by Beth C. Boggs1
In recent years, Missouri courts have addressed the validity of numerous automobile insurance policy exclusions as they impact the public policy behind the Missouri Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (hereinafter "MVFRL").2 Almost uniformly, these cases have invalidated the policy exclusion in favor of requiring the minimum state-mandated coverage of $25,000. This article will review the history of this line of cases, explain the cases decided in the last 10 years regarding this topic, and analyze the best approach for review of additional cases.
The state of Missouri requires that all motor vehicle liability policies provide mandatory minimum coverage in the amount of "twenty-five thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, . . . fifty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons injured in any one accident, and ten thousand dollars" for property damage.3 Section 303.025 states that "no owner of a motor vehicle registered in this state . . . shall operate or permit another to operate such vehicle unless the owner maintains the financial responsibility."4
During the 1990s a body of case law developed holding that any provision in an automobile liability policy is void if, when enforced, it would defeat the purpose of the MVFRL.5 The purpose of the MVFRL is to ensure that people who are injured on highways may collect damage awards, within limits, against negligent motor vehicle operators. Essentially, the goal of the state of Missouri, as with many other states, is mandatory minimum collectable insurance.
The following sections will address those cases which have reviewed various exclusions.
A. Household Exclusions
"The purpose of household exclusions in [automobile policies is generally] . . . to safeguard the insurer against collusion and the natural partiality of an insured to members of the insured's household or family circle."6
In Halpin v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., the insured's children brought a claim against her, which was the result of the insured's collision with another vehicle.7 The insurer denied coverage of the children's claim on the basis of an exclusion that read, in pertinent part:
This coverage does not apply to:The insured and her husband "then brought an action . . . as next friends for the children" challenging the validity of the exclusion.9 They sought "a declaration that the . . . exclusion" was "contrary to public policy."1010. Bodily injury to:
a. You, a relative or any other person injured while operating your insured car;
b. Any person related to you and residing in your household; or
c. Any person related to the operator and residing in the household of the operator.8
"The trial court ruled in favor of American Family, holding . . . that until parental immunity was dissolved . . . the contract [between the insured and insurer] provided no coverage for the . . . Halpin children."11 On appeal, the "Eastern District affirmed . . . [the trial court's decision] but transferred the case [to the Supreme Court], because of speculation about the effect of supervening legislation."12 The Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that the MVFRL, "§§ 303.010-303.370, effects a partial invalidity" of household exclusion clauses, and reversed the judgment.13
The Supreme Court contrasted the old statute with the new one. Under the prior statute, the owner of a motor vehicle "was not obliged to demonstrate financial responsibility until there had been an accident causing damage in excess of $500."14 The Court ruled that § 303.190, as discussed earlier, specifies the minimum coverage that will comply with § 303.025 as being insurance against "loss from the liability imposed by law. . . ."15 The Court reasoned the purpose behind the MVFRL "would be incompletely fulfilled if the household exclusion clause were fully enforced."16 In invalidating this particular household exclusion, the Court did not hold all household exclusions to be entirely invalid. "Freedom [to] contract in liability insurance" was recognized by the Court. However, the Court stated "exceptions based on public policy must usually find support in necessary implication from statutory provisions."17 A household exclusion in an automobile policy is void only to the extent that its application would deny coverage required by the MVFRL.18 Subject to certain exceptions, household exclusion provisions in automobile liability insurance policies, which are generally limitations or exclusions from providing coverage for bodily injury to the insured or any one connected with the insured by blood or affinity, will be given effect unless such exclusion should be deemed a violation of public policy, statute or regulation. Thus, such exclusions will be enforced for amounts in excess of $25,000.
A sub-issue argued by the insurer was that the MVFRL should not apply retroactively. This issue was addressed in the concurring opinion. The concurring opinion provided:
[P]ublic policy inherent in the statute creates an implicit agreement in [the insurer's] policy that, to the extent of limits required by the Financial Responsibility Act, the provisions concerning coverage will automatically change to conform to any changes in the law of Missouri related to "the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of ... use of such motor vehicle."19The insurer argued that when the policy was issued, parental immunity was still the law in Missouri.20 However, because public policy calls for coverage to change retroactively with Missouri law, the exclusion for parental immunity would no longer be applicable.21 The Court did not view this as retroactively changing the law. Rather, "when [the insurer] chose to write a policy in a state with a financial responsibility law such as Missouri's, it undertook to insure pursuant to whatever changes in the common law may occur during the term of the policy."22 In short, "[a]s the Missouri liability law changed, the scope of this exclusion clause automatically changed with it. [The insurer] is deemed to have impliedly agreed to this flexible approach."23
B. Named Driver Exclusions
A named driver exclusion on an insured automobile policy was held void as against public policy in Ingram v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co.24 At the center of this claim was an endorsement contained in the insured's policy with Shelter. The policy included an endorsement declaring that the policy provided no insurance "while any automobile is being driven by or is under the direct control of: Ronald Harmon."25 Ronald Harmon was the son of the insured. Ronald was involved in an accident while driving the insured's automobile, with the permission of the named insured.26 The insurer "denied coverage for the losses . . . on the grounds that the terms of its insurance policy excluded coverage if an automobile was driven by Ronald Harmon."27 "The trial court held that the endorsement violated public policy" behind the MVFRL.28 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's invalidation of the exclusion, reasoning the insurer's reliance on the exclusion would defeat legislative intent requiring "motor vehicle liability policies to provide coverage coextensive with liability."29
The Missouri Court of Appeals did not follow the Dairyland reasoning. The court concluded Dairyland did not provide binding precedent.39 The court went on to state that "since [Dairyland] was decided before the Supreme Court of Missouri decided Halpin,40 it is questionable that the result in Dairyland would be the same if . . . presented again."41
In Ezell v. Columbia Ins. Co.,42 the court determined that a policy defining "uninsured motor vehicle" as excluding "any vehicle owned by . . . the insured or any family member" violated Missouri public policy to the extent it precluded recovery of uninsured motorist benefits up to the mandatory amount required by the statute.43 The court went on to provide that the exclusion is only invalid to the extent of mandatory coverage by law, and valid with respect to coverage exceeding that amount.44
This claim arose out of an accident involving the insured while riding as a passenger on her husband's motorcycle. The husband's motorcycle was uninsured at the time of the accident and the insured filed a claim under the uninsured motorist coverage of her automobile insurance policy.45 The provision called into question is the policy's definition of "uninsured motor vehicle." The uninsured motorist coverage provided that the insurer would render payment of damages that the "insured [was] legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 'uninsured motor vehicle.'"46 "However, 'uninsured motor vehicle' does not include any vehicle or equipment:"
1. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any 'family member.'"47
"The trial court found . . . [the insured's husband was] a named insured under [her automobile insurance policy] and therefore [the vehicle] was not an 'uninsured motor vehicle' as defined by the [insurance] policy." Furthermore, the trial court found that the exclusion violated Missouri public policy.48 Based upon those facts, the trial court ruled in favor of the insured and awarded her damages in the amount of $50,000.49
The insurer argued on appeal that the policy definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" does not violate Missouri public policy and, in the alternative, if it were to violate public policy it did so only to the extent of the mandatory coverage required by the statute.50 The insurer relied on § 379.203 RSMo.51
The Missouri Court of Appeals had previously stated "[t]he underlying public policy which prompted enactment of [§ 379.203] was to give persons insured by such coverage, when injured by an uninsured motorist, protection parallel to that which they would have had if they had been injured in an accident caused by a motor vehicle covered by the minimum liability requirements of the financial responsibility law."52 The court concluded that "[t]he conceptual nature of uninsured motorist insurance must be distinguished from other types of insurance, for example automobile liability insurance." Uninsured motorist insurance is much like accident insurance because "it compensates for a loss suffered by an insured, as opposed to [automobile liability insurance] which indemnifies an insured against liability for losses suffered by third parties."53 "An insurer may limit the coverage afforded an insured under a policy only so long as the exclusion does not violate § 379.203 or the public policy behind it."54 In essence, the court reasoned that "[s]ection 379.203 . . . becomes a part of every policy of insurance to which it is applicable to the same effect as if it were written out in full in the policy itself."55
The court also concluded that the exclusion was only invalid to the extent of the mandatory limit required by law; it is otherwise valid as to any coverage exceeding the mandatory amount.56 The court stated, "[W]hile § 379.203 will be applied liberally to invalidate attempts by insurers to reduce benefits . . . it cannot create coverage."57 Section 379.203 reads in pertinent part, "[n]o automobile liability insurance . . . shall be delivered or issued . . . in this state . . . unless coverage is provided . . . in not less than the limits for bodily injury or death set forth in section 303.030."58 The statute mandates the minimum coverage of $25,000 for bodily injury or death of one and $50,000 for bodily injury or death of two or more in any one accident.59 The court held that "[s]o long as policy provisions meet the minimum requirements of the law and do not conflict with it, the parties remain free to create the insurance contract of their choice."60 The court, therefore, concluded the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" was only invalid to the extent of the aforementioned mandatory limit and valid as to any amount exceeding such limits.62
D. Fellow Employee Exclusion In the case of Baker v. DePew,62 the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the MVFRL did not preclude application of an exclusion of coverage for injuries to fellow employees.
Baker involved an accident on a construction site where two Holloway Construction Company employees were involved.63 Holloway was engaged in the construction of a dam at Blue Springs Lake.64 By rule, workers were not allowed to drive their personal vehicles onto the work-site. The defendant, DePew, a Holloway employee, would transfer other workers back and forth from an outlying parking area to the work-site in a Holloway owned pick-up truck.65 On one occasion plaintiff, Baker, an employee of Holloway, was a passenger in the truck driven by the defendant.66 The defendant made a sudden stop without warning the passengers and the plaintiff suffered serious injuries to his back, requiring surgery. The injuries sustained left the plaintiff almost completely disabled.67
The defendant had been "operating the pickup truck with the permission of Holloway at the time of the accident."68 The defendant asserted he was covered as "an insured under the omnibus clause of the [employer's] policy."69 Aetna Casualty & Surety Company had issued Holloway a "business automobile liability insurance policy covering the pickup truck with Holloway as the named insured" for liability coverage.70 The definition of an insured included: (1) [y]ou for any covered "auto," and (2) "[a]nyone else while using with your permission a covered auto you own."71 This is commonly referred to as omnibus clause. The insurance policy also contained various policy exclusions. Two such exclusions were the "employee exclusion clause" and the "cross-employee exclusion clause." The employee exclusion clause provided that coverage did not apply to employee indemnification and employer's liability for "[b]odily injury to . . . [a]n employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of employment by the insured."72 The cross-employee exclusion provided that the insurance policy did not apply to "'[b]odily injury' to any fellow employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of the fellow employee's employment."73
The Supreme Court of Missouri found the defendant had unlimited permission to use the vehicle for both personal and business usage and, thus, was covered under the omnibus clause of the policy.74 The Court then considered "whether coverage is excluded under one of the coverage exclusion provisions of the policy." The Court concluded that "coverage is excluded under the fellow employee exclusion" and not the employee exclusion because of the application of the severability clause.75 The basic premise of the conclusion was that under the employee exclusion provision, the plaintiff must have been an employee of the defendant and "the injury must arise out of and in the course of that employment."76 The plaintiff was not the employee of the defendant. The severability clause simply provides that because one exclusion is deemed void the entire insurance policy is not void. Only the specific exclusion is void and the remainder of the policy is valid. Because the clause applied and the plaintiff and defendant have a common employer, the employee exclusion did not apply. Only the fellow employee exclusion applied.77
The plaintiff contended that the application of the fellow employee exclusion should be overridden by the MVFRL.78 However, as relied upon by the Court, the MVFRL contains certain statutory exceptions.79 Section 303.190.5 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "[s]uch motor vehicle liability policy need not insure . . . any liability on account of bodily injury to or death of an employee of the insured while engaged in the employment . . . of the insured. . . ."80 The Court concluded that had the statute contained a severability clause like the insurance policy in question, it too would invalidate § 303.190.5 as to the defendant and apply strictly to the employer itself.81 The Court reasoned that even though severability clauses are common provisions in automobile insurance policies, they are overly complex provisions and will not be interpreted into contracts or statutes absent clear intent to do so by the parties or legislature.82 Thus, the Court concluded, "[a]bsent a clear mandate in the statute we are not inclined to override the agreement between Aetna and [its insured]."83
In the more recent case of Thompson v. Schlechter, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District upheld a fellow employee exclusion that nullified an uninsured motorist provision because the plaintiff's own automobile insurance policy, not containing a fellow employee exclusion, provided coverage where another company denied coverage.84
In Thompson, the plaintiff was employed by Hill-Behan Lumber.85 While driving a truck owned by Hill-Behan, the plaintiff was rear-ended by another Hill-Behan truck driver.86 It was determined that both drivers were "acting within the course and scope of their employment."87 The trucks owned by Hill-Behan were insured by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and the plaintiff held an automobile insurance policy with Shelter Mutual Insurance Company.88 The plaintiff filed a claim with Liberty Mutual, which was denied based upon Liberty Mutual's fellow employee exclusion. Plaintiff was advised to contact his own insurance company.89
Subsequently, Liberty Mutual notified the other employee that he too would not be covered under their policy and that their recommendation would be to notify his carrier of the accident.90 At that time, the employee maintained an automobile insurance policy with State Farm Insurance Company.91 State Farm denied coverage, claiming the vehicle "did not qualify as a temporary substitute, non-owned or newly acquired auto as defined in the policy."92
Along with Liberty Mutual's fellow employee exclusion, the policy also contained an uninsured motorist coverage clause. This clause provided that for damages resulting from "bodily injury sustained by the insured caused by an accident" Liberty Mutual "will pay all sums the insured is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle."93 This liability must also result from the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured vehicle.94
In a suit brought by the plaintiff for uninsured motorist benefits under each policy, both Liberty Mutual and Shelter filed motions for summary judgment. Both motions were granted.95 On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual, but reversed the summary judgment in favor of Shelter.96 In doing so, the court held the policy in question to be the same as the policy in Seymour v. Lakewood Hills Ass'n.97 In applying the principles of Seymour, the Thompson court found that denial of coverage complies with the MVFRL, the policy and that for which the insured bargained.98 Hill-Behan bargained for liability insurance with exclusions, including the fellow employee exclusion.99 Allowing the insured to recover under the uninsured motorist coverage would circumvent what was bargained for under the policy.100 As in Seymour, to allow the insured to "fall within the uninsured motorist coverage, the effect would be to nullify the fellow employee exclusion from liability coverage, giving the insured protection he did not bargain for."101
However, in reversing Shelter's summary judgment, the court held their policy to be unambiguous and not having a specific provision for the fellow employee exclusion.102 Furthermore, the Shelter provision "defines uninsured motor vehicle as a motor vehicle not insured by a bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident, or if there is such, the company writing it denies coverage." Therefore, under a plain reading of Shelter's policy, [the insured was] covered under [Shelter's] uninsured motorist coverage."103
E. Owner's and Operator's Policies In Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ridenhour, the Court of Appeals held that the policy in question did not violate the MVFRL or Missouri public policy merely because it did not meet the MVFRL requirements of an operator's policy where the policy met MVFRL requirements for owner's policy.104
The dispute arose out of an accident involving the defendant and a passenger in a car driven by defendant. The defendant was driving a vehicle not owned by him when he was involved in a one-car accident.105 The defendant did not have the owner's permission to drive the car involved in the accident.106 The passenger of the vehicle was injured and suit was brought to recover for her injuries.107 The trial court entered judgment in favor of the insurer.108
The court was left with the decision of whether or not the defendant's automobile insurance policy, which met the requirements of an owner's policy, also met the requirements of an operator's policy; and, if not, whether that is a violation of the MVFRL and Missouri public policy.109 "An owner's policy of liability insurance requires minimum coverage for liability arising out of the use by the named insured of those motor vehicles that the policy designates 'by explicit description or by appropriate references.'"110 "An operator's policy requires liability coverage for liability resulting from the operation of 'any motor vehicle not owned by him.'"111 As stated above, the automobile insurance policy in question met the requirements of an owner's policy.
The policy provided coverage for damages "caused by accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of the described auto or a non-owned auto."112 "This policy [described] a 'non-owned' auto '[as] any auto other than (a) the described auto or (b) an auto owned in whole or in part by, or furnished or available for regular use of, either you or any resident of you household.'"113 "There are two exclusions in the [auto insurance] policy that indicate that the policy is not, nor was it intended to be, an operator's policy of liability insurance as defined by the MVFRL. The exclusions are part of a "drive other cars" clause [allowing] the insured to be covered during the occasional use of non-owned cars."114 The first exclusion is for "non-owned autos 'owned in whole or in part by, or furnished or available for regular use of, either you or any resident of your household.' The second exclusion provides coverage for a non-owned auto only when 'the actual use or operation is with the permission, or reasonably believed to be with the permission of the owner or person in lawful possession, and within the scope of such permission.' These [type] exclusions are common in an owner's policy and are not consistent with . . . an operator's policy."115
The defendant argued that by not complying with both the requirements of an owner's policy and an operator's policy, the insurer was violating the MVFRL and Missouri public policy.116 The court reasoned, however, that the MVFRL requires owners to maintain financial responsibility pursuant to § 303.025.117 One method of complying with [§ 303.025] is to obtain a 'motor vehicle liability policy.'"118 The MVFRL provides that a 'motor vehicle liability policy' may be either an 'owner's policy or an operator's policy' of liability insurance."119 The court concluded that in order to comply with the MVFRL an insurer must issue a policy which is either an owner's or an operator's policy.120 But nothing in the MVFRL "requires a policy to be both an owner's and an operator's policy."121
F. Regular Use Exclusion A regular use exclusion excluding coverage for "bodily injury . . . arising out of use of any vehicle, other than" insured car, owned or "available for regular use" was upheld by the Missouri Court of Appeals in Sisk v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.122
A husband and wife both owned individual vehicles, insured in their own respective names. The wife was involved in an accident with two other vehicles while driving her husband's vehicle, because her vehicle was inoperable.123 Husband reported the accident to his insurance company, but was informed that his policy would not provide coverage because his premium had not been paid.124 The wife then filed a claim with her insurer, but was denied coverage because her policy excluded coverage for "bodily injury . . . arising out of the use of any vehicle which is owned by or furnished or available for regular use by you or any resident of your household."125 The trial court concluded that the policy was strictly an owner's policy and not an operator's policy and read the requirements of the MVFRL as calling for the minimum coverage of both policies.126
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the MVFRL defines a motor vehicle liability policy as an owner's or an operator's policy of liability insurance and that nothing in the MVFRL requires the policy to be both an owner's and an operator's policy.127 The court found the wife's policy was, in fact, an owner's policy,128 specifically describing all vehicles covered by the policy and that the policy insured against loss arising out of the use of the described vehicles.129 Since the loss did not arise from that use, no coverage existed.
G. Covered Auto Definition In Lawson v. Traders Ins., the court found that a nondescribed automobile acquired by the insured prior to the policy period will not be considered a covered auto even if it was intended as a replacement vehicle for the one named in the policy.130
The insured obtained an insurance policy from Coronet Insurance Company on June 10, 1993 identifying the covered auto as a pick-up truck.131 The policy was renewed again July 13, 1993 for a three-month period.132 On October 1, 1993, prior to the expiration of that policy period, the insured purchased and licensed a 1976 Nova because the pick-up had been inoperable for more than a month.133 On October 8, 1993, the insurance policy was renewed, describing the same pick-up, for another three months.134 The insured had yet to give notice or request that the Nova be added to the policy.135 On January 8, 1994 a policy was issued by Traders, again listing the pick-up truck as the only covered auto.136 The insured was then involved in a automobile accident while driving the Nova.137 Traders denied coverage, stating that the insured had the vehicle for a period of "four months prior to the accident, but had not requested that it be added to his policy or that it replace the vehicle listed on the policy."138 The insurer concluded, as did the trial court, that the vehicle was not a covered vehicle.139
The policy in question contained the following provisions:
J. "Your covered auto" means:The insured contended "that the Nova replaced the . . . pick-up [truck], and was covered under the policy as a replacement vehicle."141 The insured also argued "that under the policy provisions, [the insured] was not required to give notice of the replacement vehicle within thirty days because he did not carry coverage for damage to the . . . vehicle."142 "The policy plainly has two conditions for liability coverage on an automobile other than the one shown in the declarations to wit: it must have been acquired during the policy period; and a request to insure it must be made within 30 days after the insured became the owner."1431. Any vehicle shown in the Declarations.
2. Any of the following types of vehicles on the date you become the owner:
a. a private passenger auto, ...
This provision (J2) applies only if:
a. you acquire the vehicle during the policy period,
b. you ask us to insure it within 30 days after you become the owner;
If the vehicle you acquire replaces one shown in the Declarations, it will have the same coverage as the vehicle replaced. You must ask us to insure a replacement vehicle within 30 days only if you wish to add or continue Coverage for Damage to Your Auto.140
The insurer admitted that the 30-day notice requirement does not apply if the insured replaces the vehicle shown in the declaration, but the insurer argued that the vehicle did not qualify as a replacement vehicle and in any event was not acquired during the policy period.144 The court concluded that "[t]he policy in question conditioned coverage for a nonscheduled auto, including a replacement vehicle, upon the insured having acquired the vehicle during the policy period."145 The court held that "no coverage was afforded by the clear terms of the policy" because "the evidence was undisputed" that the vehicle was acquired prior to January 8, 1994, the policy period in question.146
The insured further contended that the "insurance policy in question . . . violated [the] public policy" set forth in the MVFRL.147 They argued that public policy requires that "motor vehicle liability insurance policies provide coverage coextensive with liability."148 The court held that § 303.190 does not require that a liability policy insure the named insured for an accident occurring while he is operating a vehicle which is owned by him, but is not one for which the policy grants coverage.149 The court reasoned that "if the [Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law] does not require liability insurance coverage for a particular situation, a policy provision excluding that coverage is not invalid."150
The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law provides that a motor vehicle liability policy must provide protection from liability in specified amounts for bodily injury or death and injury to or destruction of property of others. The plain purpose of the MVFRL is to make certain that people who are injured on highways may collect damage awards, within limits, against negligent motor vehicle operators. This protection extends to occupants of the insured vehicle as well as to operators and occupants of other vehicles and pedestrians.
Missouri courts have determined that insurance policies must provide coverage coextensive with minimum liability requirements. The MVFRL provides that drivers must maintain financial responsibility. This coverage can be in the form of an "owner's policy or an operator's policy. The MVFRL does not require that the coverage coextensive with liability be both an owner's and operator's policy. It can be one or the other, as long as the public policy behind the MVFRL is satisfied. Unsettled though, is the concept of whether drivers can maintain this "financial responsibility" by providing coverage coextensive with liability through multiple policies of insurance. This would allow for certain policy exclusions to be contracted for, while offering other policies covering that which is excluded.
What is for certain is that the MVFRL cannot create coverage. Not all exclusions are invalid; and courts have recognized the insured's and insurer's freedom of contract. Exclusions will only be void to the extent that their application denies coverage required by the MVFRL. The exclusion is only invalid to the extent of mandatory minimums by law and valid with respect to coverage exceeding that amount. Basically, the MVFRL becomes part of every insurance policy to which it is applicable to the same effect as if it were written out in full in the policy itself. There can be valid exclusions; however, such exclusions must find support in necessary implications from statutory provisions.
1 Beth C. Boggs is the founding and managing partner of the St. Louis office of Boggs, Backer & Bates, L.L.C. She received her J.D., magna cum laude, from Southern Illinois University in Carbondale, Illinois in 1991. Ms. Boggs is a frequent lecturer on insurance defense topics and has written numerous articles on medical malpractice, personal injury and insurance related topics in Missouri and Illinois. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Daniel M. McLaughlin in the preparation of this article.
2 Section 303.025, RSMo Cum Supp. 1999.
3 Section 303.190(2), RSMo Cum. Supp. 1999.
4 Section 303.025, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1999. See also American Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. May, 972 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998) (wherein minimum limits of liability coverage required by MVFRL apply with respect to each motor vehicle not each insured, and thus, MVFRL does not require separate limits of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence for both named insured and permissive user; statute requires minimum limits with respect to each motor vehicle).
5 See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Metcalf, 861 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993).
6 Jasper v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 875 S.W.2d 954 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994).
7 Halpin v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. banc 1992).
8 Id. at 480.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 484.
12 Id. at 480.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 481.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 482.
17 Id. at 483.
18 Id. See also Kearbey v. Kinder, 972 S.W.2d 575 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998).
19 Halpin, 823 S.W.2d. at 483.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Ingram v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 922 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996).
25 Id. at 855.
26 Id.
27 Id. This is a typical named driver exclusion.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 857.
30 Id. at 856.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Morse, 771 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
34 Ingram, 922 S.W.2d at 856.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 857.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Halpin, 823 S.W.2d 479.
41 Ingram, 922 S.W.2d at 857.
42 Ezell v. Columbia Ins. Co., 942 S.W.2d 913 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 914.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 915.
51 Id. Citing § 379.203.1, RSMo 1986. In pertinent part provides:
1. No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto ... in not less than the limits for bodily injury or death set forth in § 303.030, RSMo, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.52 Id. at 915. Citing Otto v. Farmers Ins. Co., 558 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Mo. App. _.D. 1977).Section 303.030.5, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1999. In pertinent part provides:
5. No such policy . . . shall be effective under this section unless issued by an insurance company . . . authorized to do business in this state . . . every such policy . . . is subject, if the accident has resulted in bodily injury or death, to a limit, exclusive of interest and costs , of not less than twenty-five thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, subject to said limit for one person, to a limit of not less than fifty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and, if the accident has resulted in injury to or destruction of property, to a limit of not less than ten thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 915.
55 Id. Citing Ward v. Allstate Ins. Co., 514 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Mo. banc 1974).
56 Id. at 919.
57 Id. at 916.
58 Id. at 918.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 919.
61 Id.
62 Baker v. DePew, 860 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. banc 1993).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 320.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 321.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 323.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 324.
84 Thompson v. Schlechter, Slip Opinion Number ED768606 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Seymour v. Lakewood Hills Ass'n, 927 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996). ("[L]itigation arose out of a one vehicle accident involving a garbage truck owned by Reliable Disposal" and insured by Ohio Casualty, whose policy included both a fellow employee exclusion and uninsured motorist coverage. The Eastern District decided that the "fellow employee exclusion [does] not violate the MVFRL" or the uninsured motorist statute and that to cover the plaintiff under the uninsured provision would "nullify the fellow employee exclusion from liability coverage, giving the insured protection he did not bargain for.")
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ridenhour, 936 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997).
105 Id. at 858.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 859.
112 Id. at 858-59.
113 Id. at 859.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 858.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bainbridge, 941 S.W.2d 546 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). (Non-owned car provision in family automobile policy was not ambiguous as applied to named insures' sons use of employer's automobile; policy clearly excluded cars owned by employer of relative of named insured.) See also Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gebhards, 947 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). (Automobile insurance policy covering use of described auto listed as pick-up truck and any non-owned auto was owner's policy of liability insurance, not operator's policy of liability insurance and, therefore, provided no liability coverage for insured while driving motorcycle . . . policy defined auto as self-propelled land motor vehicle with at least four wheels and did not intend term any auto to mean "any motor vehicle).
122 Sisk v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 860 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993).
123 Id. at 35.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 36.
127 Id. at 35.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 36.
130 Lawson v. Traders Ins., 946 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997).
131 Id. at 299.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 300.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 300-01.
146 Id. at 301. See also Schuster v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 857 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993). (Liability policy did not violate public policy as expressed in statute requiring operator's liability to insure operator against loss arising from use of vehicle not owned by operator, "legislature certainly intended that all vehicles be covered by insurance but did not intend to enact a scheme by which only one policy of insurance need be purchased per household.")
147 Id. at 301.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. Citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Ricks, 902 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995).