by Joseph G. Lauber¹

Introduction

The general public is continuously exposed to media stories regarding economic and community development groups seeking to improve a city's quality of life by attracting jobs, tourism, or redevelopment of blighted and depressed areas.² The State of Missouri has one of the broadest palettes of community development tools in the country with which such groups can advance their agendas.³ A recent addition to this collection is the Community Improvement District (CID) Act.⁴ Reintroduced in 1998⁵ due to potential constitutional issues in the language of its 1997 version,⁶ the CID Act has been virtually free of litigation.⁷ Generally, the CID Act provides for property owners or business owners within a specified area to form either a not-for-profit corporation or a political subdivision. Once formed, these entities possess powers enabling them to carry out numerous fiscal initiatives, primarily the ability to raise funds through special assessments and taxes for the provision of public infrastructure.⁸

This article will furnish historical background on the adoption the CID Act, a discussion of its procedural framework, and an analysis of the scope of capital improvements permitted. The epicentral discussion revolves around the fundamental issue of the ability of a CID to provide public improvements and services while limiting access to the public at large. Suggestions are provided for clarification of legislative ambiguities. Lastly, this article seeks to encourage members of Missouri's economic and legal communities to utilize the creative and innovative opportunities that arise from implementation of the CID Act to improve their community's quality of life.

II. History/ Background

The Community Improvement District Act (the act) was originally enacted as a component of Missouri Senate Bill 21 in 1997.⁹ Later that year, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided a related constitutional issue in Carmack v. Director.¹⁰ The act originally contained provisions relating to both community improvement districts and museum districts under Senate Bill 21's title: "An Act Relating to Sales Taxes for Economic Development and Tourism."¹¹ In order to avoid invalidity under the provisions of Article III, § 23 of the Missouri Constitution, the act was reintroduced in 1998.¹² The act delegates authority to counties, cities in first class or second class counties, and St. Louis to approve community improvement districts (CIDs) within their jurisdictions,¹³ although St. Louis originally was nearly excluded.¹⁴

Community improvement district legislation currently exists in all 50 states, Canada and the Caribbean.¹⁵ The best known use of this legislation was the cleansing of Times Square in New York City.¹⁶ In lobbying for the act, Franklin "Kim" Kimbrough, president of the Downtown St. Louis Partnership and champion for the CID cause in St. Louis, stated: "Community improvement districts provide more equity, more participation and, ultimately, more impact [than business tax districts]."¹⁷ A CID "is not a government-imposed system. The property owners of the district will design and pay for the program. . . . This is a true private-public partnership."¹⁸

The fundamental attribute of CIDs is the empowerment of citizens to "take back control of their communities instead of waiting for government to solve their needs in competition with other communities."¹⁹ Ultimately "[t]hrough the community improvement districts, residents can form their own quasi-governmental body among their neighbors, set measurable goals and see their tax dollars at work in their own backyards."²⁰

III. The CID Act

A. CID Formation

To form a community improvement district, both property owners owning more than 50 percent of the assessed value of the real property within the boundaries of the district, and 50 percent per capita of all owners within the district must sign a petition that is submitted to the hosting municipality for approval.²¹ A municipality is defined by the act as "any city located in a county of the first classification or second classification, any city not within a county and any county."²² The petition, among other things, must contain the name and boundaries of the district, a five-year capital and service plan outlining the purposes of the district, and a cost estimate of the improvements to be provided.²³

The petition also must indicate whether the CID will be formed as a political subdivision or a not-for-profit corporation.²⁴ Missouri not-for-profit corporations must be designated either as public benefit or mutual benefit corporations.²⁵ The current CID Act should be amended to require that not-for-profit CIDs must be designated as public benefit corporations. Without such a mandatory designation, ascertaining the intended structure of the entity could create significant public purpose issues.²⁶ Designation as a public benefit corporation will assist CIDs to avoid constitutional challenges based on the "public emoluments clause."²⁷ The petition also must include the assessed value of all of the district's property, whether a declaration of blight will be sought, and the proposed duration of the district.²⁸

Upon receipt of a petition from the owners within the proposed district, the municipality's clerk will review the petition for compliance with the act.²⁹ The governing body of the municipality, within 45 days of the receipt of the petition by the municipal clerk, must provide notice of a public hearing to be held on the adoption of the proposed district.³⁰ At the close of the public hearing, the governing body may, by ordinance, approve the petition and establish the district,³¹ and may also make any designation of blight sought by the applicants.³² A written report must be sent to the Missouri Department of Economic Development as the final step in the formation of the district.³³

B. Administrative Process

A board of directors is elected or appointed to govern the district.³⁴ The chief elected officer of the municipality in which the improvement district has been created will appoint the members of the board or, if elective, the election procedure utilized is outlined at § 67.1551, RSMo.³⁵ Staggered terms for board members are provided in the act.³⁶

A CID may remove or add real property to the district after its formation.³⁷ Expanding the boundaries of a district requires a second petition that is signed by owners of property in the area to be added in the same manner as was required in § 67.1431, RSMo.³⁸ Removal of property requires a written request by any real property owner within the district.³⁹ The governing body of the municipality that contains the district must give notice and hold a public hearing before allowing any change in the district's property.⁴⁰ A condition to removal of property is that, after removal, the district must remain able to meet any debts or obligations it has incurred considering the drop in revenue it will suffer as a result of the change.⁴¹

CIDs must hold an annual meeting and adopt an annual budget 30 days before the start of each fiscal year.⁴² This budget must be submitted to the governing body of the municipality that hosts the CID.⁴³ At the end of each fiscal year, the CID must submit a report to the municipality's clerk and to the Missouri Department of Economic Development stating "the services provided, revenues collected and expenditures made by the district during such fiscal year, and copies of written resolutions approved by the board during the fiscal year."⁴⁴ A community improvement district's fiscal year is identical to the fiscal year of the municipality.⁴⁵

C. Powers

Unless limited in the petition to create the district, each district has all of the powers necessary to carry out the purposes of the CID Act.⁴⁶ Subsequent to this broad grant of power, the act outlines a non-exhaustive list of 28 powers granted to CIDs.⁴⁷ Among these powers one will find powers typically granted to legal entities: to sue and be sued,⁴⁸ to enter into contracts,⁴⁹ to acquire and dispose of property⁵⁰ and to borrow and loan money.⁵¹ More particular to community improvement districts, however, is the grant of power to levy and collect special assessments and taxes.⁵² The act grants power to political subdivision CIDs in Springfield to levy real property taxes and business license taxes,⁵³ while con-currently granting political subdivision CIDs in Kansas City the power to levy sales taxes.⁵⁴ CIDs may also collect fees or rents for use of the district's real or personal property,⁵⁵ and restrict "traffic and vendors" on streets, alleys, malls, bridges, ramps, sidewalks and tunnels. . . ."⁵⁶ Improvement districts have the power to raise and expend funds to promote business activity and recruit new development and business,⁵⁷ to promote special events and even to decorate any public place in the district.⁵⁸

Most critical to the discussion in this article is the CID's power "to provide assistance to or to construct, reconstruct, install, repair, maintain and equip any . . . public improvements."⁵⁹ The statute suggests numerous public improvements divided into 10 categories, concluding with the broad provision for "[a]ny other useful, necessary or desired improvement."⁶⁰ The broad grants of power and wide range of intended improvements are what make the CID Act such an attractive economic development tool.

Additional powers are granted to CIDs when the district contains a blighted area or is located within a blighted area.⁶¹ The CID may contract with individual private property owners to "demolish and remove, renovate, reconstruct or rehabilitate any building or structure" owned by the private property owner.⁶² The CID also may expend or loan its revenues in accord with the contract for blight removal, so long as the governing body of the municipality determines that the proposed action of the CID and the private property owner is "reasonably anticipated to remediate the blighting conditions and will serve a public purpose."⁶³

D. Funding Mechanisms

A community improvement district may utilize real property taxation, special assessments, and business license and sales taxes. The ability to impose taxes or special assessments, however, is limited in St. Louis where real property in a CID is also included in a special business district established pursuant to §§ 71.790- 71.808, RSMo.⁶⁴ The CID Act also limits the ability to levy taxes to only those districts established as a political subdivision.⁶⁵ CIDs that are not-for-profit corporations may, however, levy special assessments.⁶⁶ The act additionally allows districts to "establish different classes of real property with the district for purposes for special assessments."⁶⁷

1. Special Assessments

The authority to impose "special assessments [is] independent of the limitations and authorities of the municipality in which it is located."⁶⁸ To secure funding through a special assessment, owners of real property who collectively own more than 50 percent of the real property within the district, along with 50 percent per capita of the owners of property within the district, must sign and submit a petition.⁶⁹ The petition should include a description of the service or improvement to be created by the funds, a cap on the amount of the expenditure and a list of the properties receiving a special benefit from the proposed service or improvement.⁷⁰

A special fund is required for each special assessment.⁷¹ The proceeds are deposited into this fund and used "solely to pay the costs incurred in undertaking the specified service or project."⁷² Once the service or project has been completed, monies remaining in the fund will be returned to the property owners in the district based upon the method it was collected.⁷³

Special assessments will "constitute a perpetual lien" against the "property from which it is derived" and, upon default, that "lien may be foreclosed in the same manner as any other special assessment lien as provided in section 88.861, RSMo."⁷⁴ Thus, once the special assessment has been established, the district is guaranteed to have the financial backing it needs to issue obligations or obtain loans necessary to make improvements or provide services.⁷⁵

2. Taxes and Business Licenses

A political subdivision CID may levy property taxes or business license taxes for land or businesses located within the district, subject to the approval of a majority of votes cast by qualifying voters.⁷⁶ Qualified voters are registered voters who reside within the district, or in the event that no registered voters live within the district, then qualified voters are the owners of the property who will be subject to the tax 30 days prior to the election.⁷⁷ The local election authority carries out the election for a real property tax by the procedure outlined in the act.⁷⁸

Once a real property tax has been approved, the CID may utilize the county or city tax collector to collect the amounts due and remit the funds to the CID's treasurer.⁷⁹ The district may set a lower tax rate than was approved by the voters and subsequently raise that rate up to the limit approved without additional approval.⁸⁰ A district is limited in its ability to lower or repeal the tax rate if such an action would impair the CID's ability to repay its debts and obligations.⁸¹

Community improvement districts created in Kansas City have the additional tool of retail sales tax at their disposal.⁸² This tax is imposed according to Missouri's sales tax provisions,⁸³ but the tax is additionally limited to specific rates spelled out in the statute,⁸⁴ and can not apply to the sale of "motor vehicles, trailers, boats or outboard motors and sales to public utilities."⁸⁵ Approval of the retail sales tax follows roughly the same procedure as is required for real property tax.⁸⁶ The director of the Missouri Department of Revenue will collect these taxes, which the retailers must add to their sales price so that it becomes a portion of the total purchase price.⁸⁷

The revenue generated by the district's sales and use tax must have been "designated for a specific purpose [and] shall be deposited into a special trust fund and expended only for such purpose."⁸⁸ After the tax expires, the revenue in the special fund must continue to be utilized only for the designated purpose.⁸⁹ Any funds that are not needed for the specified purpose "may be invested by the board of directors pursuant to applicable laws relating to the investment of other district funds."⁹⁰ As was the case with other funding mechanisms, the district's ability to repeal the sales tax is limited by the effect of that repeal on the district's ability to repay its debts and obligations.⁹¹

3. Community Improvement District Funds

A final source of funds available to CIDs is community improvement district funds. Each municipality that hosts a community improvement district may establish a fund in its treasury to: pay the costs associated with planning or administering the CID, or making an improvement; prepare preliminary plans, studies and engineering reports used to determine the feasibility of a proposed public improvement or service; or paying the initial cost of the improvement until the CID is able to issue and sell its obligations.⁹² This source may be extremely attractive to smaller, cash-strapped districts such as homeowners' associations that may need the promise of quick action regarding the improvement to solicit support for the district. Depending upon the type of CID established, and the purposes it will serve, use of this funding source may come into question under the Missouri Constitution's Public Credit Clause.⁹³ A discussion of this premise is a component of the analysis of the CID Act that follows.

D. Statute of Limitations

Community improvement districts are protected by a statute of limitations.⁹⁴ In respect to the establishment of a CID, no lawsuit may be brought after 90 days from the effective date of the ordinance that established the district.⁹⁵ Special assessments and taxes levied by CIDs are also protected from suits after 90 days from the effective date of the resolution levying the tax or assessment.⁹⁶

IV. Effective Implementation of the CID Act

The community improvement district is an invaluable tool, especially for close-knit areas within a city where community pride motivates citizens to seek ways to improve their surroundings. As suggested in the act itself, this tool can be used for services such as: the provision of a security force; cleaning, maintenance and refuse collection; and even decoration of the district for holidays and special occasions.⁹⁷ The act also suggests the creation of various public improvements such as parks and landscaping, parking lots and garages, and childcare facilities.⁹⁸

An interesting question arises, however, when the community is either unwilling or unable to undertake the management of such services and facilities to serve the public at large. As a hypothetical, consider a neighborhood homeowners' association that organizes itself to petition its local government to create a community improvement district for the purpose of constructing and operating a childcare facility. Suppose further that the association intends to restrict access to only individuals who reside within the district. May a community improvement district legally restrict access to the services or improvements it created with funds raised pursuant to this act?

Exploring this question requires analysis of two alternate theories regarding the act. The first issue is whether the CID is empowered by the act to make an improvement that is subsequently restricted from use by the public at large. If, by definition, all improvements created under the act are public improvements, then the scope of individuals who may subsequently utilize the improvement is irrelevant. Because the CID Act specifically grants districts the power to construct, maintain and equip "public improvements,"⁹⁹ ascertaining the meaning of that term is crucial.

Assuming for a moment that the first theory is true – that is, that a CID would have the power to make an improvement that is subsequently restricted in scope of use – the second issue that arises is whether governmental support of the CID violates article VI, § 23 of the Missouri Constitution. Sometimes referred to as the Public Emoluments Clause or Public Credit Clause, this section prohibits cities and other political subdivisions from lending their credit or granting anything of value to any corporation, association or individual without a public purpose.¹⁰⁰ Following is an analysis of both theories in turn.

A component of reaching a conclusion for both of these deeply interrelated issues, however, is establishing the parameters of the word "public." Put another way, it is necessary to answer the question, "How public is public?" Whether the issue is defining public improvement, public purpose or public use, the definition of the word "public" is critical and, as we shall see, is no easy task.

A. Defining the "Public" Component While Reaching the Meaning of Public Improvement

Neither "public improvement" nor the word "public" is defined in the CID Act. When terms are undefined in a statute, they should be "given their plain and ordinary meaning as found in the dictionary in order to ascertain the intent of lawmakers."¹⁰¹ "Public" is a word with varied meanings. According to Webster's, it can be used as an adjective, meaning "of, relating to, or affecting all the people or the whole area of a nation or state" or "of or relating to a government."¹⁰² Alternatively, it can mean "of or relating to people in general."¹⁰³ Additional meanings include: "of or relating to business or community interests as opposed to private affairs"; "devoted to the general or national welfare"; and "accessible to or shared by all members of the community."¹⁰⁴ As a noun, public can mean "a place accessible or visible to the public," "the people as a whole" or the more limited "group of people having common interests or characteristics."¹⁰⁵ While many of the definitions listed above suggest that "public" is an extremely general term, "relating to . . . community interests" and "group of people having common interests or characteristics" seem to allow a definition of "public" in a more limited sense. For that reason, it is necessary to analyze the use of "public" in other circumstances under Missouri law.

In 1913, the Supreme Court of Missouri rather circularly established that "public places" are something other than private premises.¹⁰⁶ The Court based this decision on its determination that the intent behind a St. Joseph disorderly conduct ordinance was to prevent disturbances of persons or of the public generally in public places or in places open to the public.¹⁰⁷ Later, while determining whether a road was public or private, the Court suggested that, to establish the characteristics of a public road, "[i]t is enough if its use is free and common to all citizens, and that the public has actual access to it" and not on the number of people who actually use it.¹⁰⁸

In 1935, the Court dealt with the constitutionality of the imposition of taxes to induce the siting of a national park in St. Louis.¹⁰⁹ Emphasizing the difficulty in determining the meaning of public, the Court stated, "What constitutes a public use is not easy to define."¹¹⁰ Holding that the purpose of levying a tax to attract a national park was a public one, the Court found the following facts important: "the proposed park will be open to the use of the inhabitants of the city as fully and completely as are existing city parks"; the park was "designed to be both educational and recreational;" it "will be conveniently accessible to those inhabitants of the city"; and the park was to be a public park available to the use of everyone.¹¹¹

There are many cases in which the courts have determined whether a public purpose existed.¹¹² Cape Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, for instance, explored whether a public purpose existed for a levy of taxes to finance a multi-use center at the local university.¹¹³ The Court stated what is becoming increasingly obvious in this analysis: "No hard and fast rules exist for determining whether specific uses and purposes are public or private."¹¹⁴ Nonetheless, the Court proceeded, noting earlier cases finding that when a community that pays for the purpose has an interest in the purpose, that purpose is a public one.¹¹⁵

Reversing lower court decisions that did not find a public purpose, the Court related that it was important that activities be open to the residents of the city when it held that the use of taxes for joint construction and operation of a multi-use center by a city and university was for a public purpose.¹¹⁶ Another important fact was that the center proposed a variety of uses for both the university and the community.¹¹⁷ Additionally, the city could anticipate economic benefits arising from non-residents who would be attracted to the city because of the multi-use center.¹¹⁸ It was also important that the center "promote the education, recreation and pleasure of the public and will be conveniently accessible to those residents of the City."¹¹⁹ While relying on other precedent, the Court, however, revealed the disparate meanings of "public" by mentioning that it is not necessary that the entire community benefits or actually uses the improvement.¹²⁰ Further, the Court noted that a public improvement is not deprived of its public character simply because its advantage benefits a particular group or individual.¹²¹

Although the preceding examples exhibit a tendency to define "public" in general terms, other areas of case law suggest that "public" may be described in a somewhat more limited scope. One example is the narrowed scope of "public" courts have used for the finding of public use and public purpose in the context of eminent domain issues. In Bowman v. Kansas City,¹²² taxpayers sought to enjoin Kansas City from acquiring property for the proposed operation of an off-street parking facility.¹²³ Again, the Court expressed that the "determination of whether specific purposes . . . are public or private, is often a close and difficult question."¹²⁴ The Court outlined that there are no hard and fast rules for this determination, because the term public is "elastic and keeps pace with changing conditions" and will vary with the character of the case.¹²⁵ The Court ultimately found a public purpose and public use for police power reasons because a parking facility directly affects public safety and welfare of the public's life and property.¹²⁶ Protecting public safety and welfare unquestionably benefits the public in general. In this finding, however, it is important to note that the Court determined that "it is not necessary that the whole community or any large part of it should actually use or be benefited by a contemplated improvement. Benefit to any considerable number is sufficient."¹²⁷

The scope of public benefit and public use is also limited where improvements are financed through special assessments. Public improvements can be local or general in nature.¹²⁸ "Local improvements confer a special benefit on certain limited property, and the cost is, therefore, charged against the property benefited through special assessments and not against the city at large."¹²⁹ To determine whether financing for an improvement should be assessed specially or generally, legislators and courts must determine whether the use and benefit is public.

In 1923, the City of St. Louis proposed significant improvements for civic beautification.¹³⁰ One of the proposed improvements was the construction of a memorial plaza in appreciation for the sacrifices of soldiers who fought in World War I.¹³¹ The city charter provided that when the city condemned land for specific improvements, the damages would be specially assessed against the property owners who benefited from the improvement.¹³² If, however, the improvements were for special purposes other than those enumerated in Section 4 of the charter, the city was to pay the damages incurred.¹³³ Because "special taxation for objects that are general and public is illegal," the Court had to determine whether the improvement was local or general in nature.¹³⁴

When determining the extent of the public that benefits from any given public improvement, "[t]he character of the improvement, its situation, its surrounding conditions, and whether the substantial benefits to be derived therefrom are local or general in their nature, are all to be considered."¹³⁵ Further, "[t]he fact that an improvement will be of advantage to the City does not change its character as a local improvement," especially when adjacent property is materially benefited.¹³⁶ This is distinguished from situations where the benefit is diffused throughout the entire municipality.¹³⁷ Nonetheless, the Court held that because the entire public historically desires memorials, the memorial plaza would be a general improvement.¹³⁸ Although the fact that the entire public benefited from the improvement was pivotal in this case, the criteria applied when distinguishing local improvements from general improvements suggest that it is possible, and at times necessary, to limit the meaning of the word "public" in terms of improvements.

The court also revealed a narrowed scope of "public" when it actually defined the phrase "public improvement" in 1932.¹³⁹ Addressing the general meaning of public improvement, the court defined public improvement in two ways.¹⁴⁰ In one sense, the grading of the street at issue in the case was a public improvement because the city had exclusive control of streets and had been given the power to grade them by charter.¹⁴¹ This meaning seems to coincide with the "of or relating to a government" meaning listed in Webster's.¹⁴² In a second sense, the court wrote "'public improvement' means an improvement upon any real property belonging to a municipal corporation and includes all public works belonging to or prosecuted by the city."¹⁴³ This definition suggests that "public" in the phrase "public improvement" more directly assumes the noun usage of the word. Put another way, a public improvement is a place or a thing, not a description of who may use it. Using this meaning, it is tenable that any improvement to property belonging to a political subdivision is a public improvement regardless of the scope of its subsequent use.¹⁴⁴

In the end, the decision as to what "public" means in regard to a public improvement falls upon the governing body of the municipality initially approving the CID. That legislative body will regard the multifarious meanings of public from broad to narrow as it contemplates whether to lend its credit to the district.¹⁴⁵ Fortunately, "Missouri courts will defer to a city council when it declares a particular purpose to be a public one, and not interfere with a discretionary exercise of judgment unless it is clearly erroneous or unreasonable."¹⁴⁶ The common thread developed from this analysis is that although "public" can mean access open to all members of the population, there is precedent supporting a more limited definition. A court will measure a public purpose against the aforementioned standards when determining whether a city council erred in its finding due to arbitrariness or unreasonableness.¹⁴⁷ Ultimately, a legislative body must make this finding based upon the characteristics of the word public as outlined above.

Relying on the definition of public improvement provided in Delargy v. Wells Bros. Construction Co., the municipality's governing body may find it critical that a public improvement is a "thing," not a characteristic determined by the scope of individuals permitted to utilize it. Under this analysis, the CID Act defines permitted public improvements; thus, the completion of a project related to the CID Act results in the creation of a public improvement. In any event, it will be crucial for a proposed community improvement district to convince the governing body of the municipality in which it wishes to be established that the proposed service or improvement will benefit the public, even though access to such service or improvement may be limited.

B. CID as a Separate Entity

Although the preceding analysis concluded that a CID improvement is a public improvement regardless of the scope of its subsequent use, it is important that as the scope of the meaning of "public" narrowed, it also became increasingly conceivable to permit the CID itself to constitute "the public." Highlighting this possibility, a city manager contrasting different economic development tools stated: "A special business district is an arm of the city, as opposed to the community improvement district, which is separate. . . . The CID is a new concept where you get people to tax themselves."¹⁴⁸ Thus, another perspective from which to view this issue is that once the governing body of a municipality establishes the CID, it exists as a stand-alone political subdivision or not-for-profit corporation.¹⁴⁹

When established as a not-for-profit corporation, the district has the power to accumulate funds by borrowing money, charging fees and rents, or by levying special assessments.¹⁵⁰ In this situation, a conflict with the Public Emoluments Clause may occur for the municipality if the CID attempts to borrow money from the municipality to finance the improvements, or when the CID attempts to utilize money held by the municipality in a CID fund created pursuant to § 67.1511, RSMo. The solution to this conflict was the subject of the preceding discussion, and will rely heavily upon the establishing municipality's determination of public purpose. So long as the improvements completed by use of CID funds are those defined as public improvements in the act, there is no violation of the Public Emoluments Clause. Otherwise, it does not seem outrageous that a not-for-profit corporation raises funds amongst its members, enabling it to create a benefit for those members alone.

As a separate political subdivision, however, the CID may additionally levy general property taxes and business licenses and, in Kansas City, the political subdivision CID may also enact sales taxes.¹⁵¹ Here a potential conflict arises with Article 10, § 3 of the Missouri Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: "Taxes may be levied and collected for public purposes only. . . ."¹⁵² The solution to this problem is the plausibility that the CID itself defines the public to be served. In other words, so long as the improvements remain fully open and accessible to all of the residents of the district, the services and improvements are public in nature, thus serving a public purpose.

This line of thought is far from revolutionary; in Commerce Clause¹⁵³ analysis, when acting as a market participant rather than a market regulator, a city may exercise the right to favor its own citizens over others.¹⁵⁴ Acting in this proprietary capacity, a city may also choose to prohibit non-residents from using its facilities, or may charge non-residents higher user fees.¹⁵⁵ Further, Missouri statutes provide in pertinent part that "[a]ny . . . political subdivision . . . may contract . . . with other states or their municipalities or political subdivisions, or with any private person, firm, association or corporation, for the planning, development, construction, acquisition or operation of any public improvement or facility, or for a common service."¹⁵⁶ This suggests that while political subdivisions may do business with these entities, they are not required to do so. In other words, they may limit their exposure to those outside their boundaries. As it appears this would be an issue of first impression in Missouri, it is necessary to look to the guidance of other jurisdictions.

In 1974, the final arbiter of Maryland law reviewed a case where a town had constructed and operated a swimming pool in the town park and then adopted a resolution restricting the use of that pool to residents only.¹⁵⁷ The court held that because the town owned and operated the pool, and made membership available to every resident of the town, the pool was public in nature.¹⁵⁸ Restricting non-residents from using the pool was constitutional.¹⁵⁹

In 1949, a New York court addressed a case where, by ordinance, a village charged higher prices for parking permits to some non-residents.¹⁶⁰ Looking to other decisions upholding the imposition of higher licensing fees to non-residents, the court noted that because citizens of a particular political subdivision are possessed with both citizenship and property rights, "[t]hey, and they alone, owned the property to be sold or used, and they alone had the power to dispose of it as they saw fit."¹⁶¹ Implicitly coming to the conclusion that the village could charge higher rates to non-residents for parking permits, the court nonetheless found the ordinance unconstitutional because it did not apply to all non-residents.¹⁶²

A New Jersey case invalidating the prohibition of non-residents from a municipally owned and operated casino and beach club provides some illumination for the other side of this issue.¹⁶³ In the first of two grounds for denying the restricted access, the court held that the borough did not possess the statutory power to limit the segment of the public allowed to utilize the facilities.¹⁶⁴ To avoid this ultra vires challenge, a CID would need to carefully provide the power to limit the use of its facilities in the petition creating the district. The petition operates similarly to a city's charter or a corporation's articles of incorporation in that it defines the scope and powers of the CID. The Van Ness v. Borough of Deal court also found that the borough could not prohibit the use of its facilities by non-residents under New Jersey's equal protection clause.¹⁶⁵ The court reached this conclusion because it did not believe that the restrictions bore a reasonable relationship to the borough's interest in promoting the general health and welfare of its residents.¹⁶⁶

A New York court reached the opposite conclusion, however, regarding the prohibition of non-resident use of a municipal golf course and pool.¹⁶⁷ There the court agreed that the city's restriction of the facility's use was necessary to promote the health, comfort and welfare of its citizens, while also retarding the deterioration of the facilities by avoiding excessive congestion in its use.¹⁶⁸ The court held that no invidious discrimination resulted from the restrictions because the city's basis for taking this action was reasonable.¹⁶⁹

Finally, in a rare en banc decision, the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals made it possible to unite this theory with Missouri law when it adopted the definition of public purpose.¹⁷⁰ "A public purpose or public business has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment all of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political division."¹⁷¹ In light of this authority, it is reasonable to argue that a political subdivision can restrict the use of its public facilities to its own residents. Taking this logic one step further, it could be contended that a CID, as either a political subdivision or a not-for-profit corporation, would be able to restrict the use of an improvement constructed using CID financing to exclusive use by owners of property within the district.

Some may argue that the provisions in the act for contracting with individual property owners in blight situations reveal legislative intent in the act to preclude limiting the use of improvements.¹⁷² This postulate, however, does not hold up when compared to the specific premise of the argument to limit the use of improvements. The discussion in the blight situation regards dealings with solitary persons or entities to specifically modify the existence of their private property. This is distinct from the proposition of this article, however, which is to narrow the parameters of the public served by an improvement. In the former case, an individual's private property is specifically changed by an act of a political subdivision. In the latter, the public is permitted open access to the improvement; it is just that the public itself has been narrowed in scope. Ultimately, it is entirely defensible that a CID would be able to construct a public improvement or provide a public service that is subsequently restricted from use by individuals who are not members of the district itself.

V. Suggestions and Support for Continued Use of the CID Act

There can be no doubt that Missouri's Community Improvement District Act provides an excellent tool for communities throughout the state to provide services and improvements that would otherwise be low priorities by the municipality in which they live. These tools provide fantastic control by the members who make up the district, and can also create a more immediate sense of ownership in the improvements completed, as the funds raised are used directly in the community that raised them.

While the broad grants of power found in the CID Act provide an avenue for creative use of the act, the ambiguity that is inherent in these sweeping grants of power may cause hesitancy in those who would otherwise forge ahead in its use. As a result, it may be advisable for the General Assembly to consider a clarification of the meaning of "public improvement" and whether the CID may limit access to its improvements and services to only those who reside within the district. This clarification is necessary for two related reasons. First, as was seen in the preceding discussion, defining "public" is extremely difficult and, as a result, is prone to inconsistent results. Secondly, clarification would reduce any perceived inconsistency that may serve as a damper on the use of this tool. Municipalities and potential districts want to be certain that the funding mechanism they decide to use for projects will be able to withstand constitutional challenges that may arise. This concern is further magnified by the fact that this act has yet to be tested in the courts.

Additionally, as mentioned previously, it would be prudent for the legislature to designate not-for-profit CIDs as public benefit corporations. This modification would allow courts to avoid the complicated analysis that is required to determine that designation after the fact. Finally comes the suggestion that lawmakers should re-emphasize the provisions regarding reporting to the Missouri Department of Economic Development for establishment and annual reporting of CIDs. Despite the existence of reporting provisions in the act, it is at present difficult to ascertain the true number of CIDs operating in Missouri. Although the Department of Economic Development was only aware of one CID, it is apparent from newspaper articles that approximately five CIDs have been established in the St. Louis area alone.¹⁷³

This author hopes that this article will illuminate the existence of this tool, thus compelling those in need of funds to accomplish tasks that are extreme in their local nature: projects that if left to the municipality to complete, would be delayed as a low priority if considered at all. Considered in light of the suggestions to improve the Community Improvement District Act, it is this author's desire that CIDs become an often used and reliable tool for local public improvements for years to come.

Footnotes

¹ Joseph G. Lauber is a 2003 J.D. candidate at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. Mr. Lauber is the law clerk at the City of Lee's Summit Law Department and has accepted an offer to join the Public Law Practice Division at Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP next September. The opinions set forth in this article are those of the author and should not be considered as the opinion of the City of Lee's Summit.

² See Chet Bridger, Buffalo's Still Waiting for its Second Empire Zone, The Buffalo Times, December 23, 2001, at C-6; Sheri Gassaway, Housing, Parks Groups Seek Funds for Improvements from University City; Organizations Want a Total of $45,000, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 14, 2001, at 5; Matt O'Connor, Poignant Letter Points Up Town's Misery, Chicago Tribune, March 30, 1986, Business Section, at 3.

³ Sections 67.453- 67.475, RSMo 2000 (Neighborhood Improvement District Act); §§ 67.1401- 67.1571, RSMo 2000 (Community Improvement District Act); §§ 99.300- 99.715, RSMo 2000 (Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority Law); §§ 99.800- 99.865, RSMo 2000 (Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment); Chapter 100, RSMo 2000 (Industrial Development Projects-Bonds); Chapter 238, RSMo 2000 (Transportation Districts and Transportation Corporations, Special Projects); Chapter 353, RSMo 2000 (Urban Redevelopment Corporations Law).

⁴ Sections 67.1401- 67.1571, RSMo 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the CID Act).

⁵ Id. For historical reference see H.B. 1636, 89th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998).

⁶ Section 67.1300, RSMo 2000. For historical reference see S.B. 21, 89th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997) (found unconstitutional because it failed the single subject rule).

⁷ An exception to this statement is Missouri Athletic Club v. Leggett, No. 004-00619 (22nd Judicial Circuit, filed June 26, 2001) (mem.) (invalidating the funding mechanism for St. Louis' Downtown Community Improvement District because: (1) the resolution enacting it preceded the effective date of the district by nearly four months; and (2) finding that the revenue collected amounted to an illegal tax because the resolution did not outline in enough specificity the benefits to be conferred to those assessed). The tax was declared illegal because the CID had been formed as a not-for profit corporation, which was not granted the power to tax under the statute. Id. Counsel for Ronald Leggett, the St. Louis Collector of Revenue, requested that Judge Bush vacate his opinion prior to filing an appeal. See Mark Schlinkmann, Downtown Improvement Program Faces Uncertain Future After Ruling to Void Fees, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 4, 2001, at 8. The parties subsequently settled the dispute. See Tim Bryant, City, MAC Settle Dispute Over Downtown Fees, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 26, 2001, at B2.

⁸ See § 67.1461.8, RSMo 2000.

⁹ Michael T. White, Missouri Economic Development Law 14 (University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law 1999).

¹⁰ 945 S.W.2d 956 (Mo. banc 1997) (holding that a bill entitled "relating to economic development" containing 102 statutory amendments was void under Mo. Const. art. III, § 23). The Missouri Constitution provides that "[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title. . . . " Mo. Const. art. III, § 23.

¹¹ S.B. 21, 89th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997), codified § 67.1300, RSMo 2000.

¹² H.B. 1636, 89th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998), codified §§ 67.1401-67.1571, RSMo 2000; See White, note 8 at 14.

¹³ Section 67.1401(9), RSMo 2000.

¹⁴ See Charlene Prost, City Wants in on Bill That Would Aid Tax Districts; St. Louis was Exempted, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 13, 1998, at C3. Representative Thomas Hoppe of Kansas City, sponsor of the bill, amended it early in 1998 to exclude "St. Louis after the city's own lobbyist, and others from St. Louis, raised objections. Hoppe said he didn't want the acrimony coming from St. Louis to spoil things for people in the rest of the state."

¹⁵ William Flannery, Improvement District Work Gets Under Way, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 22, 1998, at C1.

¹⁶ See id.

¹⁷ Prost, note 14, at C3 (quoting Franklin Kimbrough).

¹⁸ Flannery, note 15 at C1 (quoting Steve Gibson, president of Main Street Group of Long Beach, Cal., engaged by the Downtown St. Louis Partnership to run a CID program.)

¹⁹ Edith Cunnane, When Neighborhoods Help Themselves, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 7, 1999 at B7.

²⁰ Id.

²¹ Sections 67.1421(2)(1)-67.1421(2)(2), RSMo 2000.

²² Section 67.1401(2)(9). The City of St. Louis, which is a city not located within a county, and 22 of Missouri's 114 counties are empowered to establish CIDs. Information compiled from County Officials, available at http://www.sos.state.mo.us/moinfo/co-offl1.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2002). The eligible counties are as follows: Boone, Buchanan, Callaway, Camden, Cape Girardeau, Cass, Clay, Cole, Franklin, Greene, Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson, Johnson, Lafayette, New Madrid, Pettis, Platte, St. Charles, St. Francois, St. Louis and Saline. Counties of the fourth classification are treated as counties of the second classification in the law. See § 48.020, RSMo 2000.

²³ Section 67.1421(2)(3), RSMo 2000.

²⁴ Id.; see Chapter 355, RSMo 2000.

²⁵ See § 355.881, RSMo 2000.

²⁶ See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City, Inc. v. Nixon, 26 S.W.3d 218, 228-32 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (holding that the non-profit health care provider was a public benefit corporation, thus effectively blocking a merger with an out of state provider). The merger was blocked because public benefit corporations are under close control of the attorney general's office and possess extremely limited power to undertake a merger. Id. at 225. Additionally, a public benefit corporation's assets are impressed with a constructive and/or charitable trust. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court was required to conduct a complex ad hoc analysis of the non-profit corporation's character to determine whether it existed for a public purpose. See id. at 228-32.

²⁷ Mo. Const. art. VI, § 23.

²⁸ Section 67.1421.2(3), RSMo 2000.

²⁹ Section 67.1421.3, RSMo 2000.

³⁰ Section 67.1431.1, RSMo 2000.

³¹ Section 67.1421.4, RSMo 2000.

³² Id.

³³ Section 67.1421.6, RSMo 2000. While the statutory mandate for notification exists, there is no penalty for neglecting this requirement. Telephone interview with Michelle Linder, redevelopment coordinator, Missouri Department of Economic Development (January 18, 2002). The Missouri Department of Economic Development has only been notified of one community improvement district since the act was adopted in 1998. Id. The department mentioned that due to the local nature of CIDs, their office provides more of an "information center" function as compared to other programs under the department's control. Id.

³⁴ See § 67.1451(1), RSMo 2000. The board for a not-for-profit CID will be compiled according to Chapter 355; see also §§ 355.271-355.326, RSMo 2000. If the district has been established as a political subdivision, the petition will have set out whether its directors should be elected or appointed. Section 67.1451(3), RSMo 2000.

³⁵ See §§ 67.1451(4)–67.1451(5), RSMo 2000.

³⁶ Section 67.1451(4)(4), RSMo 2000. At the time of this writing, proposed legislation existed to modify board member terms.

³⁷ Section 67.1441, RSMo 2000.

³⁸ Section 67.1441(2), RSMo 2000.

³⁹ Section 67.1441(1), RSMo 2000.

⁴⁰ See § 67.1441, RSMo 2000.

⁴¹ Section 67.1441(1)(2), RSMo 2000.

⁴² Section 67.1471(3), RSMo 2000.

⁴³ Id.

⁴⁴ Section 67.1471(4), RSMo 2000.

⁴⁵ Section 67.1471(1), RSMo 2000.

⁴⁶ Section 67.1461(1), RSMo 2000.

⁴⁷ Sections 67.1461(1)(1)-67.1461.1(28), RSMo 2000.

⁴⁸ Section 67.1461(1)(2), RSMo 2000.

⁴⁹ Section 67.1461(1)(3), RSMo 2000.

⁵⁰ Sections 67.1461(1)(6)-67.1461(1)(7), RSMo 2000.

⁵¹ Sections 67.1461(1)(12)- 67.1461(1)(13), RSMo 2000.

⁵² See §§ 67.1461(1)(8)-67.1461(1)(10), RSMo 2000.

⁵³ Section 67.1461(1)(9), RSMo 2000.

⁵⁴ Section 67.1461(1)(10), RSMo 2000.

⁵⁵ Section 67.1461(1)(11), RSMo 2000.

⁵⁶ Section 67.1461(1)(18), RSMo 2000.

⁵⁷ See § 67.1461(1)(24), RSMo 2000.

⁵⁸ See § 67.1461(23), RSMo 2000.

⁵⁹ Section 67.1461(1)(16), RSMo 2000.

⁶⁰ Section 67.146(1)(16)(K), RSMo 2000.

⁶¹ Section 67.1461(2), RSMo 2000.

⁶² Section 67.1461(2)(1), RSMo 2000.

⁶³ Section 67.1461(2)(2), RSMo 2000.

⁶⁴ Section 67.1501(1), RSMo 2000.

⁶⁵ Section 67.1501(3), RSMo 2000.

⁶⁶ Id.

⁶⁷ Section 67.1501(2), RSMo 2000.

⁶⁸ Section 67.1521(9), RSMo 2000 (disposing of the requirements of § 88.812, RSMo 2000, including, inter alia, estimates to be prepared by the city engineer and filed with the municipal clerk, notice in a county newspaper, and public hearings).

⁶⁹ Section 67.1521(1), RSMo 2000.

⁷⁰ Section 67.1521(2), RSMo 2000.

⁷¹ Section 67.1521(6), RSMo 2000.

⁷² Id.

⁷³ Section 67.1521(7), RSMo 2000.

⁷⁴ Section 67.1521(5), RSMo 2000 (allowing the plaintiff in suits for foreclosure of tax liens to recover the amount due together with interest and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees).

⁷⁵ Subject to antecedent existence of priority liens. The Missouri Constitution protects priority status over another lien. Gershman Investment Corp., v. Duckett Creek Sewer Dist., 851 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). Statutes that purport to provide priority lien status may be in violation of Article I, § 13 of the Missouri Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto laws. See id. In order to establish priority status over existing priority liens, the legislature must manifest a clear intent that the statute is to be applied retrospectively. Id.

⁷⁶ Section 67.1531(1), RSMo 2000.

⁷⁷ Section 67.1401(2)(14), RSMo 2000.

⁷⁸ See § 67.1551, RSMo 2000.

⁷⁹ Section 67.1541, RSMo 2000.

⁸⁰ Section 67.1531(2), RSMo 2000.

⁸¹ Section 67.1531(4), RSMo 2000.

⁸² See § 67.1545, RSMo 2000.

⁸³ Sections 144.010-144.525, RSMo 2000.

⁸⁴ "Any sales and use tax imposed pursuant to this section may be imposed at a rate of one-eighth of one percent, one-fourth of one percent, three-eighths of one percent, one-half of one percent or one percent." Section 67.1545(1), RSMo 2000.

⁸⁵ Section 67.1545(1), RSMo 2000.

⁸⁵ See id.

⁸⁷ Section 67.1545(4), RSMo 2000.

⁸⁸ Section 67.1545(8), RSMo 2000.

⁸⁹ Id.

⁹⁰ Id.

⁹¹ Section 67.1545(9), RSMo 2000.

⁹² See § 67.1511, RSMo 2000.

⁹³ Mo. Const. art. III, § 23.

⁹⁴ See § 67.1561, RSMo 2000.

⁹⁵ Id.

⁹⁶ Id.

⁹⁷ See § 67.1461, RSMo 2000.

⁹⁸ See id.

⁹⁹ Section 67.1461(16), RSMo 2000.

¹⁰⁰ Mo. Const. art VI, § 23. See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & Stephen P. Chinn, Transportation Corridors: Shaping and Financing Urbanization Through Integration of Eminent Domain, Zoning and Growth Management Techniques, 55 UMKC L. Rev. 153, 194 (1987).

¹⁰¹ Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Mo. banc 1993).

¹⁰² Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 952 (Merriam-Webster 1987).

¹⁰³ Id.

¹⁰⁴ Id.

¹⁰⁵ Id.

¹⁰⁶ City of St. Louis v. Slupsky, 162 S.W. 155, 157 (Mo. 1913) (addressing whether a back yard constituted a public place under a disturbing the peace ordinance). Later the Court found that although it would normally be considered a public place, a Ramada Inn was not a public place because all of the facilities of the inn, including the restrooms, were reserved for a private party. City of St. Joseph v. Christgen, 513 S.W.2d 458 (Mo. 1974) (reviewing the applicability of a disturbing the peace ordinance to an incident in the restroom of an inn).

¹⁰⁷ Id.

¹⁰⁸ Dayton Township of Cass County v. Brown, 445 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Mo. 1969).

¹⁰⁹ See Vrooman v. City of St. Louis, 88 S.W.2d 189, 191-92 (Mo. banc 1935).

¹¹⁰ Id. at 193 (quoting Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 11 S.W.2d 1045, 1047 (Mo. banc 1928)).

¹¹¹ Id.

¹¹² See e.g., Cape Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 706 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. banc 1986); State ex rel Zoological Bd. of Control v. City of St. Louis, 1 S.W.2d 1021 (Mo. banc 1928) (addressing whether taxes levied to maintain a zoo are for a public purpose, the Court found it important that zoological parks are for the benefit of the public, and that the features of the zoo "may be enjoyed by the general public, regardless of its citizenship." Id. at 1025-26.).

¹¹³ See Cape Motor Lodge, 706 S.W.2d at 209.

¹¹⁴ Id. at 213.

¹¹⁵ Id. (quoting Enright v. Kansas City, 536 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Mo. banc 1976)).

¹¹⁶ Cape Motor Lodge, 706 S.W.2d at 213.

¹¹⁷ Id.

¹¹⁸ Id.

¹¹⁹ Id. at 213-14 (citing Vrooman, 88 S.W.2d at 193).

¹²⁰ Id.

¹²¹ Id. (citing Bowman v. City of Kansas City, 233 S.W.2d 26, 33 (Mo. banc 1950)).

¹²² 233 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. banc 1950).

¹²³ Id. at 27.

¹²⁴ Id. at 32.

¹²⁵ Id. (quoting Kansas City v. Liebi, 252 S.W. 404, 407 (Mo. banc 1923)).

¹²⁶ Id. at 35 (taking judicial notice that off-street parking reduces the hazards to life and property and facilitates the smooth flow of traffic).

¹²⁷ Bowman, 233 S.W.2d at 33.

¹²⁸ White, Acquisition and Use of Municipal Property at § 8.2.

¹²⁹ Robert B. Fizzell, Jr., Municipal Revenues, Taxation and Expenditures, I Mo. Local Government Law § 5.20 (MoBar 2nd ed. 1986).

¹³⁰ City of St. Louis v. Pope, 126 S.W.2d 1201, 1203 (Mo. banc 1939).

¹³¹ See id.

¹³² Id. at 1208.

¹³³ Id. at 1209.

¹³⁴ Id. at 1214.

¹³⁵ Pope, 126 S.W.2d at 1214 (noting quotation of McQuillan's in appellant brief).

¹³⁶ Id.

¹³⁷ Id.

¹³⁸ Id.

¹³⁹ Kansas City to Use of Delargy v. Wells Bros. Constr. Co., 54 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. App. W.D. 1932) (holding that because a contract required by city ordinance did not exist, the city had not authorized a public improvement).

¹⁴⁰ Id. at 452.

¹⁴¹ Id.

¹⁴² See Webster's, note 100.

¹⁴³ 54 S.W.2d at 452; See also James H. White, Acquisition and Use of Municipal Property, in Mo. Local Government Law § 8.2 (MoBar 2nd ed. 1986).

¹⁴⁴ Subject, of course, to Art. VI, § 23 of the Missouri Constitution.

¹⁴⁵ See Siegel v. City of Branson, 952 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997); Halbruegger v. City of St. Louis, 262 S.W. 379, 381 (Mo. banc 1924).

¹⁴⁶ Siegel, 952 S.W.2d at 296.

¹⁴⁷ See id.

¹⁴⁸ Janet McNichols, Council Weighs Big Bend, Elm Redevelopment; Special Business District is Likely to Gain Support, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 17, 1998, at 1 (quoting Milton Matthews, city manager, Webster Groves, Missouri).

¹⁴⁹ See § 67.1411(3), RSMo 2000.

¹⁵⁰ See § 67.1461, RSMo 2000.

¹⁵¹ Id.

¹⁵² Mo. Const. art. 10, § 3.

¹⁵³ U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has extended the power to regulate commerce among the several states to matters that merely affect interstate commerce, even though the activity is purely intrastate in nature. See e.g. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).

¹⁵⁴ See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 207-08 (1983) (holding that executive order by the mayor of Boston requiring that half of employees on construction projects funded by the city be Boston residents did not violate the "Commerce Clause" because the city was a market participant).

¹⁵⁵ Red River Service Corp. v. City of Minot, N.D., 146 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that City of Minot could constitutionally restrict use of its landfill to residents of the city only); Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3rd Cir. 1989) (holding that county could charge differential rates for use of a landfill based on where the waste was generated).

¹⁵⁶ Section 70.220, RSMo 2000 (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁷ Logan v. Town of Somerset, 314 A.2d 436, 439 (Md. 1974).

¹⁵⁸ Id. at 440.

¹⁵⁹ Id.

¹⁶⁰ People v. Kraushaar, 89 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1949).

¹⁶¹ Id. at 689 (quoting McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (affirming the judgment of a lower court that upheld a state law providing for criminal penalties against out of state residents who planted oysters in specific Virginia rivers).

¹⁶² See id. Residents of two neighboring towns were also able to park at the lower resident's fee.

¹⁶³ Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 352 A.2d 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).

¹⁶⁴ Id. at 608.

¹⁶⁵ Id.

¹⁶⁶ See id.

¹⁶⁷ Matter of Schrieber v. City of Rye, 278 N.Y.S.2d 527 (N.Y. 1967).

¹⁶⁸ See id. at 528.

¹⁶⁹ See id.

¹⁷⁰ See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, Inc., 26 S.W.3d at 228.

¹⁷¹ Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1231 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added)).

¹⁷² See § 67.1461(2), RSMo 2000.

¹⁷³ See Edith Cunnane, When Neighborhoods Help Themselves, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 7, 1999 at B7; Strange Bedfellows, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 15, 2001 at B6; Improvement District is Set for South Grand Businesses, Local Briefs Column, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 15, 2001 at C5; Mark Schlinkmann, Downtown Improvement Program Faces Uncertain Future After Ruling to Void Fees, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 4, 2001, News section at 8.