Workers' CompensationEditor:
Chris T. Archer, EsquireDoes the Division of Workers' Compensation retain jurisdiction and the authority to enter an amended award? Thomas v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, No. 72432 (Mo. App. W.D., December 14, 2010), Martin, J.
An award of compensation was issued that had conflicting provisions
on the amount or percentage of PPD that was awarded. An amended award
was drafted due to the clerical error. Claimant appealed the second
amended award but did not file an appeal of the original award. The
Labor and Industrial Commission denied jurisdiction over the case
finding that the error was not clerical but judicial and therefore no
appeal was properly taken from the one and only valid award provided.
The court stated that unless an application for review has been
filed, an Administrative Law Judge and the Division of Workers'
Compensation retains jurisdiction. "Section 287.610.6 RsMo does not
prevent an ALJ from determining a claim by an amended award so long as
the ALJ's amended award is entered before a review hearing is initiated
under either Section 287.470 or Section 287.480, or prior to the
expiration of twenty days following the entry of the original award,
whichever first occurs."
8 CSR 20-3.040, which prohibits the appeal to the Labor and
Industrial Relations Commission of a temporary or partial award, is
constitutional. Motor Control Specialties, Inc., et al. v. Labor and Industrial Relations, et al., No. 71586 (Mo. App. W.D., November 9, 2010), Newton, J.
A declaratory judgment petition was filed challenging 8 CSR
20-3.030(1) that states: "Whenever an administrative law judge issues a
temporary or partial award under Section 287.510 RsMo, the same
shall not be considered a final award from which an application for
review (see 8 CSR 20-3.030) may be made.'
Motor Control challenged the regulation arguing it violates due
process clause of the Missouri Constitution Article V, Section18, which
provides that all final decisions by administrative agencies are
subject to judicial review.
The court affirmed the lower court's decision that upheld the
regulation as being constitutional, finding that awards denoted as
partial or temporary are not "final" awards as that term has been
interpreted and defined in Missouri. "Intermediate decision-making
steps within the agency, before its decisions become final are
constitutionally permissible."
Defining the burden of proof for a motion for summary
judgment in a civil case raising the exclusivity of the worker's
compensation act. Treaster, et ux. v. Betts, et al., Nos. 71654 and 71857 (Mo. App. W.D., November 9, 2010), Witt, J.
In a case involving an accident that occurred before the legislative
change requiring "strict construction" in 2005, the court outlined the
requirements to satisfy a summary judgment motion following Robinson v Hooker, WD 71207, decided August 2010.
The court stated that the co-employee defendant in the civil case, to
be granted summary judgment motion, must show: (1) Plaintiff's claim
is based on an accident arising out of and in the course of plaintiff's
employment; (2) Respondents were acting as employees; and (3)
Respondents were acting pursuant to non-delegable duty that the
Employer owed to its employees.
In this case involving an accident that occurred in 2003, "the
something more test is still applicable." If
Respondents otherwise satisfy the requirements of summary judgment
above, the burden shifts to the Petitioner to show that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Respondent's conduct falls
within an exception to co-employee immunity; that the Respondent's
conduct satisfies the "something more" exception to co-employee
immunity.
The court remanded the case for a final record to be developed consistent with this decision.
The Missouri Bar Courts Bulletin, 11-Jan