the putative adopter is that of a natural child. In fact, the appellate courts of this state refuse to apply the doctrine of equitable adoption when the child/proponent is already an adult at the time the purported oral contract to adopt is entered into.42 It is noteworthy that in some cases in which an express contract to adopt has been clearly and unequivocally proven, the record is remarkably devoid of any reference to the child's age, presumably because the proponent's remedy in those cases is based not upon an estoppel theory but upon the specific performance of an express contract to adopt.43
C. Cessation of Relationship Between Child and Natural Parents
Equitable adoption is usually sustained in those cases in which the proponent is completely unaware of the identity of his or her natural parents during his or her childhood,44 often the result of the natural parents' abandonment of the child,45 or because one or both of the child's natural parents has died.46 Under such circumstances it is the child's belief throughout the earliest and most significant years of its rearing that he or she is, in fact, the natural child of the adopter -- the initial impetus for decreeing an adoption by estoppel.
In contrast, in at least some cases in which equitable adoption has been rejected, there is evidence of an ongoing relationship between the child and at least one of its natural parents, even after the child is taken in by the putative adopter.47 In one such case, the child continued to see his natural father on a number of occasions after being taken into his stepfather's household, the child attended his natural father's funeral, and the child even received a small bequest through his natural father's estate.48 In another instance the child was told of the identity of his natural father at an early age, knew his natural siblings, used his given surname beginning in eighth grade, attended his father's funeral, and received Social Security benefits after his natural father's death.49 In each of these cases it is difficult to conceive how the child detrimentally relied upon the assumption that someone other than his known biological father was his natural father, and therefore an equitable adoption can hardly be premised upon an estoppel theory in such cases.
D. "Holding Out" the Child as Adopter's Child
Except in those cases in which equitable adoption is based upon a clearly proven contract to adopt, it is a recurrent theme throughout the cases sustaining equitable adoption that the child is not only recognized by the adopter as his own child, but also that the child is held out to and known within the general community as the adopter's child.50 Indicia of such a holding out include the adopter's reference to the child as his child and the child's use of the adopter's surname for public or legal purposes (as evidenced by the child's birth certificate, baptism and school enrollment records, church membership records, driver's license, voter registration and Social Security number.)51
In cases rejecting equitable adoption, the child's failure or refusal to assume the surname of the adopter has been viewed as a compelling circumstance.52Courts have declined to decree an equitable adoption even in cases in which a putative adopter has referred to and held out to the general public that the child is his own child53 or his "adopted" child.54 It is noteworthy that in stepparent cases, even when a child has assumed the surname of a stepparent and been held out by the stepfather as his own child, courts have declined to decree an equitable adoption.55 Interestingly, in the case of Bellinger v. Boatmen's National Bank,56 the stepfather's oral representation to the child of his intent to adopt was disregarded by the appellate court and dismissed as a "sentimental misrepresentation" of the stepfather. The rationale for minimizing the weight to be attributed to the "holding out" of a stepchild by a stepparent as his or her own is expressed in Weidner v. American Family Ins. Co.:
In cases where it is a stepchild seeking equitable adoption from a stepparent, courts have looked for evidence of more than a stepchild/stepparent relationship, such as indicia of an intent or attempt to adopt. When such cases yield evidence of only a close stepchild/stepparent relationship, justice, equity and good faith do not require a finding of adoption. Otherwise, the numerous cases in which a stepchild is taken into the home of a stepparent and a close relationship develops would all give rise to equitable adoptions.57
E. Testamentary Intent Consistent Only with Recognition of Child as "Adopted" Child of the Putative Adopter
In many equitable adoption cases there is evidence of the putative adopter's expression of an intention to leave some property or some part of his or her estate to the child/proponent, whether it be by will, codicil, written memorandum or oral statements to other witnesses. In some instances the putative adopter has, during his or her lifetime, already conveyed property to or conferred some financial benefit upon the child prior to death.58 However, mere expressions of an intent to leave property to a child do not necessarily equate with an intent to adopt.59 Equitable adoption has been rejected even where a putative adopter has declared directly to the child or to others his intention to leave the child all or part of his estate,60 and where a putative adopter has designated the child as his life insurance beneficiary61 or made inter vivos conveyances of property or financial contributions to the child,62 and where a putative adopter has expressly promised to a child's natural parent that the child would be made an "heir" of the putative adopter.63 In the case of Wohlgemuth v. Browning,64 the adoptive mother's execution of a testamentary memorandum bequeathing specific items of personal property to claimant, but without making any specific reference to the child as either her own daughter or as her adopted daughter, was held insufficient to sustain an equitable adoption.
The opinion in the case of Taylor v. Hamrick65 offers pivotal insight into the weight to be attributed to evidence of an intent to convey property to one claiming to be equitably adopted. In that case the stepmother executed an application for life insurance designating her stepdaughter as her "daughter." The plaintiff stepdaughter thereafter sought a decree of equitable adoption, asserting that evidence of an intent to adopt should be inferred from her designation as her stepmother's beneficiary. Moreover, plaintiff argued, her designation as "daughter" should be construed as stepmother's recognition of her as an "equitably adopted daughter." The Supreme Court soundly rejected plaintiff's arguments, and in fact determined that no intent to adopt would be inferred, absent any designation of or reference to the child as the stepmother's "adopted daughter":
The application for insurance named plaintiff as beneficiary and designated her relationship to the deceased as "daughter." It is conceded that plaintiff was not the daughter of the deceased, but was in fact her stepdaughter. The words "adopted daughter" are not used. The evidence is wholly insufficient to establish that the deceased considered plaintiff an "adopted daughter." There is some evidence which might tend to show that deceased considered that the relationship of stepdaughter created a status equivalent to that of a natural daughter or of an adopted daughter, insofar as inheritance was concerned, but there is no suggestion that deceased attributed any such right of inheritance to any act of her own, other than her mere marriage to plaintiff's father. We have held that an adoption cannot necessarily be effected by the . . . adoptive parent, . . . naming the alleged adopted child as the beneficiary and designating such child as son or daughter as the case may be."66 (emphasis added)
In a stepparent case it is incumbent upon the trial court to find an intent or agreement to adopt that is predicated upon a clear and unequivocal recognition of the proponent as the putative adopter's natural or adopted child, as opposed to an intent to make provision for his stepchild out of a sense of duty or moral obligation to the putative adopter's spouse and stepchild.
VI. Conclusion
There has not been any discernible movement toward expanding the doctrine of equitable adoption in recent years, and even the most recent decisions carefully circumscribe the onerous burden of proof that is imposed upon the proponent. Although no appellate opinion has heretofore delineated any comprehensive test for determining whether and when an equitable adoption should be decreed, an exhaustive review of the case law in this area reveals a cogent set of factors and circumstances that are likely to be dispositive of the issue. It appears that the level of scrutiny is somewhat higher when the proponent is a stepchild seeking a declaration of adoption by a stepparent. Any proponent relying upon the theory should be cognizant of these factors before litigating an equitable adoption claim, in order to build the proper foundation for proving up his or her case.
Endnotes
1 William G. Reeves practices in the firm of Reeves & Goff, P.C., in Farmington, with emphasis on civil litigation, family law and real estate practice. Mr. Reeves is a 1978 graduate of the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, and 1996-1998 member of The Missouri Law Review.
2 See Engel v. Kenner, 926 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996), in which the Eastern District rejected the use of equitable adoption as a basis for awarding custody to the natural mother's former live-in boyfriend; and Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. banc 1998), wherein the Supreme Court of Missouri likewise refused to sanction the use of equitable adoption as a vehicle for awarding custody and guardianship to an "equitable parent".
3 Engel, 926 S.W.2d at 474; Weidner v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 928 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996); 1876 Mo. Laws.
4 Id; 1917 Mo. Laws 193.
5Weidner, 928 S.W.2d 401 at 403; Goldberg v. Robertson, 615 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. banc 1981).
6 Id.
7 Menees v. Cowgill, 214 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Mo. App. W.D. 1948), rev'd, 223 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1949); Niehaus v. Madden, 155 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Mo. 1941).
8 Drake v. Drake, 43 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. banc 1931); Kay v. Niehaus, 249 S.W. 625, 626 (Mo. 1923); Bland v.Buoy, 74 S.W.2d 612, 620 (Mo. 1934).
9 Thompson v. Moseley, 125 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Mo. 1939); Weber v. Griffiths, 159 S.W.2d 670, 674 (Mo. 1941).
10 Bellinger v. Boatmen's National Bank, 779 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989); Weidner, 928 S.W.2d at 403; In the Matter of Estate of Van Cleave, 610 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. banc 1981); Hogane v. Ottersbach, 269 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Mo. 1954); Wohlgemuth v. Browning, 384 S.W.2d 820, 824 (Mo. App. W.D. 1964); Kidd v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 74 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Mo. 1934).
11 Hegger v. Kausler, 303 S.W.2d 81, 89 (Mo. 1957).
12 Capps v. Adamson, 242 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Mo. 1951); Benjamin v. Cronan, 93 S.W.2d 975 (Mo. 1936); Rich v. Baer, 238 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1951); Wohlgemuth, 384 S.W.2d at 824.
13 Weidner, 928 S.W.2d 401 at 404.
14 Niehaus, 155 S.W.2d 141 at 144.
15 Capps, 242 S.W.2d 556 at 560; Hogane, 269 S.W.2d 9 at 11; Hegger, 303 S.W.2d 81 at 89.
16 Benjamin, 93 S.W.2d 975 at 979; Wohlgemuth, 384 S.W.2d 820 at 824; Kidd, 54 S.W.2d 827 at 830.
17 See Niehaus, 155 S.W.2d 141 at 144.
18 Weidner, 928 S.W.2d 401 at 403, and cases cited therein. See, e.g., In the Matter of Estate of Van Cleave, 610 S.W.2d 620 at 622, wherein the stepchildren petitioned to be declared the equitably adopted child of their deceased stepmother:
It is not questioned that decedent loved petitioners and treated them as her children, and that petitioners thought of decedent as their mother and returned her affection. . . But the children also benefitted from having decedent as their stepmother. They were the recipients of her love, affection and guidance. . . . The relationship and conduct of decedent and petitioners was mutually beneficial; it was consistent with that of a stepmother and stepchildren. There is no evidence of an intent or attempt to adopt prior to decedent's death." (emphasis added).
19 Benjamin, 93 S.W.2d 975 at 981; and see Hegger, 303 S.W.2d 81 at 89; Rich, 238 S.W.2d 408 at 411 (asserting that any relaxation of the stringent burden of proof is tantamount to an invitation to fraud).
20 Kidd, 54 S.W.2d 827 at 830.
21 Eldred v. Glenn, 52 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Mo. App. S.D. 1932).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Bellinger, 779 S.W.2d 647 at 650; Birdwell v. Phillips, 805 S.W.2d 220, 221-22 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991); Weidner, 928 S.W.2d 401 at 403; Niehaus, 155 S.W.2d 141 at 144.
25 Taylor v. Hamrick, 134 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Mo. 1939).
26 See, e.g., Carlin v. Bacon, 16 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. 1929) (written contract to adopt) and Rumans v. Lighthizer, 249 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1952) (written "deed for adoption" executed by putative adopters in accordance with the 1857 adoption statute, which had already been repealed at the time of their execution of the deed for adoption).
27 Bland, 74 S.W.2d 612 (the child was taken from an orphanage upon the express condition that the child be adopted by the putative adopters); Lukas v. Hays, 283 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1955) (the child was released from the hospital upon the express condition of adoption by putative adopters); Taylor v. Coberly, 38 S.W.2d 1055 (Mo. 1931) (putative adopters agreed to take the child from its natural parents and adopt it, provided the natural parents concede exclusive custody and control to the putative parents); and Lynn v. Hockaday, 61 S.W. 885 (Mo. 1901) (unequivocal testimony that the putative adopters agreed to take the child upon the express condition that they adopt it).
28 Id.
29 Holloway v. Jones, 246 S.W. 587 (Mo. 1922); Johnson v. Antry, 5 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1928).
30 Lukas, 283 S.W.2d 561.
31 Johnson, 5 S.W.2d 405.
32 Drake, 43 S.W.2d 556 (testimony by putative adopter's wife and three of his closest friends); Eldred, 52 S.W.2d 35 (testimony from the child himself); Holloway, 246 S.W. 587 (testimony from family physician); Johnson, 5 S.W.2d 405 (testimony from putative adopter's lawyer); Kay, 249 S.W. 625 (testimony from putative father and his first and second wives); Mize v. Sims, 516 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. App. S.D. 1974) (live testimony from putative father).
33 Eldred, 52 S.W.2d 35.
34 Drake, 43 S.W.2d 556; Holloway, 246 S.W. 587; Mize, 516 S.W.2d 561.
35 Drake, 43 S.W.2d at 556.
36 Bland, 74 S.W.2d at 612; Carlin, 16 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. 1929); Kay, 249 S.W. 625.
37 Mize, 516 S.W.2d 561.
38 Hegger, 303 S.W.2d 81; Gamache v. Doering, 189 S.W.2d 999 (Mo. 1945); Kidd, 54 S.W.2d 827; Westlake v. Westlake, 201 S.W.2d 964 (Mo. 1947). Taylor v. Hamrick, 134 S.W.2d 52.
39 Hemphill v. Jackson, 306 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. App. E.D. 1957); Keller v. Lewis County, 134 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1939); Rich, 238 S.W.2d 408; Westlake, 201 S.W.2d 964.
40 See, e.g., Drake, 43 S.W.2d 556 (child 5 years of age); Holloway, 246 S.W. 587 (age 2); Johnson, 5 S.W.2d 405 (age 1); Long v. Willey, 391 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. 1965) (age 4); Lynn, 61 S.W. 885 (age 4); Mize, 516 S.W.2d 561 (under 2 years of age); and Taylor v. Coberly, 38 S.W.2d 885 (4-5 weeks old).
41 See Capps, 242 S.W.2d 556 (stepchild, age 10); Hogane, 269 S.W.2d 9 (stepchild, age 10); Kidd, 54 S.W.2d 827 (stepchildren, ages 11 and 13); and Taylor v. Hamrick, 134 S.W.2d 52 (stepchild, age 10).
42 Taylor v. Hamrick, 134 S.W.2d 52; Hemphill, 306 S.W.2d 610.
43 See Carlin, 16 S.W.2d 46; Bland, 74 S.W.2d 612; Rumans, 249 S.W.2d 397. In each of these cases there was clear and unequivocal evidence of an express contract to adopt, and in each the appellate opinion is devoid of any discussion of the child's age.
44 See Lukas, 283 S.W.2d 561; Lynn, 61 S.W. 885; and Mize, 516 S.W.2d 561, in which the child in each case was wholly unaware of the identity of his or her true parents until his or her teens or adulthood.
45 Holloway, 246 S.W. 587; Johnson, 5 S.W.2d 405; Long, 391 S.W.2d 301.
46 Drake, 43 S.W.2d 556; Taylor v. Coberly, 38 S.W.2d 1055.
47 Bellinger, 779 S.W.2d 647; Birdwell, 805 S.W.2d 220.
48 Bellinger, 779 S.W.2d 647.
49 Birdwell, 805 S.W.2d 220.
50 Bland, 74 S.W.2d 612; Carlin, 16 S.W.2d 46; Drake, 43 S.W.2d 556; Eldred, 52 S.W.2d 35 (child assumed surname of stepfather after mother's remarriage, and was thereafter held out and known by stepfather's name); Long, 391 S.W.2d 301; Mize, 516 S.W.2d 561; and Taylor v. Coberly, 38 S.W.2d 1055.
51 Id.
52 Holland v. Martin, 198 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. 1946).
53 Capps, 242 S.W.2d 556; Keller, 134 S.W.2d 48; Rich, 238 S.W.2d 408; In the Matter of Estate of Van Cleave, 610 S.W.2d 620.
54 Benjamin, 93 S.W.2d 975; Holland, 198 S.W.2d 16; Westlake, 201 S.W.2d 964.
55 Bellinger, 779 S.W.2d 647; Capps, 242 S.W.2d 556; Kidd, 54 S.W.2d 827; Weidner, 928 S.W.2d 401.
56 779 S.W.2d 647.
57 928 S.W.2d at 403.
58 Capps, 242 S.W.2d 556 (during his lifetime putative adopter created a joint bank account with the child and deeded certain real estate to the child); Bellinger, 779 S.W.2d 647 (prior to his death putative adopter provided assistance to the child in connection with several financial ventures).
59 Thornton v. Miller, 151 S.W.2d 1101 (Mo. 1941).
60 Hegger, 303 S.W.2d 81 (declaration by adoptive father: "I want [the child] to have what I have . . ."); Holland, 198 S.W.2d 16 at 17 (statement by putative adopter that he wanted the child to "'have everything' [he had] when he died"); Stillman v. Austin, 148 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. 1941) (declaration by putative adopter that the child would someday "get all [he] had"); Thornton, 151 S.W.2d 1101 (adoptive couple told witnesses they would leave their property to the child, and their promise to the child's natural father to make the child their heir); Benjamin, 93 S.W.2d 975 (declaration by putative adopter: "I want to leave you something . . .").
61 Capps, 242 S.W.2d 556; Taylor v. Hamrick, 134 S.W.2d 52.
62 Capps, 242 S.W.2d 556; Bellinger, 779 S.W.2d 647.
63 Thornton, 151 S.W.2d 1101.
64 384 S.W.2d 820. See also Thornton, 151 S.W.2d 1101.
65 134 S.W.2d 52.
66 Id. at 56 (emphasis added). See also Benjamin, 93 S.W.2d 975 at 979.