Synopsis: With the advent of the computer age and Internet capabilities, e-mail has become a popular communication medium. This article analyzes some of the basic privacy issues associated with the use of e-mail, and how the courts and the federal and state legislatures are addressing these issues.

There are few people today who have not heard of e-mail (electronic mail). Many people have chosen to use e-mail as an adjunct to, or a replacement of, postal mail and telephone systems.

There are three main types of e-mail, depending on the cyber forum chosen. First there are "real time" or "chat" rooms that allow correspondents to respond to each other in instantaneous cyber-conversation.1 Chat rooms are essentially public forums open to an unlimited number of correspondents. Second, there are computer "bulletin boards." These are usually geared toward common interests of the correspondents. Correspondents leave messages on the bulletin board for the perusal of anyone who visits, or "hits," on that particular bulletin board.2 Finally, there is direct e-mail that is sent from one individual to another. Direct e-mail is not intended to be read by third parties.3

E-mail correspondence differs from either postal or face-to-face conversation in several important ways. Most e-mail correspondents do not use their real names when corresponding in cyberspace, although the respective Internet server will have a record of who is identified by which alias.4 This perceived anonymity causes e-mail messages to be more blunt and direct, and the language used may be more harsh and crude than that used in conversation and postal mail.5 In spite of this perception of anonymity, the e-mail server has the capability to track down the sender of the message.6

To send e-mail, the correspondent must direct his or her message through an Internet or system server, a "cyber post office," so to speak. Most people are familiar with America Online (AOL), Prodigy, and some of the other commercial servers. When an Internet user subscribes to these services, he or she will be assigned an e-mail address, and he or she gains access to any chat rooms or bulletin boards that are associated with these services, as well as those on the World Wide Web. There are also a number of public servers, such as C.O.I.N. in Columbia, Missouri, which often function through educational institutions. Users of these servers access the Internet through the World Wide Web, which, in turn, offers access to chat rooms and bulletin boards.

The simplest servers, and the ones people are the most familiar with, are interoffice servers that connect colleagues with one another in the workplace. Many corporations and government offices provide, and encourage the use of, their internal e-mail systems for routine communications among their employees.

The computer revolution has made the use of e-mail increasingly commonplace. E-mail is the newest popular communication technology and, as with its telephonic predecessors, the legal system will have to come up with a means of regulating the fledgling medium while safeguarding the users from economic and personal abuse.

As it has with most new technologies, the legal system is playing catch up in the area of e-mail law. There are many legal issues to be considered when dealing with e-mail: privacy, copyrights, choice of law, encryption policies, contract, and telecommunications issues, to name a few. This article deals primarily with privacy issues, although some of the other issues will necessarily be included in the discussion. The article will analyze applicable case law, state and federal statutes dealing with e-mail, and some common privacy issues affecting all e-mail users.

The federal government has been in the forefront of computer related legislation. This is to be expected given the inter-jurisdictional nature of computer communications. Federal computer legislation can be tracked back to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.7 This legislation, otherwise known as Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), deals with electronic surveillance and wiretaps.

In 1986, Congress passed the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Act, which was amended in 1988.8 This act became Title II of the aforementioned ECPA.

Title II of the ECPA deals specifically with e-mail and similar stored communications. Section 2701 of the act makes it a crime to intentionally access, without authorization, an electronic communications server facility, such as America Online. Section 2702 makes it a violation for a server to divulge the contents of stored communications to an unauthorized person or entity. Section 2703 sets forth the requirements, such as a warrant or court order, for the government to access stored communications under the control of the server. Section 2704 provides that governmental entities may include in a subpoena or court order a requirement that the server make back-up copies of the contents of stored communications. Section 2705 gives delayed notice guidelines. Section 2706 creates a civil cause of action for service providers, subscribers, or customers who have been aggrieved by any violation of the chapter. Relief in such cases includes preliminary or other appropriate equitable or declaratory relief, damages, including actual damages and ill-gotten profits of the violator, but in no case less than $1,000, and reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs.9 Civil actions under the section must be commenced within two years of the date the violation was or could reasonably have been discovered.10

There have been relatively few reported cases dealing with the federal e-mail statute. The entire area of e-mail privacy is nascent. As the national communication mix begins to rely more heavily on e-mail correspondence, the federal caseload in this area will, no doubt, increase.

The states have approached e-mail in a much less systematic manner. Most states have laws pertaining to computer hacking and theft, but these statutes do not specifically address stored communications such as e-mail. At the time of this writing, only eleven states have passed legislation targeted at e-mail.

Six states -- Arizona, California, Indiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Wyoming -- include e-mail communications in their harassment/stalking statutes.11 California limits e-mail harassment provisions to violence in the workplace.12

Alaska and Arizona have laws governing the authorized government access of stored communications.13 In Arizona, e-mail correspondence is considered to be "ordinary business records" and can be discovered by subpoena.14

Florida, Georgia, and Utah have laws creating a civil cause of action against parties who divulge the contents of stored electronic communications.15 In Geogia, this constitutes an invasion of the right of privacy.16

There is another Georgia statute that specifically addresses the issue of e-mail forgery. Section 16-9-93 of the Official Code of Georgia makes it a crime to transmit data via computer using a false or unauthorized name, trade name, registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted symbol. The statute provides for both criminal and civil actions, and includes specific venue provisions for bringing such actions.17

Missouri has a general computer statute, but at the present time there are no statutes dealing specifically with e-mail. A bill addressing e-mail privacy was introduced in the 1996 legislative session, but it was not passed.18 The question remains whether such statutes are necessary or advisable.

Litigation in the area of e-mail privacy reached the appellate level in the mid-1990s. Although the cases deal with several different privacy issues, about half the cases deal with search and seizure.

In 1994, the Fifth Circuit decided the case of Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service.19 This was an appeal of the case of the same caption from the western district of Texas.20 The cause arose when the federal government seized, under warrant, a computer system used by Blankenship, an employee of Steve Jackson Games, Inc. (SJG). Blankenship was suspected of hacking into a Bell Telephone computer system. An electronic bulletin board service provided to subscribers of SJG was included in the seized computer system. During the course of the investigation of the hacking case, the stored, and as yet undelivered, bulletin board e-mail was read by Secret Service agents, who deleted some of the stored information. SJG and several individuals whose e-mail had been seized and read sued the federal government.

Plaintiffs sued the Secret Service claiming violations of the federal Privacy Protection Act (PPA), Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (wiretap provisions), and Title II of the ECPA (Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access Act (ECTRAA).21

The trial court found that the Secret Service had violated the PPA, which regulates the seizure of work documents, because the agents continued their search of the stored documents after they had been informed that SJG was engaged in the publishing business.22 The court awarded SJG $42,259 in damages for the government's violation of the PPA. Due to the nature of the offense under the PPA, the government's liability on that claim extended only to SJG. The award was upheld on appeal.23

The trial court held, and the appellate court concurred, that there had been no violation of Title I of the ECPA. The appellate court said that the Secret Service did not illegally "intercept" the e-mail, as that term is contemplated in Title I of the ECPA, because "its acquisition of the contents of the electronic communications was not contemporaneous with the transmission of those communications."24

Finally, the trial court and the appellate court held that the Secret Service had violated Title II of the ECPA. No notice of the proposed seizure was given as required by law, and no back-up copies of the deleted e-mail were made. The Secret Service did not challenge this ruling on appeal. Each individual plaintiff was awarded $1,000 in damages.25

Search and seizure was also the subject of State v. One (1) Pioneer CD-ROM Changer out of Oklahoma.26 In that case, the state had seized, under warrant, computer equipment belonging to Davis. The seizure was based on the allegation that Davis had used the computer equipment to produce and distribute obscene materials. Davis argued that Titles I and II of the ECPA should apply, Title I because the seizure of the equipment was, in effect, an interception of his e-mail contained in the computer system at the time of the seizure, and Title II because the e-mail included a number of private communications. The state offered to return the e-mail and other private communications, noting that the officers who seized the computer system were unaware of the existence of the e-mail at the time of the seizure. The court held that the appellant failed to show that the seizure of the equipment that was being used for illegal purposes and which contained e-mail constituted an "interception" under Title I of the ECPA.27

Davis also argued that the seizure violated the PPA because it included "work product materials" for broadcast, dissemination to the public, or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. The court found that there was no bar to the forfeiture of the computer equipment under the PPA, but the court did state, "We express no opinion regarding whether Davis may have a viable civil cause of action under the Privacy Act."28

The final search and seizure case involving e-mail is United States v. Maxwell.29 Maxwell, a Colonel in the Air Force, was a subscriber to America Online (AOL). The AOL service allowed him to communicate via e-mail or bulletin boards using up to five screen names or cyber aliases. Maxwell used four such names, Redde1, Zirloc, Concho1, and Jimmax.30 Even though AOL considered each screen name to be a separate identity, for billing purposes the names were all registered to Col. Maxwell.

In 1991, Roger Dietz, a California resident, reported to the FBI that he believed some AOL subscribers were transmitting and receiving visual images portraying child pornography. Dietz gave the FBI a computer disc containing some of these images, and sent AOL a list of the screen names of the people involved in the transmissions. The list included the screen name Redde1.

The FBI decided to seek a warrant to seize the electronic transmissions of the subscribers with the listed screen names. In anticipation of the warrant, AOL extracted the information the FBI was seeking, including the transmissions of Col. Maxwell under all four of his screen names. The warrant itself listed only the Redde1 name, misspelled "Reddel," but AOL turned over all of Col. Maxwell's files to the FBI. The FBI, in turn, turned over the seized items pertaining to Col. Maxwell to the Air Force. The seized communications included messages, signed "Zirloc" by Col. Maxwell, to another Air Force member. These messages were the basis of the charge of "communicating indecent language" in Col. Maxwell's court martial.31

The military magistrate for the base authorized a search of Col. Maxwell's quarters for evidence related to the transmission and possession of child pornography and other obscene matter. Col. Maxwell's computer was seized as evidence, and contained three depictions of child pornography that were admitted into evidence at his court martial.

The appellate court analyzed Col. Maxwell's constitutional claims under the Fourth Amendment, applying the two-pronged test set forth in Smith v. Maryland.32 To prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place, the claimant must prove that he had an actual, or subjective, expectation of privacy, and that his individual expectation of privacy was one that society recognizes as reasonable, an objective expectation of privacy. The trial court held that Col. Maxwell was seeking anonymity as opposed to privacy when he sent e-mail transmissions to multiple subscribers to AOL.33 The appellate court noted that Col. Maxwell may have forfeited his right to privacy in e-mail that was downloaded by another subscriber or removed by a private individual from AOL. However, the court found that Col. Maxwell had an objective expectation of privacy in e-mail transmissions still stored in the AOL computers, in stored messages that he alone could access with his password, and in messages sent to specific individuals.34 The court noted that there was virtually no risk such computer transmissions would be received by anyone but the intended recipient.35 The court concluded, "In the modern age of communications, society must recognize such expectations of privacy as reasonable. We believe such recognition is implicit in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act."36

After concluding that Col. Maxwell had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal e-mail under the Fourth Amendment, the court went on to find that there was probable cause to issue the warrant authorizing the search of the AOL computers for Redde1 messages. The misspelling of the screen name, Redde1, did not invalidate the warrant. The probable cause to search did not extend to any of the other e-mail boxes assigned to Col. Maxwell, but the court found that the evidence seized from the "Zirloc" mailbox was admissible under the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule.37

In upholding Col. Maxwell's conviction, the court held that the transmission of visual images through use of an on-line computer system was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465, which makes it a crime to transport obscene materials for the purpose of sale or distribution in interstate or foreign commerce.38 The court also held that because his e-mail transmissions were revealed as a result of criminal activities, Col. Maxwell's conviction did not violate his First Amendment right of free speech or his Fifth Amendment right of freedom from self incrimination.39 The "community standard" for the obscenity charges against Col. Maxwell was properly based on the Air Force community which extends nationwide.40 Finally, the court found, for purposes of the best evidence rule, that any printout or other output from a computer which is readable by sight and which is shown to accurately reflect the data is an "original" document.41

It is clear, based on the foregoing cases, that the courts are ready to recognize that there is an objective expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment for e-mail that is either being stored by an internet server or is intended to be sent from one individual to another via such a service. But what about e-mail sent within a closed system, such as an interoffice or corporate computer network? Is such correspondence also considered to be private?

The seminal case in this area is Smyth v. The Pillsbury Co.42 Pillsbury Company set up an interoffice e-mail system for employee use. Employees were assured that their e-mail on the system would remain private and confidential, and that it would not be intercepted by the management or used as grounds for termination or reprimand. Plaintiff was a Pillsbury employee. He exchanged a number of e-mail messages with his supervisor that the company management intercepted and read. Plaintiff was terminated for transmitting "inappropriate and unprofessional comments over defendant's e-mail system."43 Since plaintiff was an employee at will, the only way he could fight the termination was to prove that defendant's actions violated a clear mandate of public policy. The court held that the defendant's interception of plaintiff's interoffice e-mail did not violate public policy. In the court's words: "[w]e do not find a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor over the company e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that such communications would not be intercepted by management. . . . Moreover, the company's interest in preventing inappropriate and unprofessional comments or even illegal activity over its e-mail system outweighs any privacy interest the employee may have in those comments."44

The court in Pillsbury made it clear that employees cannot expect their interoffice e-mail correspondence to be private from their employers. In other words, employees should not send anything over in-house e-mail that they do not wish to be read by management.

In-house e-mail is a convenient way to save paper, but can it be subpoenaed as business records? In the case of Monotype Corp. PLC v. International Typeface Corp.,45 which dealt with an agreement not to compete in the typeface market, plaintiff sought to introduce e-mail correspondence from an International Typeface Corporation (ITC) employee to a Microsoft employee. Plaintiff maintained that the e-mail constituted business records and should be admitted into evidence. The court held that the requested e-mail messages were highly prejudicial and that they were inadmissible as evidence. The court stated that, as distinguished from computer printouts which are admissible as business records, "E-mail is far less of a systematic business activity than a monthly inventory printout. E-mail is an ongoing electronic message and retrieval system whereas an electronic inventory recording system is a regular, systematic function of a bookkeeper prepared in the course of business."46 Another court found, however, that e-mail records maintained by a federal agency must be preserved pursuant to the Federal Records Act and are subject to the Freedom of Information Act.47

Another federal statute that has been applied to e-mail correspondence is the Lindbergh Act.48 This act makes it a crime to transmit a communication via interstate or foreign commerce which contains a threat to kidnap or injure another person, or a request or demand for ransom. In United States v. Baker, the defendant, a university student, was accused of sending threats, using the university e-mail service, against another individual.49 Defendant had published a torture/rape/murder story on an electronic bulletin board. After the publication of the story, defendant began a private e-mail correspondence with another individual in which he discussed kidnapping, raping and killing adolescent girls.

Because the Lindbergh Law deals with "pure speech," the courts are very careful when applying the law. The court in Baker held that defendant's e-mail correspondence did not constitute a "true threat" to any specific individual and, therefore, the Lindbergh Law did not apply to that case.50 Since the court did not find Baker guilty pursuant to the Lindbergh Law, the question remains whether that statute applies to e-mail correspondence. If a "true threat" were made by e-mail, the courts would most likely apply the Lindbergh Law, which itself has evolved from including only postal correspondence to including telephonic and wire threats.

The most recent case involving e-mail privacy relates to the subject of encryption. Encryption is a means of scrambling e-mail messages so they cannot be intercepted by unauthorized individuals. In Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the State Department because it refused to allow him to publish the source code for his Snuffle.C and Unsnuffle.C computer programs and an academic paper explaining his Snuffle encryption system.51 The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) gives the State Department the authority to implement the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).52 The AECA contains a list of designated defense articles and services, known as the United States Munitions List (USML).53 A license from the Department of State is required for an article or service included on the list to be imported or exported, unless that article or service is exempted.54 Category XIII of the USML includes cryptographic systems, equipment, or software capable of maintaining the secrecy or confidentiality of information or information systems.55

The State Department determined that Snuffle and Unsnuffle were subject to licensure under the AECA. The status of the academic paper was unclear. The court held that the licensure provisions of the ITAR were an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected speech under the First Amendment, and that portions of the regulations were void for vagueness.56

At most, the Bernstein decision indicates that the federal government cannot regulate plaintiff's encryption systems under the present regulatory scheme. The court refused plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the government from prosecuting him for teaching classes on cryptography.57

The encryption battle between the federal government and the computer industry is far from over. The government is presently seeking to impose a hardware encryption system called "Clipper" on the computer industry.58 Clipper would allow government officials to decrypt transmissions as required for law enforcement and security reasons. Such a scheme raises numerous constitutional concerns and is being questioned by computer industry watchdog groups.59

The cases discussed above deal with unique situations that most people will never encounter. The use of e-mail does raise a few issues of concern for all users, however.

E-mail is being used more and more frequently as a means of sexual and other forms of harassment. Once a perpetrator has obtained the e-mail address of his or her victim, it is simple to send harassing messages, often in complete anonymity. The obvious answer for the victim is that he or she simply ignore such messages. With e-mail, this is neither practical nor equitable.

Unlike postal mail, e-mail is not delivered in an envelope with identifiable printing or handwriting and stamped with a postmark. The recipient of e-mail knows only that there is "mail" in his or her box. It is necessary to read at least part of the message to see what e-mail has been sent. In other words, the e-mail harassment victim cannot just ignore or dispose of harassing messages.

There are a few strategies that can be used on-line to discourage the harassment. One method is to block incoming messages via a "kill file," but this feature may not be available on business or educational server systems. Another tactic is to "flame" the sender by returning scathing messages. However, these remedies to e-mail harassment may backfire and they are virtually ineffective over the Internet system.60 The victim is left with two alternatives, stay off the internet or change e-mail addresses, neither of which is acceptable because these remedies penalize the victim without punishing the perpetrator.

The logical answer to e-mail harassment is to include it in anti-harassment and anti- stalking statutes. In spite of the impression that e-mail is an anonymous medium, the system server has the capability to track down the senders of virtually all messages. Once e-mail correspondence has been identified as illegal harassment, it should prove relatively easy for the server to trace the author of the harassing messages.

Missouri's harassment statute can be amended to cover e-mail harassment. As with all computer crimes, choice of law provisions must be included in any legislation relating to e-mail. Section 569.090, RSMo, can be amended as follows:

Another situation that can easily arise when using e-mail is the unauthorized use of another's name when sending e-mail, that is, e-mail forgery. All states have forgery statutes, including Missouri.61 Only Georgia has passed legislation making it a criminal offense to send unauthorized, forged messages over a computer or telephone network.62

As with other inter-jurisdictional crimes, choice of law is a consideration. In Missouri, there is a common law precedent in tort cases dealing with fraudulent misrepresentation. In such cases, Missouri has applied the law of the state in which the injury or loss was suffered, as opposed to the law of the state where the misrepresentation was made.63 Instead of relying on common law to determine the choice of law, Georgia has included a venue statute in its anti- forgery legislation.64

As more Missouri citizens utilize the Internet and correspond via e-mail, there will be more opportunities for fraudulent misrepresentation in cyberspace. Because of the informal nature of e-mail correspondence and the fact that e-mail is a soft medium (that is, messages sent by e- mail are not delivered written on paper), it will become necessary to find new ways to protect e-mail users from forgery and fraud. The Georgia statutes in the e-mail forgery area are comprehensive and straightforward. (See Appendix A). Missouri should consider passing similar legislation.

Another privacy issue that particularly affects e-mail users is the unauthorized publication of private correspondence. Although there may also be copyright ramifications of such publication, there is a more fundamental matter at stake. The publication of an individual's e-mail correspondence could constitute a violation of that person's right of privacy.

Missouri has recognized the tort of invasion of privacy since 1911.65 The Restatement (Second) of Torts at § 652 states that the right of privacy is invaded when there is (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; or (2) appropriation of the other's name or likeness; or (3) unreasonable publicity given to another's private life; or (4) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.

To make a submissible case of intrusion upon seclusion, the plaintiff must prove: "(1) the existence of a secret and private subject matter; (2) a right possessed by the plaintiff to keep that subject matter private; and (3) the obtaining of information about that subject matter by defendant through some method objectionable to the reasonable man."66 The tort of intrusion upon seclusion requires no showing of publication or publicity.67

"The generally recognized elements of the tort of public disclosure of private facts are: (1) the publication, (2) absent any waiver or privilege, (3) of private matters in which the public has no legitimate concern, (4) such as to bring shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities."68 For the tort of public disclosure of private facts, the publication requirement may be satisfied by a proof of disclosure to a very limited number of people, or even to a single person, when a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the "public" to whom the information has been disclosed.69 When the privacy tort is the public disclosure of private facts, the place of invasion, and the venue for the action, is where the private information was communicated to a person other than the plaintiff.70

It is conceivable that any of the four invasion of privacy torts could result from the use and misuse of e-mail. The impersonal nature of the medium lends itself to casual abuses of privacy. Some obvious examples include sharing private e-mail messages with co-workers, broadcasting private information over electronic bulletin boards, or sending incriminating messages under an appropriated name.

When the communication medium is as universal and public as the Internet, it is imperative to protect the privacy rights of the individual. In Missouri, the right of privacy is a matter of common law, but several other states have chosen to codify the right of privacy.71 With the advent of the increasingly popular use of the Internet and e-mail nationwide, Missouri may want to consider like legislation to protect its citizens. (See Appendix B).

E-mail can be a valuable business tool and a congenial source of entertainment and personal communication, but as with other forms of communication, it can also be abused. Missouri can and should take steps now to anticipate the needs of its citizens as they enter the computer age. The legislature should pass laws addressing both the technical aspects of e-mail, such as the federal Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access Act at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et seq., and the more mundane privacy issues of harassment, forgery, and the invasion of privacy. By passing such laws now, Missouri will be able to safeguard its citizens' privacy rights in the face of an increasingly public society.

Ga. Code Ann. Section 16-9-93.1. Misleading transmittal and use of individual name, trade name, registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted symbol over computer or telephone network; criminal penalty; civil remedies.

For the purpose of venue under this article, any violation of this article shall be considered to have been committed:

Ga. Code Ann. Section 16-11-62. Eavesdropping, surveillance, or intercepting communication which invades privacy of another; divulging private message.

* Any proposed legislation in Missouri could have a similar reference to messages obtained by warrant or by any other legal means. For e-mail, that could be messages legitimately received but subsequently published in violation of the sender's privacy rights.

1 McGraw, David K., Sexual Harassment in Cyberspace: The Problem of Unwelcome E-Mail, 21 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L. J. 491, 494 (1995).

2 Id.

3 Id.

4 McGraw, at 496; United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568, 573 (1995).

5 McGraw, at 492.

6 McGraw, at 496.

7 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994).

8 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1994).

9 18 U.S.C. § 2707(b), (c) (1994).

10 18 U.S.C. § 2707(e) (1994).

11 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Supp. § 13-2921 (West 1996); Cal. Lab. Code § 527.8 (West 1997); Ind. Code Ann. Supp. § 35-45-2-2 (Michie 1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Supp. § 750.411i (1)(f) (West 1997); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:4 (1996); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2- 506 (Michie 1997).

12 Cal. CCP Code § 527.8 (West 1997).

13 Alaska Stat. § 12.37.300 (Michie 1996); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3016 (West 1989).

14 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3016 (West 1989).

15 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 934.21, .22, .27 (West 1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-62 (1996); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-403 (1991).

16 Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-62 (1996).

17 Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-9-93.1 and 16-9-94 (1996).

18 HB 1435, 88th Mo. Gen. Assem.

19 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).

20 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993).

21 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa, et seq. (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1994).

22 Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993).

23 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).

24 Id. at 459-60.

25 Steve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. 432, 443 (W.D. Tex. 1993).

26 891 P.2d 600 (Okla. App. 1994).

27 Id. at 607.

28 Id.

29 42 M.J. 568 (1995).

30 Maxwell at 573.

31 Maxwell at 574.

32 442 U.S. 735 (1979).

33 Maxwell at 575.

34 Maxwell at 576.

35 Id.

36 Id.

37 Maxwell at 578.

38 Maxwell at 580.

39 Id.

40 Maxwell at 581.

41 Id.

42 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

43 Pillsbury at 99.

44 Pillsbury at 101.

45 43 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 1994).

46 Monotype at 450.

47 Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 877 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1995).

48 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994).

49 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995).

50 Baker at 1390.

51 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

52 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1-130.17 (1996).

53 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1994).

54 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2) (1994).

55 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 XIII (b)(1) (1996).

56 Bernstein at 8, 10.

57 Bernstein at 12.

58 "Security and Encryption," electronic Mail Association Conference Proceedings, June 1993.

59 "Comments of the Electronic Frontier Foundation," Electronic Mail Association Conference Proceedings, June 1993.

60 McGraw, at 503-06.

61 Section 570.070, RSMo 1994.

62 Ga. Code Ann. § 16-9-93.1 (1996).

63 Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).

64 Ga. Code Ann. § 16-9-94 (1996).

65 McNally v. The Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69, 78 (8th Cir. 1976).

66 Corcoran v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Mo. App. W.D. 1978).

67 Id.

68 McNally, at 78.

69 McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

70 McNally, at 78.

71 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 934.21, .22, .27 (West 1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-62 (1996); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-403 (1991).

Ms. Pritchard is a 1981 graduate of the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. She served as a hearing officer of the Missouri State Tax Commission for five years. This article is being submitted on behalf of the Technology & Computer Law Committee of The Missouri Bar.

© 1997, Jan Hemm Pritchard

JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI BAR
Volume 53 - No.4 - July-August 1997