Missouri's One and Only Court of Appeals
Ryan Westhoff*I. Introduction
Before 1970, the intermediate appellate courts in Missouri consisted of three separate courts: the St. Louis Court of Appeals, created in 1875; the Kansas City Court of Appeals, created in 1884; and the Springfield Court of Appeals, created in 1909.1 In 1970, Missouri voters elected to amend Article V of the Missouri Constitution and drastically reform the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Missouri and the intermediate appellate courts.2 On January 1, 1972, the amendment became effective and transferred general appellate jurisdiction of nearly all cases from the Supreme Court to the newly-created Missouri Court of Appeals.3 This appellate structure has been in effect for 36 years now without significant criticism, and it presumably is in place for many years to come. The issues presented in this article are whether members of Missouri’s legal community have lost sight of the intentions of the 1970 amendment to the Constitution and whether a decision from one of the three districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals should strictly bind a decision from another district.
II. Background
The reformation of the Missouri appellate court system effectively consolidated the three previously separate appellate courts into a single appellate court. Before the 1970 amendment, Article V, § 1 read, “The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, circuit courts, probate courts, the St. Louis courts of criminal correction, the existing courts of common pleas, magistrates courts, and municipal corporation courts.”4 Presently, Article V, § 1 of the Missouri Constitution states, “The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, a court of appeals consisting of districts as prescribed by law, and circuit courts.”5 By changing the language of the constitutional provision from “courts of appeals” to “a court of appeals,” the intent was to recognize one appellate court. Furthermore, the current § 13 of the same article similarly recognizes just one Court of Appeals by providing, “The court of appeals shall be organized into separate districts, the number, not less than three, geographical boundaries, and territorial jurisdiction of which shall be prescribed by law….”6 Pursuant to the preceding constitutional authority, the Missouri Legislature also recognized a single Court of Appeals in 1979 when it enacted the following statute establishing three separate districts: “The court of appeals shall consist of three districts to be known as the eastern, southern and western districts.”7 Therefore, under the Missouri Constitution, as amended in 1970, and the current revised statutes, Missouri’s intermediate appellate structure includes a consolidated “single Court of Appeals consisting of three districts.”8
III. The Problem
In light of the amendment to the constitution, the question presented by this article is how did the transformation from three separate intermediate appellate courts into a single court with three districts affect the development of precedential authority in the Missouri? That is, did the 1970 restructuring actually do anything to the jurisdictional powers of the intermediate appellate courts besides grant them general appellate jurisdiction?9 The phrase, “The court of appeals,” suggests that the appellate court restructuring abandoned the operation of the appellate courts as three separate and distinct jurisdictional entities. In other words, it implies that the administration of the court, along with the authority of the judges to render opinions, are consolidated under one jurisdictional umbrella, with geography and territorial boundaries serving as the only distinction between the three districts.10 However, it appears there is a significant trend to the contrary.
Under Article V, § 2 of the Missouri Constitution, the Supreme Court is the highest authority in the state, and its decisions are binding on the Court of Appeals and all other courts within the state.11 The Court of Appeals is also bound to follow its own precedential decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis.12 The doctrine of “stare decisis is the cornerstone of [Missouri’s] legal system.”13 Under this doctrine, “a court follows earlier judicial decisions when the same point arises again in litigation.”14 The identification of similar points or issues in earlier decisions, rather than similarity of facts, gives rise to authoritative precedent until a higher authority overrules it.15 Furthermore, a court’s disagreement with the analysis of an earlier decision is insufficient to violate stare decisis, because courts “should not lightly disturb . . . precedent.”16 The policy behind the doctrine is the promotion of stability in the legal system by encouraging adherence to authoritative precedent.17
Prior to 1970, the law on stare decisis and the impact of precedential authority within the intermediate appellate courts was relatively settled. In 1967, the St. Louis Court of Appeals held in Forsthove v. Hardware Dealers, “If the rule finds no support in the Supreme Court decisions and only finds support in the decisions of the Courts of Appeal of this state, then the rule is not binding on this court and, at most, these decisions are only persuasive.”18 This pre-1970 case firmly reflected the common law view in Missouri that an opinion in one appellate court did not bind another, even if it was on point.19 The court in the Forsthove case took notice of an opinion from the Springfield Court of Appeals, and simply decided not to follow its holding.20 While this case supports the position that the three districts are not binding on one another, we are left with uncertainty as to whether Forsthove is still good law after the constitutional amendment in 1970. In fact, there is “no decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri discussing the effect of a conflict between holdings of two districts of the court of appeals, either upon each district or on trial courts located in or outside the respective territorial jurisdictions of the two districts.”21
While the adherence to precedent is not absolute in instances where facts of a case are distinguishable, there are several opinions from the Court of Appeals that flatly reject precedent arising out of other districts when the facts are not significantly distinguishable.22 For example, in Whoberry v. Whoberry, the Court of Appeals-Southern District “simply disagree[d] with the eastern district” that, under § 452.402, RSMo, grandparent visitation may only be awarded when it is “minimally intrusive.”23 Two years later, the Court of Appeals-Western District recognized the Southern District’s disagreement with the Eastern District precedent, and opted to follow the Eastern District.24
In State v. Wilkerson, the Western District also disregarded precedent from another district by stating, “Both cases cited would seem to support respondent’s contention that a written waiver which does not include all six elements required by § 600.051.1 does not constitute plain error. However, we decline to follow these holdings of the Eastern District.”25 Furthermore, in Harper v. Director of Revenue, the Court of Appeals-Western District plainly stated that they “decline[d] to follow the Clare and Timko opinions from the Eastern District.”26 Similarly, the same court in another case “decline[d] to follow the Eastern District’s holdings in Duing and Hansen,” and adopted a holding to the contrary.27
While the preceding decisions are examples where judges have explicitly recognized a split among the districts in their opinions, there are commentators who have noted instances where splits have resulted from opinions that fail to recognize precedent from another district.28 There are also a few circumstances where the parties in litigation have argued that courts are not bound by precedent from other districts. For instance, in Huff v. Director of Revenue, the court noted, “Respondent claims we are not bound to follow Boyd because it was issued by the Western District and is unsound. As the circuit court’s decision is against the weight of the evidence, however, we need not reach this issue.”29 Another party made a similar argument in Hansen v. Hansen, and the opinion noted, “Respondent’s former husband argues that we are not bound by the decisions of the Western District.”30
Another related question to the issue is whether the lower circuit courts within the appellate districts are bound to follow the appellate decisions from other districts. One opinion quotes Corpus Juris Secundum in a footnote, which seems to answer this very question:
Where there are several appellate courts or divisions with coordinate jurisdiction, an inferior court in one division or district should follow the decisions of the appellate court of another division or district as to a matter which has not been passed upon by its own appellate court; but in case there is a conflict between the decisions of such courts or divisions an inferior court should follow the decisions of its own appellate court. In case there is a conflict between the decisions of several appellate courts or divisions and the question has not been determined in another division, an inferior court of the latter division is free to follow whichever view of the other divisions seems more correct.31
Despite going to the heart of the issue, the preceding quote is not binding law because it is merely dicta, and the appellate court transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri.32
In certain circumstances, appellate courts transfer cases to the Supreme Court after rendering a conflicting decision with another district of the Court of Appeals.33 After transfer, the appellate courts do not release the case for publication in the reporters, and no split of precedential authority remains.34 However, a transfer to the Supreme Court, as provided in Rule 83.02, is not mandatory because a party must apply to the Court of Appeals for transfer, or the court may transfer on its own motion.35 The Court of Appeals has full discretion to order the transfer only if it determines that the case is “of the general interest or importance of a question involved in the case or for the purpose of reexamining existing law.”36 An example of the application of Rule 83.02 occurred when Judge Crane of the Eastern District held, “[W]e recognize the conflict between the Eastern and Western districts on whether ‘bodily injury’ as defined in the policy is ambiguous and includes mental suffering. Because of the importance of this question we transfer this case to the Missouri Supreme Court.”37
Next, under Rule 83.03, a case heard in the Court of Appeals may also be transferred if (1) a “judge dissents from a majority opinion” and (2) certifies that the opinion is “contrary to any previous decision of an appellate court of this state.”38 Therefore, if neither of these occurs, then there is no mandatory transfer of an opinion to the Supreme Court, even when an opinion is contrary to a previous decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals. The last resort under the rules is Supreme Court Rule 83.04. Under this rule, a party may apply directly to the Supreme Court of Missouri for transfer, but only if a denial of transfer occurred under Rule 83.02.39 If a party does not apply for transfer under either Rule 83.02 or 83.04, then a split may occur, because the Supreme Court will not take the case sua sponte, and no rule provides for mandatory transfer.40
In addition to the Supreme Court rules cited above, Supreme Court Operating Rule 22.01 requires a panel opinion from one district of the Court of Appeals that conflicts with a prior opinion from any district of the Court of Appeals to be reviewed by the judges of the conflicting district en banc.41 While the rule tends to keep panels from freely disagreeing with one another, it essentially grants each district the power to reject the opinions from other districts as long as the appellate judges of that particular district decide the case en banc. This operating rule has coincidently illustrated yet another instance where the three districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals disagree with one another. Both the Eastern District and the Western District have local rules in accordance with Supreme Court Operating Rule 22.01, but the Southern District has no such local rule.42
None of the preceding rules provide for a mandatory transfer to the Supreme Court. If a district of the Court of Appeals issues an opinion with no dissent, no applications to transfer by the parties, and no sua sponte motion by the court itself to transfer, then no rule requires mandatory transfer to resolve a conflict with another district; therefore, creating the splits of decisions among the districts as illustrated above.
After further research, many other instances were discovered where various authorities implicitly recognize permissible splits of decisions among the three districts of the Court of Appeals, and suggest that the districts are completely separate for jurisdictional purposes. First, if you read the History of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District on the Missouri Courts website, you will find the statement that “the existing courts were incorporated into one…but each district must operate separately as it had in the past….”43 The statement is ambiguous as to whether the word “operate” is limited to simple administrative operations in the three separate court buildings in three separate cities, or if it goes further to suggest that each court must continue to act as its own jurisdictional entity after the 1970 amendment.
Second, the Supreme Court rules also suggest that the three districts are three independent appellate jurisdictions. For instance, Rule 84.15 states, “Unless pursuant to its own rules a district of the Court of Appeals determines to hear a case en banc, the decision of a majority of a division of that district shall be the decision of the district.”44 The Supreme Court chose to use the phrase “decision of the district,” when it could have used the phrase “decision of the Court of Appeals.” This implies that a decision is exclusively the opinion of the single district, rather than the Court of Appeals as a whole.
The Missouri Constitution fails to grant each district of the Court of Appeals explicit constitutional authority to adopt its own local court rules.45 Nevertheless, Supreme Court Rule 50.01 grants the districts rule-making authority by stating, “The Missouri Court of Appeals, districts thereof…may make rules governing the administration of judicial business….”46 By using the words “districts thereof,” the Supreme Court granted each district the power to make its own rules, rather than limiting the rule-making power to the Court of Appeals as a single entity.
Lastly, there has been a significant trend in the past few decades for judges to distinguish between the three appellate districts when they cite to decisions from the Court of Appeals in opinions. For example, rather than referring to a 2008 opinion handed down by the Western District as “Mo. App. 2008,” many case citations read, “Mo. App. W.D. 2008.” The current edition of The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation specifically states that the former court abbreviation is proper method for citing to the Court of Appeals.47 The Bluebook also provides that a citation should not “indicate the department or district in citing decisions of intermediate state courts unless that information is of particular relevance.”48 However, the Association of Legal Writing Directors’ ALWD Citation Manual: A Professional System of Citation, another standard for legal citation, changed its rule to include the district designation in case citations with the release of a third edition of its citation manual in 2006.49 It is unclear what prompted the change, but it may reflect the fact that many recent opinions indicate districts in citing decisions, even when there is no relevant reason to do so.50 My research shows that opinions did not indicate the district designation in case citations prior to 1980, and subsequent opinions indicated the district designation in citations increasingly thereafter.51 This trend suggests that opinion writers consider noting that a case originates from a particular district of the Missouri Court of Appeals to be of some distinguishing importance. Moreover, the practice of including the district designation in case citations is another example of how the districts are viewed by courts as separate jurisdictional entities, rather than as a part of one Court of Appeals.
After expanding on this analysis and looking at the issue as addressed in courts outside of Missouri, Illinois appears to follow the same trend developing in Missouri. Much like the Missouri Constitution, the Illinois Constitution provides, “The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts.”52 Also similar to Missouri, Illinois divides its single Appellate Court into five districts rather than five separate appellate courts.53 However, under Illinois law, “one district of the State appellate court is not always bound to follow the decisions of other districts.”54 Expanding on this rule, Illinois courts have taken the position that appellate court rulings from any district bind the lower circuit courts throughout the state, unless the rulings are contrary to the ruling of the district in which the lower court sits.55 In other words, the districts of the appellate court do not bind one another, and circuit courts are bound by the rulings of other districts if those rulings are consistent with those within their own district.56
Based on the foregoing analysis, one might conclude that the three districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals are a part of one court for purposes of constitutional formality, but, in reality, they are three separate jurisdictional entities free to disagree with one another until resolved by the Supreme Court of Missouri. While courts in Illinois have firmly established their position on this issue, it does not necessarily mean that Missouri should fall in line. It can be argued that this line of reasoning is improper, and the practice should discontinue in order to avoid the problem the 1970 amendment to the Constitution of Missouri intended to rectify.
IV. Original Intent
Under a plain language interpretation of the constitution, a change from “courts of appeals” to “a court of appeal” creates a unified Court of Appeals, but the effect on the courts’ treatment of precedent can only be gleaned from a look at the original intent behind the change.57 In 1968, during the debate over the reformation of the judicial system, the Honorable Fred L. Howard wrote an article entitled, The Need For a Unified Court System in Missouri.58 In that article he noted the proposed change from three separate courts of appeal to one court of appeals and reasoned, “With this unified court structure all within one single and simplified system of judicial authority, it will for the first time be possible to weld the courts of Missouri into a flexible, integrated organization wherein each court complements and supplements the others and they all work together as one entity.”59
During the same year, Professor Charles Blackmar, prior to his term as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Missouri, argued that one of the two “function[s] of the appellate system is that of developing and harmonizing the law of the state.”60 At the time, Blackmar was also on the Special Study Committee on Judicial Revision appointed by the president of The Missouri Bar (Loyd E. Roberts) in 1964.61 Blackmar argued that, under a unified intermediate appellate court with multiple districts, “[T]here should be free transfer of judges among appeals districts.”62 Reflecting Blackmar’s position, one version of the proposed judicial article for the Constitution, in fact, contained a provision allowing for the transfer of judges among appeals districts.63 The free transfer of judges suggests an intention of creating a system where judges in the multiple districts are to conduct themselves as members of a single court, rather than as members of multiple courts. This implies that the judges, as potential acting members of other districts, should treat opinions from the other districts the same as decisions rendered by another panel of judges within their home district. However, the transfer provision was not included in the final amendment as adopted by Missouri voters.64 Despite omitting the transfer provision, the intent of the amendment was to unify the appellate courts, and any treatment of the districts as separate judicial entities is inconsistent with the original purpose of the amendment to Article V.
V. The Solution
A single Court of Appeals should be structured as one court handing down decisions reflecting a uniform body of law, and the primary reason for why the Court of Appeals should adopt this policy is consistency. Under an assumed system of three courts with the power to disagree with one another, each district court inevitably adopts its own body of law within the confines of Supreme Court rulings, and effectively creates three separate sub-jurisdictions within Missouri. The average person understands that, when they cross into another state, they are subject to the different laws of another jurisdiction. However, the average person likely has no clue when they cross territorial boundaries from one appellate district to another. Therefore, the law should be consistent from one district to another. How should one conduct oneself and adhere to the law if there is no consistent law by which to abide?
Consistency of appellate decisions also creates a reasonable level of certainty for the lower circuit courts. For instance, if a circuit court is within an appellate district that has yet to rule on a particular point of law, then the circuit judge has reasonable certainty that the appellate court will not overrule her if she adheres to precedent set by an appellate court located in one of the other districts. Consistency of opinion at the intermediate appellate level is good policy for the state of Missouri, and the preceding points illustrate why the districts of the Court of Appeals should strictly adhere to this policy.
The problem of conflicts among appellate courts is a topic debated at the federal level as well.65 Inconsistency of opinions in the federal appellate circuits leads many authors to advocate for a change in the way the court is structured.66 Instead of one appellate court, the federal system consists of multiple circuits throughout the United States, each with its own court of appeals.67 Congress established this system with the Evarts Act of 1891, which never addressed the issue of splits of authority among the different circuit courts.68 One author suggests that the omission was largely due, in part, to long drawn out debates resulting in the acceptance of any kind of compromise to pass the act.69 Once established, the system facilitated independent examination of federal law among each circuit, and the practice was eventually encouraged by the United States Supreme Court.70 Unfortunately, the ever-increasing volume of cases has led to substantial conflicts among the circuits, and the Supreme Court has not been able to resolve a large number of these inconsistent decisions.71 In fact, the problem is so bad that the Judicial Conference of the United States has begun to try to find other ways to resolve the splits among the circuits.72
One solution to the problem is a unified court of appeals practicing national stare decisis.73 More specifically, one advocate of this solution proposes, “The nine-judge divisions would not be separate, autonomous courts of appeals as they are today, but would instead be part of one unified court, the United States Court of Appeals. The judges would think of themselves as members of a court that issues opinions on uniform, national law. By definition, there would no longer be inter-circuit conflicts because there no longer would be circuits.”74 Under this system, the appellate system would become a true federal organization, rather than regional, and the Supreme Court would be relieved to focus on matters of more particular national importance.75
Another author suggests that the solution to this problem is simply to recognize that this is “more of an aesthetic concern for law professors” than a problem at all.76 He argues that nationwide companies must now, and will always have to, deal with a wide range of conflicting state law in the various states, so handling the differences in federal law based on regional conflicts among the circuits is essentially the same.77 This argument, however, is not persuasive if we apply it to the issue of conflicting appellate decisions at the state level. Companies that conduct their business statewide in Missouri should not have to figure out how to handle geographic differences in the substantive state law among the three districts. This burden on companies only leads to unnecessary confusion and inefficiency at the state level.
Based on the foregoing, I propose that the Court of Appeals operate much like a single circuit court at the federal level. Under this system, all appellate judges of the Court of Appeals are members of the same court, regardless of the district in which they are located. Much like a panel of federal circuit court judges who meet in different cities throughout the circuit, the judges of the Missouri Court of Appeals should meet in panels in their respective cities throughout Missouri, as they already do.78 One panel, however, shall not attempt to overrule precedent set by another panel, regardless of the district in which each panel sits – much like the practice in the federal circuit courts.79 Furthermore, one district sitting en banc should not have the power to render a decision which conflicts with a decision of another district. Lastly, the federal circuit courts sometimes decide that they want to overrule a prior panel decision of the court, but overruling requires the circuit court to meet en banc.80 Requiring all of the judges of the Missouri Court of Appeals to meet en banc is probably not the best solution; therefore, I suggest that the present system of transferring unresolved issues to the Supreme Court is an effective method for addressing conflicts where panels or districts cannot agree with one another.81 To ensure that the transfer takes place, I propose that the Supreme Court modify its rules to make application for transfer mandatory in all cases where one panel or district sitting en banc disagrees with an opinion from another district of the Court of Appeals. In cases where the Supreme Court denies the transfer, then the majority opinion shall be consistent with prior decisions of the Court of Appeals regardless of the district from which the prior decision arose.
This proposed system does not require an extensive restructuring of the Missouri Court of Appeals or an overhaul in the way the courts already practice. It merely advocates a change in the way Missouri judges and lawyers view the development of precedent in the intermediate appellate court that is more congruent with the 1970 amendment of the Missouri Constitution. Additionally, the change will provide for more certainty and consistency, and it will simultaneously reduce any confusion that arises when districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals split.
Footnotes
* Ryan Westhoff is an in-house attorney with HNTB Federal Services, an engineering, architecture, and planning firm that provides design services exclusively for federal projects. His primary focus is on construction contracting and compliance with federal regulations. He is a 2008 graduate of the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law and holds an architecture degree from Kansas State University. Ryan is a member of the Missouri Bar.
1 Official Manual, State of Missouri 2007-2008, 249 (Krista S. Myer ed.,) available at http://www.sos.mo.gov/BlueBook/2007-2008/5_Jud.pdf#p249.
2 Joy I. Hannel, Celebrating 125 Years of Justice: A History of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, 1876-2001, http://www.courts.mo.gov/file/OPO%20History_3.pdf.
3 Id. ; Official Manual, State of Missouri 2007-2008, 249.
4 Mo. Const. of 1945, art. V, § 1 (emphasis added).
5 Mo. Const. art. V, § 1 (emphasis added).
6 Mo. Const. art. V, § 13 (emphasis added).
7 Section 477.040, RSMo. 2000 (emphasis added).
8 Official Manual, State of Missouri 2007-2008, 249.
9 Id.; Hannel, note 2.
10 Sections 477.050, 477.060, 477.070, RSMo. 2000.
11 Mo. Const. art. V, § 2.
12 Tillman v. Cam’s Trucking, Inc., 20 S.W.3d 579, 584 n.9 (Mo. App. S.D. 2000).
13 M & H Enters. v. Tri-State Delta Chems., Inc., 984 S.W.2d 175, 178 n.3 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998) (emphasis in original).
14 Tillman, 20 S.W.3d at 584 n.9.
15 M & H Enterprises, 984 S.W.2d at 178 n.3.
16 Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 71-72 (Mo. banc 1998).
17 Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 156 S.W.3d 333, 334-35 (Mo. banc 2005).
18 Forsthove v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 208, 213 (Mo. App. E.D. 1967).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Williams v. State, No. 16522, 1990 WL 61911, at 7 FN2 (Mo. App. S.D. 1990).
22 Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 156 S.W.3d 333, 334-35 (Mo. banc 2005).
23 977 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998).
24 Hampton v. Hampton, 17 S.W.3d 599, 605 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000).
25 948 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997).
26 118 S.W.3d 195, 202 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003).
27 Carr v. Dir. of Revenue, 95 S.W.3d 121, 129 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002).
28 21 Jack Cochran & Nancy Beardsley-Garris, Missouri Practice § 4.4 n.1 (2d ed. 2007); Bradley D. Kuhlman, Comment, Prior Misconduct Evidence in Missouri, 58 Mo.L.Rev. 907, 942 (Fall 1993).
29 778 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989).
30 734 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987).
31 Williams v. State, No. 16522, 1990 WL 61911, at 7 FN2 (Mo. App. S.D. 1990).
32 Williams v. State, 800 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. banc 1990).
33 Rules 83.02, 83.03, and 83.04; see Ivy v. Hawk, 878 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Mo. banc 1994).
34 See e.g., Missouri Coalition For The Environment v. Herrmann, No. ED 81790, 2003 WL 21488873 at *6 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Verdoorn v. Dir. of Revenue, No. WD 60784, 2002 WL 31452804 at *4 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002).
35 Rule 83.02. “A case…may be transferred…Transfer may be ordered…” Id. (emphasis added).
36 Rule 83.02.
37 Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Leiendecker, No. 71213, 1997 WL 434801 at *9 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997).
38 Rule 83.03; Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.
39 Rule 83.04.
40 Id.
4117 Daniel P. Card & Mark G. Arnold, Missouri Practice § 83.03-1 (3d ed. 2004).
42 Id. “In accordance with S. Ct. Operating Rule 22.01, any division opinion of this court that chooses not to follow a previous decision of a Missouri appellate court shall be reviewed en banc. This Court shall either 1) rehear the case en banc, or 2) enter an order stating: ‘The Court en banc has reviewed this opinion.’ A copy of the order signed by the chief judge shall be placed in the case file and noted (by footnote or otherwise) within the opinion.” Mo. App. E.D. Local Rule 403, available at www.courts.mo.gov/page.asp?id=817 (last visited October 31, 2008). “In accordance with Supreme Court Operating Rule 22.01, any division opinion that chooses not to follow a previous decision of a Missouri appellate court shall be reviewed en banc. This court shall either (1) rehear the case en banc or (2) enter an order stating that ‘this opinion has been reviewed an [sic] approved by order of the court en banc.’ A copy of the order, signed by the chief judge, shall be placed in the case file.” Mo. App. W.D. Local Rule XXXI available at www.courts.mo.gov/page.asp?id=1152 (last visited October 31, 2008).
43 History of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District available at www.courts.mo.gov/page.asp?id=123 (last visited October 31, 2008).
44 Rule 84.15 (emphasis added).
45 The Supreme Court has rule-making authority under Article V, § 5 of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit courts have rule-making authority under Article V, § 15 of the Missouri Constitution.
46 Rule 50.01 (emphasis added).
47 The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 216 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
48 Id. at 90. (Rule 10.4(b)).
49 ALWD Citation Manual: A Professional System of Citation 380 (Association of Legal Writing Directors & Darby Dickerson, eds., 2006); cf. ALWD Citation Manual: A Professional System of Citation 354 (Association of Legal Writing Directors & Darby Dickerson, eds., 2003).
50 See e.g., Blue Pool Farms v. Basler, 239 S.W.3d 687 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007); UMB Bank v. City of Kansas City, 238 S.W.3d 228 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007). There are also some examples of decisions where the indication of the district was not included court abbreviation. See e.g., Lawrence v. State, 209 S.W.3d 515 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006).
51 Conclusion derived via a Westlaw terms and connectors search for terms (“mo.app. w.d.” “mo.app. e.d.” “mo.app. s.d.”) & dates (before 1981). The earliest district designation in a case citation I found in a Missouri opinion was on March 18, 1980. Moses v. Dawson, 596 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).
52 Ill. Const. art. 6, § 1 (emphasis added).
53 Ill. Const. art. 6, § 2; Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1996).
54 In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 604 N.E.2d 929, 938 (Ill. 1992).
55 People v. Collings, 420 N.E.2d 203, 206 (Ill. Appt. Ct. 1981).
56 Id.
57 State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 513 (Mo. banc 1986).
58 Fred L. Howard, The Need For a Unified Court System in Missouri, 24 J. Mo. Bar 433 (1968).
59 Id. at 436.
60 Charles B. Blackmar, Missouri’s Appellate System: Is It Adequate For the 21st Century?, 24 J. Mo. Bar. 380 (1968).
61 Hiram H. Lesar, Improving the Administration of Justice: Proposed Revision of the Judicial Article (V) of the Missouri Constitution, 23 J. Mo. Bar. 337, 340 n.1 (1967)
62 Blackmar at 384.
63 Lesar at 343.
64 Adopted August 4, 1970 (For – 320,047; Against – 237,169). Laws of Missouri Passed at the Regular, First, Second, Third and Fourth Extra Sessions of the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly (James C. Kirkpatrick, Secretary of State, 1969).
65 20 Charles Alan Wright & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3 (2008); see also Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. of Chi. L.R. 603, 628-30 (1989); Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decision, 70 Tenn. L.R. 605 (2003).
66 Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Disconnecting the Overloaded Circuits – A Plug for a Unified Court of Appeals, 39 St. Louis. U. L.J. 455, 457 (1995).
67 28 U.S.C. § 43.
68 Weis at 459
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 460; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Looking Ahead: October Term 2007, 2006 – 2007 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 335, 351-52.
72 Reynolds, note 71.
73 Weis at 464-65.
74 Id. at 466.
75 Id.
76 Caleb Nelson, Reviews, Statutory Interpretation and Decision Theory, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 329, 359 (2007)
77 Id.
78 This includes, but is not limited to Kansas City, St. Louis, and Springfield.
79 Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union v. N.L.R.B., 260 F.2d 736, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Hamilton v. Standard Ins. Co., 516 F.3d 1069, 1073 (8th Cir. 2008); Dahl v. Akin, 630 F.2d 277, 282 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980); Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1975); United States. v. Jenson, 450 F.2d 1258, 1264 (9th Cir. 1971); Habich v. City of Dearborn, 331 F.3d 524, 530 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003); Rogers v. United States., 281 F.3d 1108, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002).
80 Doe, 529 F.2d at 642.
81 See note 33.