Personal Jurisdiction: Has the Internet Changed Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice?
by W. Dudley McCarter1 and Joseph C. Blanner2
The dramatically increasing use of web sites and Internet services has injected new factors into personal jurisdiction issues. This article will examine recent federal and state court decisions involving personal jurisdiction issues, and will also discuss the impact that the Internet has had on these issues.
Standard of Review
In a diversity action, a U.S. District Court may assume jurisdiction over non-resident defendants only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state, and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Missouri liberally construes the provisions of its long-arm statute "to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of [Missouri] . . . over nonresident defendants to that extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States."4
Because Missouri's long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction to the extent permissible under the Due Process Clause, a federal court in Missouri need only determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process.5 Thus, the court's inquiry into whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant satisfies Missouri's long-arm statute is coextensive with its inquiry into whether the assertion satisfies due process.6 "When personal jurisdiction is challenged," the party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court bears the burden to show that jurisdiction exists.7 "To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff" is only required, however, to "make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over the defendant."8 "If the district court . . . relies on pleadings and affidavits, . . . the court must look at the facts in the light most favorable to the" party invoking personal jurisdiction "and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of that party."9
The Supreme Court has recognized two categories of personal jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction exists when a non-resident defendant has sufficient contact with the forum state and the cause of action arises out of, and relates to, that contact.10 General jurisdiction is applicable where the plaintiff's cause of action does not arise out of, and is not related to, the defendant's contacts in the forum. The Eighth Circuit has recognized that "the relationship of the cause of action to the contacts . . . distinguishe[s] between specific and general jurisdiction."11 Both specific and general jurisdiction must satisfy the requirements of due process, but general jurisdiction requires a higher level of contacts with the forum state.12
II. Due Process Requires Minimum Contacts With the Forum State
Due process allows a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident when the non-resident has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"13 A non-resident must meet the "minimum contacts" standard before being subjected to a state's jurisdiction.14 "This requirement 'is satisfied if the defendant has "purposefully directed" his activities at residents of the forum, . . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that "arise out of or relate to" those activities.'"15
The defendant's contact with the forum state must be sufficiently purposeful "that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."16 In examining the sufficiency of the contacts, a court should focus on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."17 Once minimum contacts have been established, the court must determine whether conferring jurisdiction is in accordance with "fair play and substantial justice."18
Supreme Court precedent requires that there be a "substantial connection" between the defendant and the forum state.19
Determining whether this standard is met requires the analysis of five factors:
(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state;
(2) the quantity of the contacts with the forum state;
(3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts;
(4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and
(5) the convenience of the parties.20
"The last two factors are considered less important and are not determinative."21
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has shown caution when personal jurisdiction is sought over a non-resident defendant who has no demonstrable physical presence of any type in the state. In CPC-Rexcell, Inc. v. La Corona Foods, Inc.,22 the court rejected the assertion of jurisdiction after looking at "the relationship of the defendant and its proximity to the state," and finding no "substantial and continuing relationship purposefully made [by the defendant with] the forum state."23 In La Corona, the defendant maintained "no office, agent, or real [estate] in the state," shipped no products to the state and made "no personal visits" to the state.24
Similarly, in Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd.,25 the Eighth Circuit again found that the assertion of personal jurisdiction would offend due process where the defendant had no physical presence in the state and had simply placed its product into the stream of commerce. In Falkirk, the court held that the "mere placement of [a product] within the stream of commerce did not constitute an act of purposeful availment toward[] the forum state" and does not establish sufficient minimum contacts to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction in the state.26
III. Continuous and Systematic Contacts Required for General Jurisdiction
"General jurisdiction is applicable only where the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state are so 'continuous and systematic' that the defendant may be subject to suit for causes of action that are unrelated to the forum contacts."27 "The court may assert general jurisdiction over a defendant only when the 'continuous corporate operations within a state [are] thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.'"28
IV. Specific Jurisdiction
In Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. Trans Western Polymers, Inc.,29 the court held that "[m]erely entering into a contract with a forum resident does not provide the requisite contacts between a [non-resident] defendant and the forum state."30 "This is particularly true when the nonresident defendant is a buyer, rather than a seller."31 The "'foreseeability' [of an impact within the forum] alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause."31
"Although minimum contacts 'need not include physical presence at all,' [the defendant's] contacts must be more than "attenuated" to support jurisdiction."33 "The use of interstate facilities, [such as telephones or mail] are secondary or ancillary factors and cannot alone provide the 'minimum contacts' required by due process."34 Additionally, "the unilateral activities of one claiming some relationship with the non-resident defendant is not enough to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement."35
In Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Hawker Siddeley Canada, Inc.,36 the Eighth Circuit found that long-arm jurisdiction cannot be exercised over a non-resident defendant unless the "defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."37 The court reaffirmed that the "minimum contacts" test must be based on "some purposeful act by the defendant directed at the forum."38
V. The Missouri Long-Arm Statute
Missouri courts recognize that the Missouri long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to the extent consistent with due process and have declined to exercise such jurisdiction where the defendant's activities were not directed to Missouri. For example, in Johnson Heater Corp. v. Deppe,39 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that "phone calls, mail and faxes" made by a non-resident defendant to a party in Missouri were insufficient to "create a 'substantial connection' with Missouri such that compelling him to court here does not offend our notion of fair play."40 As stated in Johnson Heater, the "'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts, . . . or of the 'unilateral activity'" of the plaintiff.41 Jurisdiction must be based on contacts resulting "from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with [Missouri]."42
Similarly, in State ex rel. Pain, Anesthesia and Critical Care Service v. Ryan,43 while finding insufficient contacts to satisfy the due process requirements for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the Missouri Court of Appeals reaffirmed "the principle that the 'unilateral activity of [a plaintiff] cannot satisfy the requirement of contact[s] with the forum State'" and that the "'purposeful availment' requirement" ensures "that a defendant will not be haled into a foreign jurisdiction as the result of random, fortuitous or attenuated contacts."44 Also, in State of Mo. ex rel. Wichita Falls General Hospital v. Adolf,45 the court held that where a Texas hospital had no history of conducting business in Missouri and had not invoked the benefits and protections of Missouri law, both public policy reasons and due process required the denial of personal jurisdiction to comport with the principles of fair play and substantial justice.46
In Lindley v. Midwest Pulmonary Consultants,47 a Kansas doctor was found not to be subject to personal jurisdiction in Missouri since his medical care to plaintiff was provided in Kansas. The Lindleys filed a medical negligence action against Michael Nelson, a Kansas physician. The Lindleys alleged that Dr. Nelson was negligent in monitoring medications prescribed for Mr. Lindley. Dr. Nelson filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. His affidavit in support of the motion stated that all of the medical services he provided to Mr.Lindley took place in Kansas. In response, the Lindleys stated that Dr.Nelson was licensed to practice medicine in Missouri and that their payments for Dr. Nelson's services were sent from Missouri. The trial court sustained Dr. Nelson's motion to dismiss and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
According to the Lindley court, "[w]hen a defendant raises the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction by [establishing]: (1) that the action arose out of an activity covered by the long-arm statute, [§ 506.500, RSMo,] and (2)that defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with [Missouri] to satisfy due process."48 The court found that even though the fee for Dr. Nelson's services was paid in Missouri, it was for services rendered in Kansas. Nothing done in Kansas was intended to have an effect in Missouri. According to the court, the fact that Dr. Nelson had a Missouri medical license was not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish that he had conducted business in Missouri. Moreover, the court found that there was no showing that Dr. Nelson "consulted with any Missouri physician in the care and treatment of Mr. Lindley."49 Because all of the alleged acts of negligence took place in Kansas, there was no action in Missouri.50
In Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Citizens National Bank,51 both the trial court and appellate court found that Citizens National, a Kansas bank, did not have sufficient contacts with Missouri to support long-arm jurisdiction. Citizens National held a security interest in the accounts receivable of Engineered Systems, Inc., which did work for the City of Kansas City on a road project. Citizens National sent a letter to the City of Kansas City requesting that the city send to Citizens National in Lenexa, Kansas, the payments owed on the project to Engineered Systems, Inc. Kansas City complied with that request and sent Engineered Systems, Inc.'s payments to Citizens National. Capitol Indemnity, a surety of ESI, sought recovery of those payments from Citizens National under equitable subrogation and conversion theories. Citizens National did not have a registered agent in Missouri and was not otherwise doing business in Missouri. Finding insufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process, the court determined that any contacts Citizens National had with Missouri were random and attenuated. The use of mail or telephone communications, without more, did not constitute the transaction of business for purposes of long-arm jurisdiction in Missouri. Even if the act of Citizens National in sending a letter to the city of Kansas City amounted to the transaction of business, such act was, at most, an attenuated contact, single in nature, which could not satisfy due process requirements or justify the imposition of personal jurisdiction by Missouri courts over Citizens National.
On the other hand, long-arm jurisdiction was found in Beckers v. Seck,52 where Lisa Beckers obtained an order of protection against her uncle, Kenneth Seck, under the Missouri Adult Abuse Chapter. Mr. Seck, a Kansas resident, repeatedly called Lisa at her home in Missouri, and sent letters to other relatives in Missouri, blaming Lisa for her mother's death. Seck challenged personal jurisdiction over him, but both the trial court and the court of appeals found jurisdiction. Seck's contacts were both numerous and significant. "The state of Missouri is . . . interested in providing a forum for its residents under harassing and stalking statutes," and Beckers was a Missouri resident.53 There was no inconvenience to Seck, since he lived in the Kansas City metropolitan area. Seck's calls and mailings to Beckers were intentionally and purposefully directed to her. Because he purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Missouri, he should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Missouri. Seck's contacts with Beckers in Missouri were sufficient for the court to acquire personal jurisdiction over him.
VI. Internet Activities
The Internet is rapidly growing as a mode of communication, commerce and education serving the social, cultural, business and political institutions of our day. As its importance and use grows, new application of the aforementioned legal principles is required. In response to this need, the courts have attempted to apply the legal framework already established to this new medium. However, some difficulty in applying the aforementioned principles is inherent because of the nature of the medium. As acknowledged in ACLU v. Reno,54 "[t]here is no centralized storage location, central point, or communications channel for the Internet. . . ."55 Because of the "jurisdiction" confounding nature of the Internet, varying strains of jurisdictional analysis have arisen.
The courts have, however, consistently held that the mere presence on the Internet alone does not establish the minimum contacts necessary to subject a corporation or individual to personal jurisdiction throughout the world.56 Rather, the federal courts have held that posting information on a website is most analogous to placing a product into the stream of commerce.57 "Creating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide - or even worldwide - but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state."58
To obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant based on that defendant's Internet activities, the defendant must direct its website activities to the state and purposefully avail itself of the benefits and protections of that state.59 In cases of specific jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit has adopted the framework of Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.60 which requires an analysis of the type of website maintained by the defendant. In Lakin v. Prudential Securities, Inc.,61 the plaintiffs "filed suit in Missouri state court, alleging claims of negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty" against Prudential Savings Bank, a federally chartered savings bank with its principal place of business in Georgia.62 The case was removed to federal court and Prudential moved for dismissal, arguing that Missouri lacked personal jurisdiction. Prudential's motion was granted.63
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that Prudential was subject to specific and general jurisdiction due to its transaction of business with Missouri residents and due to its maintenance of an Internet website. The court first considered Prudential's business contacts. Prudential maintained home-equity loans and lines of credits in the total amount of approximately $10 million with Missouri residents. The court determined these contacts to be continuous because the maintenance of loans involved a series of transactions occurring over time.64 Prudential argued that the contacts were not substantial because they only accounted for one percent of Prudential's total business. The court disagreed, stating that "[p]ercentage of a company's sales in a given state are generally irrelevant. Instead, our focus is on whether a defendant's activity in the forum state is 'continuous and systematic.'"65 "[O]ur relevant inquiry is not whether the percentage of a company's contacts is substantial for that company; rather, our inquiry focuses on whether the company's contacts are substantial for the forum."66 Based on the foregoing, the court determined that discovery on the jurisdictional issues was necessary to complete the inquiry.
Next, the court considered the plaintiffs' argument that Prudential's maintenance of a website subjected it to general jurisdiction in Missouri. The court determined that "Missouri courts have not yet addressed whether a Web site may provide sufficient 'minimum contacts' to invoke personal jurisdiction. Neither have we."67 Thus, the court adopted the Zippo approach in cases involving Internet websites and specific jurisdiction.68
This approach has also been adopted by a majority of the federal circuits.69 The Zippo court applied the traditional personal jurisdiction framework to Internet websites, stating, "[T]he likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of [the] commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet."70 In applying this principle, the court distinguished between three general categories of websites along a sliding scale, and categorized them as websites that are (1) interactive, (2) semi-interactive, or (3) passive.
The Zippo court defined an interactive website as one where "the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet."71 A defendant operating an interactive website "can properly be haled into the courts of that foreign jurisdiction."72
A passive website is one that "merely makes information available" and does permit commercial transactions or activity to be conducted through it.73 To uphold jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant on the basis of a passive website would, as held in Bell v. Imperial Palace/Casino, Inc.,74 "turn the notion of federal personal jurisdiction on its head, eliminating the protections that jurisdictional requirements were designed to safeguard."75
Lastly, "semi-interactive websites [are those websites] through which there have not been a high volume of transactions between the defendant and residents of the [forum.]"76 According to Zippo, "[i]n these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site."77 [A] web site targeted at a particular jurisdiction [will] likely" subject a defendant to jurisdiction.78 Federal courts have consistently held that an Internet advertisement, even when available nationwide, is insufficient, of itself, to establish jurisdiction over a non-resident party.79
In Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc.,80 the court found that the defendant had not directed any electronic activity at Maryland because its website had a strongly local character. The court went on to state that even though the website was semi-interactive, because it was not directed at Maryland residents, the defendant could not be subject to personal jurisdiction in Maryland.
In Revell v. Lidov,81 the court held that the maintenance by a university of a website did not constitute substantial contacts with a foreign state to support specific jurisdiction without violating due process. The Revell court found that the subject matter of the suit did not arise out of the solicitation of subscriptions on the university's website and that the website would not support a finding of minimum contacts. In addition, the court held that the university's website, which was directed at the entire world, did not constitute a purposeful availment in the forum state because the university could not reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Finally, the court found that "[t]he defendant must be chargeable with knowledge of the forum at which his conduct is directed in order to reasonably anticipate being haled into court in that forum. . . ."82
In Lakin, the Eighth Circuit determined, however, that the "sliding scale" created in Zippo should not apply "presumptively for cases of general jurisdiction."83 This determination was made because in cases of general jurisdiction, the court is to look at "the 'nature and quality' of the contacts" and the "quantity of the contacts" with the forum, rather than their connection with "the cause of action."84 According to the Lakin court, under the Zippo approach "it is possible for a Web site to be very interactive, but" not to have the sufficient "quantity of contacts" necessary for general jurisdiction.85 Instead, the court modified its approach by first applying the Zippo test and then by examining the quantity of the contacts with Missouri residents. The court stated,
As one court has noted, the Zippo test "is not well adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry, because even repeated contacts with forum residents by a foreign defendant may not constitute the requisite substantial, continuous and systematic contacts required for a finding of general jurisdiction. . . ." As a result, we will first apply the Zippo test and then also look at the quantity of those contacts with Missouri residents.86
In application of these principles, the
Lakin court found the Prudential website to be:
a sophisticated, interactive Web site in which a user can exchange information with the host computer. Not only can Missouri consumers review detailed company, service, and financial information about Prudential Savings, they can also exchange electronic mail; establish and access secure online accounts; and calculate home-mortgage rates. More importantly, Missouri consumers are also able to complete online application for home-equity loans and lines of credit. The site states that it provides electronic responses to the inquiry within three to five business days.87
In spite of the foregoing, the court reasoned that "this is not sufficient for general jurisdiction," because "the record contain[ed] no indication of: the number of times that Missouri consumers have accessed the Web site; the number of Missouri consumers [requesting] further information about Prudential," etc.
88 Thus, the Eighth Circuit continues to require a clear showing that the defendant had continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum state.
89
Following these same principles, beer sales over the Internet to Missouri consumers supported long-arm jurisdiction in an earlier Missouri case, State ex rel. Nixon v. Beer Nuts, Ltd..90 Beer Nuts, a North Carolina corporation, sold memberships in its "beer-of-the-month" club through its website on the Internet. Several investigators for the attorney general purchased memberships in the Beer Nuts Club "directly through its website using an on-line order form." The investigators were not required to make any representations regarding their age when using the website to place the order. The attorney general brought suit against Beer Nuts, alleging violations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act and the Missouri liquor control law. The trial court enjoined Beer Nuts from selling beer club memberships to Missouri consumers and imposed a civil penalty of $1,000.
On appeal, Beer Nuts challenged the trial court's finding of personal jurisdiction, but the court of appeals affirmed. "Missouri's long-arm statute was designed to allow the exercise of jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants to the extent permissible under the due process clause."91 "Physical presence is not a determinative factor in commercial cases in establishing sufficient minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum."92 By allowing Missouri consumers to purchase beer on Beer Nuts' website using an on-line order form, Beer Nuts purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting business within Missouri. "[T]he interest of the State of Missouri in regulating the sale and delivery of alcoholic beverages within [the state] outweighs the burden that Beer Nuts bears in appearing as a party defendant in Missouri."93 Beer Nuts had [sufficient] minimum contacts with Missouri and its due process rights were not violated by the trial court exercising personal jurisdiction over it."94 Moreover, by advertising its products for direct sale to Missouri consumers, Beer Nuts was subject to the provisions of Missouri's liquor control law. "Beer Nuts took no precautions to prevent the sale of its beers to minors."95 "By selling [beer] without statutory safeguards, Beer Nuts . . . present[ed] a risk of substantial injury to Missouri consumers."96 By selling memberships to Missouri consumers and shipping beer to Missouri residents without requiring proof of age, Beer Nuts violated Missouri's liquor control law.97 Using the Zippo analysis, a federal court would have also found jurisdiction due to the interactive website of Beer Nuts.
VII. Conclusion
While websites and Internet services, like the use of mail, telecommunications and faxes, have certainly created additional types of contacts that a defendant may have with the forum state, they are usually not sufficient of themselves to satisfy due process. The defendant must still purposefully avail itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state to be subject to long-arm jurisdiction. Where the defendant's website is interactive, it is likely that this test will be easily met. Where the website is passive, much more must be shown to establish minimum contacts by the defendant.
Footnotes
1 W. Dudley McCarter is a principal in the St. Louis firm of Behr, McCarter & Potter, P.C. He received his J.D. degree in 1975 from the University of Missouri - Columbia. He is a past president of The Missouri Bar and the St. Louis County Bar Association. His practice is concentrated in the area of civil litigation. Mr. McCarter has written more than 25 articles that have been published in the Journal of the Missouri Bar.
2 Joseph C. Blanner is an associate with the St. Louis firm of Behr, McCarter & Potter, P. C. He is a 1998 graduate of the University of Missouri - St. Louis. In 2001, he graduated from St. Louis University School of Law with a joint J.D./M.A. degree. Mr. Blanner's practice is concentrated in the areas of civil litigation and municipal law.
3 Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 1994).
4 Clune v. Alimak AB, 233 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 2000).
5 Porter v. Berall, 293 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 2002).
6 See Wessels, Arnold & Henderson v. National Medical Waste, Inc., 65 F.3d 1427, 1431 (8th Cir. 1995).
7 Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1086 (E.D. Mo. 2001), citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996). May Dept. Stores Co. v. Wilansky, 900 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (citing Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1982)).
8 Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecommunications (PTE), Ltd., 89 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1996).
9 Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Watlow Electric Mfg. Co. v. Patch Rubber Co., 838 F.2d 999, 1000 (8th Cir. 1988); Nieman v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 619 F.2d 1189, 1190 (7th Cir. 1980).
10 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
11 Burlington Indus., 97 F.3d at 1102.
12 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417.
13 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
14 Dakota Indus., 946 F.2d at 1389.
15 Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
16 World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
17 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984); BIB Mfg. Co. v. Dover Mfg. Co., 804 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
18 804 F. Supp. at 1132 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 321)).
19 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
20 Porter, 293 F.3d at 1076; see also Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 708 F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1983).
21 Id.
22 912 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1990).
23 Id. at 243-44.
24 Id.
25 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990).
26 Id. at 375.
27 Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1087 (E.D. Mo. 2001).
28 Id. at 1090, citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952).
29 53 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1995).
30 Id. at 922, citing Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301, 1303 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
31 Id., citing Precision Constr. Co. v. J. A. Slattery Co., 765 F.2d 114, 118 (8th Cir. 1985).
32 Id., quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980); Scullin Steel Co. v. National Ry. Utilization Corp., 676 F.2d 309, 313 n.5 (8th Cir. 1982).
33 Id.at 923, citing U.S. Kids, 22 F.3d at 820; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
34 Scullin Steel, 676 F.2d at 314; Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651, 655-56 (8th Cir. 1982).
35 Wessels, 65 F.3d at 1432 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
36 950 F.2d 526 (8th Cir. 1991).
37 Id. at 529.
38 Id. See also Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc., 923 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1991); Charles Schmitt & Co. v. Grand Prix Auto Wholesalers, 616 F. Supp. 1191, 1192 (D.C. Mo. 1985) ("The party seeking to invoke . . . jurisdiction [over a non-resident] bears the burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction" exists). See also Precision Constr. Co. v. J. A. Slattery Co., 765 F.2d 114, 118 (8th Cir. 1985).
39 86 S.W.3d 114 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002).
40 Id. at 120 (citing Elaine K. v. Augusta Hotel Associates, 850 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993)).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 728 S.W.2d 598 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987).
44 Id. at 603-04.
45 728 S.W.2d 604 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987).
46 Id. at 609. See also Breen v. Jarvis, 761 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988).
47 55 S.W.3d 906 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001).
48 Id. at 909.
49 Id. at 912.
50 Id. at 914.
51 8 S.W.3d 893 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000).
52 14 S.W.3d 139 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000).
53 Id. at 143.
54 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
55 Id. at 832.
56 See Lakin v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 348 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2003).
57 Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 41 (D. Mass. 1997).
58 Bensuan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D. N.Y. 1996).
59 Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002). See also Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Stowell, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Mo. 2001), and Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D.N.J. 1997) (The placement of information on Internet site as advertisement and even having added feature of enabling user to contact defendant through its website is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on defendant).
60 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
61 348 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2003).
62 Id. at 705.
63 Id. at 705.
64 Id. at 708.
65 Id.at 709.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 710.
68 Id. at 711.
69 See Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999); Soma Medical Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 120 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 2003). See also Butler v. Beer Across America, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2000); Ty Inc. v. Clark, 2000 WL 51816 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
70 952 F. Supp. at 1124; Soma Medical Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999).
71 Zippo at 1124; Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997).
72 334 F.3d 390, 399 (4th Cir. 2003).
73 Id.; see Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 373, 336 (5th Cir. 1999).
74 200 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (E.D. Mo. 2001).
75 Id. at 1091. See Harbuck v. Aramco, Inc., No. 99-1971, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16892 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1999) ("[T]he website amounts to 'passive' advertising at best; and subjecting (defendant) to this court's jurisdiction because of the website would be unreasonable").
76 Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 399 (4th Cir. 2003).
77 See Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Medical Surgical Products Ltd., 64 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("[T]he establishment of a website through which customers can order products does not, on its own, suffice to establish general jurisdiction.").
78 S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
79 See, e.g., Mid City Bowling Lanes & Sports Palace, Inc. v. Ivercrest, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 507 (E.D. La. 1999); Bensuan Restaurant Corp v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. N.Y. 1996); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 120 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
80 334 F.3d at 401.
81 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
82 Id. at 475. See also Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002); Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2002).
83 Lakin, 348 F.3d at 711.
84 Id at 712.
85 Id.
86 Id., citing Revell, 317 F.3d at 471.
87 Id. at 712.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 29 S.W.3d 828 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000).
91 Id. at 833.
92 Id. at 834.
93 Id. at 836.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 838.
96 Id.
97 Id.
JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI BAR
Volume 60 - No. 6 - November-December 2004