Labor Law - Federal
Editors:Jeffrey D. Hanslick, EsquireTraci Daffer Martin, EsquireBenjamin A. McMillen, EsquireEighth Circuit affirms district court's dismissal of a
former employee's complaint alleging a violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), holding that even if informal complaints to
one's employer amount to protected activity that would trigger the
anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, the former employee failed to
allege sufficient facts to show she even made such informal complaints.
Thus, there could be no liability under the FLSA. Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light, No. 10-1356, 2011 WL 9354 (8th Cir. January 4, 2011).
Plaintiff Lisa Richie alleged the defendant hospital terminated her
employment in retaliation for her insistence on recording her overtime
work. Specifically, Richie claimed the hospital asked her to perform a
particular task and instructed her not to record any overtime. When
Richie recorded the overtime anyway, the hospital terminated her
employment. Richie eventually filed suit, claiming retaliatory
discharge under the FLSA. However, Richie did not allege that she was
not paid for the overtime, and her attorney ultimately admitted that
Richie had in fact been compensated for all the overtime work she
performed. The district court granted the hospital's motion to
dismiss, finding that Richie had failed to state a claim because she
did not allege she engaged in statutorily protected activity. Richie
appealed, arguing specifically that informal complaints to an employer
(like those she allegedly made) trigger the anti-retaliation protection
of the FLSA, and that the hospital retaliated against her for
exercising her rights under the FLSA.
Held: Affirmed. In affirming the district court's
dismissal, the Eighth Circuit refrained from addressing whether
informal complaints are sufficient to trigger the anti-retaliation
provision of the FLSA. Even while assuming informal complaints are
sufficient, the court concluded that Richie failed to allege sufficient
facts to demonstrate that she had made any such complaints. In doing
so, the court rejected Richie's contention that she gave sufficient
notice to her supervisor that she believed his instructions were a
violation of the law because she "recorded the overtime hours in
writing despite orders not to record them." The court reasoned that
instead of constituting an affirmative complaint that would trigger the
anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, Richie's recording of her
overtime could be "nothing more than mere insubordination, she having
been instructed to the contrary." The court agreed with defense
counsel's argument that if merely recording one's overtime amounts to a
"complaint" that triggers the anti-retaliation provision, an employer
would not be able to discipline an employee for working unauthorized
overtime so long as the employee recorded the overtime. Thus, the
court concluded that Richie's complaint merely alleged, but did not
show, that Richie was entitled to any relief. As such, the court
affirmed the district court's dismissal of Richie's complaint.
The Missouri Bar Courts Bulletin, 11-Jan